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All these are in a purely advisory capacity. Each Unit of Cavalry, Artillery, and Infantry has a Liaison Officer, and there is also a Liaison Officer for Transport. These Officers also are in an advisory, not executive capacity. The Headquarters Staff is as follows:-

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The future development of the Iraq Army is governed rather by the limitations imposed by financial stringency than by the requirements of the country.

The area of country, for which it is desired that the 'Iraq Army should accept responsibility, has been laid down for 1922, as being the right bank of the Tigris from the Northern frontier as far as Baghdad and the Euphrates as far as its junction with the Tigris on both banks.

The minimum force requisite to discharge these responsibilities is as follows:

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The force outlined above is estimated to cost, with the necessary services, a sum of 115 lakhs. No provision is contained in the present programme for taking over the defence of Kurdish and Persian Frontiers nor for the garrisoning, for purposes of internal security, of the areas between the Tigris and the Eastern Frontier of 'Iraq.

To raise a force on the present lines adequate to undertake these additional tasks will necessitate an expenditure of more than another hundred lakhs. Such a sum is beyond the financial resources of the country. If, therefore, an expansion of this nature is needed it is evident that it cannot be attempted on the present system. The only possible remedy appears to be some form of compulsory service, and the question of its introduction is not one that can be deferred very much longer.

Amongst other proposals for the development of the Army in the year 1922-23 it is desired to send five English speaking officers of the 'Iraq Army to England during the year to undergo courses of instruction in staff duties, Musketry, Artillery and Engineering. The size of the Army and the resources of the country do not warrant the cost of maintaining establishments for higher military training in 'Iraq, but by sending to England every year a small number of officers to study various branches, it is hoped to have in a few years a staff of officers of the 'Iraq Army competent to instruct and train the other officers of the Army.

Regarding the 'Iraq Military College, it is proposed after Ramadhan to start special Musketry and Signalling classes for officers and N.-C.O.'s, in addition to the training of Officer Cadets in general Military subjects. Courses in Machine-Gun training, Cavalry courses, etc., etc., will be held as the need arises.

It is hoped during the coming financial year to effect the translation of the remaining portions of the principal text books of the three Arms of he Service.

V.-'IRAQ LEVIES.

1. THE LEVY IN 1920.

The birth of the Levy dates back to the period when the British Forces were making the final advances upon Baghdad. In those days and for some considerable period afterwards, the Levy consisted of Shabanahs who acted as irregular military police, taking their orders from Political Officers. Gradually these Shabanahs were clothed in uniform, equipped, and formed into small bodies, under command of British Officers: at this stage their role differed little from that originally allotted to them.

By October, 1920. Shabanahs had undergone a considerable change. Company and Squadron organization was being introduced. The numbers had reached a total of 2,000. The good work done by the Shabanahs in the early and difficult days must not be overlooked when reviewing the more brilliant achievements of the Levy in recent times. In October 1921, the Levy was definitely made responsible for the maintenance of internal order in certain areas in Iraq. This responsibility stretched from Mosul to Qurnah on the Tigris, and from Ba'quba to Nasiriyah on the Euphrates.

Official despatches and the honours gained testify to the excellent work performed by Levies during the disturbances in 1920. During this anxious period Levies were also employed as guides, scouts for columns, and in active operations with British Troops. The casualty roll during the year ending September, 1921, of 107, which contained the large proportion of 73 killed, indicates the reality of the fighting in which they were engaged. The award of 15 medals of the British Empire for gallantry in the field is significant of the high opinion of their fighting value held by the British Column Commanders under whom they served.

2. THE LEVY AFTER THE CAIRO CONFERENCE.

The Levy in 1920, consisted for the greater part of men of Arab nationality. The summer of 1921 saw further responsibilities being vested in the Levies. The decision of the Cairo Conference necessitated a considerable increase. originally estimated to make a a total of 7.500. Responsibilities extended to Kurdistan in addition to 'Iraq. The strength of the force at this period numbered 4,000 rank and file. Though a certain small proportion. of Kurds had been introduced into the Levy, and the Kurdish Levy in Sulaimani had been incorporated, it was not till the end of August that the raising of Assyrian Units was begun and a Christian element introduced.

