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by Thucydides in Cleon, that because he used to hold on the bad side in causes of estate, therefore he was ever inveighing against eloquence and good speech, knowing that no man can speak fair of courses sordid and base. And therefore as Plato said elegantly, "That Virtue, if she could be seen, would "move great love and affection:" so seeing that she cannot be shewed to the sense by corporal shape, the next degree is, to shew her to the imagination in lively representation: for to shew her to reason only in subtilty of argument, was a thing ever derided in Chrysippus, and many of the Stoics, who thought to thrust virtue upon men by sharp disputations and conclusions, which have no sympathy with the will of
Again, if the affections in themselves were pliant and obedient to reason, it were true, there should be no great use of persuasions and insinuations to the will, more than of naked proposition and proofs: but in regard of the continual mutinies and seditions
of the affections, Video meliora, proboque,
Deteriora sequor ;
Reason would become captive and servile, if eloquence of persuasions did not practise and win the imagination from the affections part, and contract a confederacy between the reason and imagination against the affections; for the affections themselves carry ever an appetite to good, as reason doth. difference is, that the affection beholdeth merely the present, reason beholdeth the future and sum of time. And therefore the present filling the imagination more, reason is commonly vanquished; but after that force of eloquence and persuasion hath made things future and remote appear as present, then upon the revolt of the imagination reason prevaileth.
We conclude therefore, that rhetoric can be no more charged with the colouring of the worst part, than logic with sophistry, or morality with vice. For we know the doctrines of contraries are the same, though the use be opposite. It appeareth also, that
logic differeth from rhetoric, not only as the fist from the palm, the one close, the other at large; but much more in this, that logic handleth reason exact, and in truth; and rhetoric handleth it as it is planted in popular opinions and manners. And therefore Aristotle doth wisely place rhetoric as between logic on the one side, and moral or civil knowledge on the other, as participating of both: for the proofs and demonstrations of logic are toward all men indifferent and the same: but the proofs and persuasions of rhetoric ought to differ according to the auditors:
Orpheus in sylvis, inter delphinas Arion. Which application, in perfection of idea, ought to extend so far, that if a man should speak of the same thing to several persons, he should speak to them all respectively, and several ways: though this politic part of eloquence in private speech, it is easy for De pru- the greatest orators to want; whilst by the observing dentia ser- their well graced forms of speech, they lose the monis privolubility of application: and therefore it shall not be amiss to recommend this to better inquiry, not being curious whether we place it here, or in that part which concerneth policy.
Colores boni et mali, sim
Now therefore will I descend to the deficiences, which, as I said, are but attendances: and first, I plicis et do not find the wisdom and diligence of Aristotle comparati. well pursued, who began to make a collection of the popular signs and colours of good and evil, both simple and comparative, which are as the sophisms of rhetoric, as I touched before. For example;
Quod laudatur, bonum: quod vituperatur, malum.
Laudat venales qui vult extrudere merces.
Malum est, malum est, inquit emptor; sed cum recesserit, tum gloriabitur.
The defects in the labour of Aristotle are three; one, that there be but a few of many; another, that their elenchus's are not annexed; and the third, that he conceived but a part of the use of them: for their use is not only in probation, but much more in im
pression. For many forms are equal in signification, which are differing in impression; as the difference is great in the piercing of that which is sharp, and that which is flat, though the strength of the percussion be the same: for there is no man but will be a little more raised by hearing it said; "Your ene"mies will be glad of this;"
Hoc Ithacus velit, et magno mercentur Atrida; than by hearing it said only," This is evil for you.”
Secondly, I do resume also that which I mentioned before, touching provision or preparatory store, for the furniture of speech and readiness of invention, which appeareth to be of two sorts; the one in resemblance to a shop of pieces unmade up, the other to a shop of things ready made up, both to be applied to that which is frequent and most in request: the former of these I will call antitheta, and the latter formula.