During the autumn of 1921, the decision arrived at during the Cairo Relief of Imperial Conference in March took effect, with the flow of Imperial Troops out of the troops. country. Levies were now called upon to shoulder still heavier responsibilities in finding reliefs on the Kurdish frontiers for the imperial Troops. In actual fact, Levies, of a strength approximately a weak Brigade, without artillery or automatic fire, were called upon to relieve what approached very nearly to two weak Divisions. The manner in which they fulfilled their obligations is shewn by the fact that the frontier is still intact and that no serious tribal rising has occurred. The casualty roll is eloquent of the readiness with which they responded when called upon to assert Government authority by force of arms. The very successful operation against Batas, in September 1921, had political effects of a far reaching nature and did much to curb the activities of the truculent Kurds of the Rawanduz area.

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Towards the end of December, 1921, a patrol of Levies was treacherously Surchi ambushed by Shaikh 'Ubaidullah of the Surchi to the East of Arbil and suffered Operations. severe casualties. The prestige of the Government was at stake and punitive action was imperative. As no Imperial troops were available, it became necessary to use the Levies in their new role as a military force. Accordingly, Christmas Day, a force of Levies 1,000 strong, under the command of the Inspector-General, moved out against the tribes who were holding a strong position on the South side of the Rawanduz Gorge. The strength of the tribes was estimated at approximately 600 rifles and they were supported, albeit somewhat halfheartedly, by 200 Turkish troops, eight machine-guns and one gun. In spite of the fact that all of the Levies employed were by no means fully trained and that there was a decided shortage of British officers, the operations, which unfortu nately involved the loss of two British officers, were brought to a successful conclusion in two days. The Turkish troops took no part in the operations after the first day's fighting and retired to Rawanduz. The tribesmen, after putting up a stout resistance, were driven from their hills and several of their villages burned. Their casualties were reported as twenty killed and seventy wounded and a number of flocks and herds were captured. A march through the country of a tribe whose loyalty to the Government was very much in question concluded the operations which undoubtedly had a very great effect in shattering the prestige of the small Turkish garrison in the Rawanduz area. The successful result of this first attempt of the Levies to act as an organized military body in conjunction with the Royal Air Force, an attempt which was necessarily undertaken at a time when the training and equipment of the Levies was still incomplete, holds out excellent promise for their success in the future.

Training.

In September, 1921. two senior and experienced officers arrived and Organization and assumed the role of Inspector-General and Deputy Inspector-General of the Levy Force. Steps were gradually taken to transfer the weight of the Levies from the Valley of the Euphrates to Kurdistan and, at a Conference held at the Residency early in December, it was decided definitely to eliminate Levies from the Euphrates and to assign to them as their sector in the defence scheme of the whole country the Mosul outposts and Kurdistan. Owing to the inability of the 'Iraq Army to take over the whole of the Euphrates it has unfortunately been impossible up to the moment of writing this report to remove the Levies from Diwaniyah, Samawah and Nasiriyah. It has. however, been possible to dispense with many outlying detachments and the consequent concentration of units has resulted in improvements in interior economy and in the possibility of introducing improved systems of training. Desertions, which had reached an average of seventy-seven per month, have fallen to three per month and a marked improvement in the general behaviour of the Levies has been noticed from time to time by Political Officers who have come in contact with them. At the same time, after the operations mentioned in the previous paragraph, the Inspector-General reported to the High Commissioner that existing arrangements, in his opinion, did not work for efficiency and suggested that the Levies should be placed under General Headquarters for the purposes of administration. After full discussion with the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, it was decided that the change was immediately necessary in the interests of efficiency and Levies were accordingly transferred from the direct charge of the High Commissioner to that of the General Officer Commanding, acting on his behalf, with effect from February 22nd, 1922.