Antitheta are theses argued pro et contra, wherein Antitheta men may be more large and laborious; but, in such rerum. as are able to do it, to avoid prolixity of entry, I wish the seeds of the several arguments to be cast up into some brief and acute sentences, not to be cited, but to be as scanes or bottoms of thread, to be unwinded at large when they come to be used; supplying authorities and examples by reference.
PRO VERBIS LEGIS.
Non est interpretatio, sed divinatio, quæ recedit à
Cum receditur à litera judex transit in legislatorem.
PRO SENTENTIA LEGIS..
Ex omnibus verbis est eliciendus sensus, qui interpretatur singula.
Formula are but decent and apt passages or conveyances of speech, which may serve indifferently for differing subjects; as of preface, conclusion, digres sion, transition, excusation, etc. For as in buildings there is great pleasure and use in the well-casting of the stair-cases, entries, doors, windows, and the like; so in speech, the conveyances and passages are of special ornament and effect.
A CONCLUSION IN A DELIBERATIVE.
So may we redeem the faults passed, and prevent the inconveniences future.
There remain two appendices touching the tradition of knowledge, the one critical, the other pedantical; for all knowledge is either delivered by teachers, or attained by men's proper endeavours: and therefore as the principal part of tradition of knowledge concerneth chiefly writing of books, so the relative part thereof concerneth reading of books: whereunto appertain incidently these considerations. The first is concerning the true correction and edition of authors, wherein nevertheless rash diligence hath done great prejudice. For these critics have often presumed that that which they understand not, is false set down. As the priest, that where he found it written of St. Paul, Demissus est per sportam, mended his book, and made it Demissus est per portam, because sporta was an hard word, and out of his reading and surely their errors, though they be not so palpable and ridiculous, yet are of the same kind. And therefore as it hath been wisely noted, the most corrected copies are commonly the least correct.
The second is concerning the exposition and explication of authors, which resteth in annotations and commentaries, wherein it is over usual to blanch the obscure places, and discourse upon the plain.
The third is concerning the times, which in many cases give great light to true interpretations.
The fourth is concerning some brief censure and judgment of the authors, that men thereby may make some election unto themselves what books to read.
And the fifth is concerning the syntax and disposition of studies, that men may know in what order or pursuit to read.
For pedantical knowledge, it containeth that difference of tradition which is proper for youth, whereunto appertain divers considerations of great fruit.
As first the timing and seasoning of knowledges; as with what to initiate them, and from what for a time to refrain them.
Secondly, the consideration where to begin with the easiest, and so proceed to the more difficult, and in what courses to press the more difficult, and then to turn them to the more easy; for it is one method to practise swimming with bladders, and another to practise dancing with heavy shoes.
A third is the application of learning according unto the propriety of the wits; for there is no defect in the faculties intellectual but seemeth to have a proper cure contained in some studies: as for example, if a child be bird-witted, that is, hath not the faculty of attention, the mathematics giveth a remedy thereunto, for in them, if the wit be caught away but a moment, one is new to begin: and as sciences have a propriety towards faculties for cure and help, so faculties or powers have a sympathy towards sciences for excellency or speedy profiting; and therefore it is an inquiry of great wisdom what kinds of wits and natures are most proper for what sciences.
Fourthly, the ordering of exercises is matter of great consequence to hurt or help: for, as is well observed by Cicero, men in exercising their faculties, if they be not well advised, do exercise their faults, and get ill habits as well as good; so there is a great judgment to be had in the continuance and intermission of exercises. It were too long to particularize a number of other considerations of this nature; things but of mean appearance, but of singular efficacy for as the wronging or cherishing of seeds or young plants, is that that is most important to their thriving; and as it was noted, that the first six kings, being in truth as tutors of the state of Rome in the infancy thereof, was the principal cause of the immense greatness of that state which followed; so the culture and manurance of minds in youth hath such a forcible, though unseen, operation, as hardly any length of time or contention of labour can countervail it afterwards. And it is not amiss to observe also, how small and mean faculties gotten by education, yet when they fall into great men or great