Late in November it was decided to raise the strength of the Levies from Recruiting 4,500 to 5,500. Recruiting of Arabs having ceased and the supply from among Assyrians. Kurdish sources being inadequate and not always of very good quality, a vigorous recruiting campaign was started among the fighting tribes of the Assyrians who had been settled North of the Mosul Division. The recruiting was entrusted to Captain MacNernie whose efforts have met with such striking success that by the end of the period under report the total of 5,000 had not only been reached, but actually exceeded by some 400. The surplus will be disposed of by weeding out non-efficients.

Details of organization will be found in Appendix II.

Paradoxical

Lature of

•Iraq position.

Historical
Summary.

VI.—THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.

1.—GENERAL OBSERVATIONS.

Egypt under the Cromer regime has been described by Lord Milner as the land of paradox. In the period covered by this report the Government of Iraq has passed from a Civil Administration, regularly established in accordance with international law by an Army occupying enemy territory, to a position of equal paradox, a Constitutional Monarchy, of which the constitution has not yet been formulated, depending for its sanction and recognition on a Treaty that has never been confirmed and a Mandate that has never been ratified. The practical administrator need care for none of these things, but they press hard on his legal advisers who are responsib→ for the administration of justice, the jurisdiction of the courts, the Government's legal relations, internal and external, and the exercise of its legislative powers.

This branch of the Administration has, however, gone boldly ahead, first as the Judicial Department and later as the Ministry of Justice, and in spite of the insecurity of the Government's legal status, has adapted its own organisation and functions, as well as those of the Courts of Justice, to the political or constitutional changes.

It is necessary briefly to summarise the changes which have a ted this Ministry.

In October 1920, a Provisional Native Government under the High Commissioner was substituted for the Civil Administration established by the occupying army. The departments of the old Administration became either Ministries under a native Minister or Departments under one of such Ministries. The Judicial Department became the Ministry of Justice and on the 11th November, 1920, the venerable Shaikh Mustafa al Alusi, a Shar‍ah official of great experience who at one time held the post of Qadhi of Mecca, accepted the appointment of Minister. Sir Edgar Bonham Carter. K.C.M.G.. CIE, who as Judicial Secretary had administered the Judicial Department, became the Adviser and so ceased to be the titular head of the system which he had established. In this connection it is right to point out that he had himself, soon after the Armistice, proposed the appointment of an Iraq Minister of Justice. The insurrection of 1920 brought down upon many departments of the Administration severe criticism, but Sir Edgar justly claimed that little if any criticism in connection with the causes of the rebellion was directed against his judicial system. This immunity he attributed to the policy which he had pursued, first, of making no unnecessary alterations in institutions or laws with which the people were familiar, and secondly, of making the fullest use of Iraqis as judges and officials of the Department. The institution of the new Ministry, therefore, involved no change and no necessity for change in the policy which had been so successfully pursued.

The next change which reacted upon the judicature followed closely upon the formation of the Council of State in November 1920. Sir Edgar has deseribed it as follows:

"During the war the local administration was entrusted ⚫. British Political Officers and Assistant Political Officers, who exercised at once both executive and magisterial functions. At the end of 1920, the Conneil of State was constituted and it was decided to revert to the local administrative system which was in force under the Turks, and to replace the British Political Officers and Assistant Political Officers by Ira. Mutasarrifs and Qaimmagams assisted by British Advisers who are to have no executive functions.

One of the essential features of the Turkish Administrative System was the complete separation of the executive and the judicial, and it became therefore, necessary to increase and extend the Courts, so as to make provision for the trial of criminal cases throughout the entry.

At the same time the opportunity was taken to strengthen the Court of Appeal by the addition of two judges and to vest in it the nowers of confirmation and revision which had previously been vestel in the High Commissioner. Similarly the powers of revision formerly exercised by the Political Officer within his Division will be transferred to the Court of First Instance for the Division.

In certain Diviciers where the indicial work is Fight, a 3. Ze Judge will be appointed with the powers of a Court of First Instance in Civil matters. He will be assisted by an Assistant Judge. This is in accordance with a scheme which had been brought into force by the Turks shortly before the cutbreak of war.”

The detailed scheme as approved by the Council of State is set out on ven 6 of the "Report of the Administration of Justice for the year 1920.

Hitherto the Court of Appeal has exercised the functions of a Court of Revision for all Courts subordinate to it. The Council of State, however, supported by public opinion, both legal and commercial, has attached great inportance to the institution of a Court of Cassation or Revision, distinct from the Court of Appeal, on the ground that it is in accordance with Ottoman Law and will provide a second appeal in civil cases of importance. The policy of providing and supporting institutions to which native ideas are wedded outweighed considerations of economy and the obvious objections to a multiplica tion of appeals and shortly before his departure, Sir Edgar, as Acting High Commissioner, himself confirmed a resolution of the Council of State establishing a Court of Cassation. In the year which has since elapsed, shortage of funds, other political changes and the difficulty of finding suitable personnel have delayed the execution of this decision, and up to the end of March 1922, the Court of Appeal, provisionally known as the Court of Appeal and Cassation, continued to function as the only Court of Revision as well as of final appeal.

Another development of the policy of introducing the old system was the appointment of legal procurators in the early Summer of 1921. Police procurators were already provided for by the Criminal Procedure Regulations, but judicial procurators, distinct from the police, had no real place in the existing system and were appointed in anticipation of the revision of the Criminal Procedure and Penal Code. The result has been unfortunate. The procurators have left undone the work they might have done and have interfered where there was no need. The result has been friction with the police authorities, and the Procurators General appointed at Baghdad, Basrah and Mosul have been transferred to judicial work until their duties have been properly defined by a new Code of Criminal Procedure.

The modifications in the judicial system which have been outlined above were given legal sanction by the Courts (Revision) Proclamation 1921,. on the 14th May, 1921. The keynote of this enactment is sounded in section 24 which substitutes for the expression "Occupied Territories" the term "Iraq". The Ministry and the Judicature were adapted to the needs and wishes of the Provisional Native Government. On the 26th of the same month, Sir Edgar Bonham Carter left 'Iraq.

During the further political changes which ensued on the Cairo Conference and the accession of His Majesty King Faisal, the office of Adviser was temporarily held by Mr. E. M. Drower until the arrival at the end of September of Mr. N. Davidson. The organisation of the Ministry and Judicature remained the same and it was not until the first Ministry of King Faisal was appointed, in succession to the Provisional Government, that any material alteration was effected. On the 11th September, 1921, Naji Beg al Suwaidi was appointed Minister of Justice. The change that soon became apparent was not one of organisation but of personality. The late Minister had been content to leave the administration almost entirely in the hands of his Adviser. Naji Beg, the scion of a family deeply steeped in politics, has not only considerable legal and administrative experience but a forceful character, skill in debate and tireless energy. The new Minister, as was right and proper, immediately assumed the full responsibility of his position. This involved a corresponding change in the position of the Adviser whose duty it became no longer to administer the department but to keep the administration on the right lines. On the other hand Naji Beg has always been ready to recognise the special responsibilities of the Adviser. No important step was taken and no judicial appointment made without mutual consultation and it was early agreed that all correspondence or other documents issuing from the Ministry, should be seen by both the Minister and the Adviser, except the Adviser's correspondence with other Advisers or with the High Commissioner's Secretariat. The Minister's character necessarily led him to force the pace at a time when the Adviser would have preferred to let well alone, and the Adviser was not infrequently obliged to check action by the Minister which might have appeared to derogate from the independence of the Courts. But during the seven months of Naji Beg's Ministry the Adviser on no occasion felt himself obliged to bring an issue between himself and Naji Beg before the Council of State or the High Commissioner.

Like most well-educated orientals of the younger school, the Minister attached what we consider an exaggerated importance to committees, reports examinations and diplomas. With the concurrence of the Council of State and the approval of the Press, committees of judges and other legal officers were instituted to deal with the appointment of civil judges, the appointment of Shar'ah judges and the drafting of legislation. None of these committees have been entirely satisfactory. As all appointments ultimately depended on the Minister and the Adviser, the appointments committees lacked real responsibility in their decisions, while the valuable advice which their members were able to give

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