Epictetus, who presupposes that felicity must be placed in those things which are in our power lest we be liable to fortune and disturbance. Hence also we must censure the desire to fly from perturbations rather than extinguish them, and the "tenderness" of certain ancient philosophers who retired too easily from civil business in order to avoid indignities and perturbations. (Adv. II. xx. 1-2; Aug. VI. i.)

Private Good is either passive or active. The latter is the worthier. Passive Good consists in the preservation or perfection of one's own nature; active Good in imprinting one's own nature upon other things.

Passing to that Good of men which concerns society, and which we will term "duty," we are to consider it not in its relation to society (which subject is reserved for the discussion of man "congregate") but in its effect on the individual, or man "segregate"; and first we will treat of the fruit, then of the culture necessary to obtain the fruit. The duty of a man, as a member of the State, has been well handled by others; but the duty of a man in his profession, vocation, and place, has been only indirectly set forth by men of different professions, who have unduly magnified their several vocations; wherein, however, must be mentioned with special praise His Majesty's treatise on the duty of a King.

For the complete discussion of the duties and virtues of professions, we should know their vices and impostures; for it is not possible to join serpentine wisdom with columbine innocency except men know all the conditions of the serpent. We must also treat of domestic and social relations in detail, and of the comparative importance of different and possibly contending duties. (Adv. II. xxi. 1-11; Augm. VII. ii.)

After discussing the fruit, ie. the nature of Good, we come to the culture, i.e. the means by which the Will should be conformed thereto. If it be said that this culture, or cure of the mind, belongs to divinity, it may be replied that divinity has moral philosophy for her handmaid; and this subject has been left uninquired. First, then, like true husbandmen, we must ask what depends on us, and what does not. In the culture of the mind, two things are beyond our control, points of nature and points of fortune. Human nature cannot be altered, but vincenda ferendo, it must be conquered by suffering; not, however, by a dull suffering, but by a wise and industrious suffering, better called "accommodating" or "applying."

Now as we cannot fit or supply a garment till we have taken the measure of the body, so we cannot apply culture to the mind till we have set down varieties of human nature. For example, we must consider versatility as compared with narrowness of mind; the disposition that conceives and executes far-reaching plans (or "longanimity") as compared with the contrary; the disposition to take pleasure in the good of others, or benignity as compared with malignity. Add to this the impressions of nature, imposed on the mind by age, climate, health, beauty, nobility, wealth, prosperity, and their opposites; all of which must be as carefully studied by the cultivator of the mind as varieties of soil by the agriculturist. And as in the body, we must study not only physiology but also pathology, so, in the mind, diseases as well as ordinary nature must be known; whence it follows that we must at this point study the affections. These ought to have been handled by Aristotle directly in his Ethics, instead of collaterally in his Rhetoric; nor have the Stoics examined this subject in a practical way. But the poets and historians are the best teachers of this knowledge, showing us the complex motions of the affections, and how to set affection against affection and to master one by another; as for example by employing fear and hope to bridle the rest.

Having considered the nature of the field, and the limitations of culture, we pass now to culture proper, that is, to the work that is within our command. Here we ought to discuss custom, exercise, habit, education, example, imitation, emulation, company, friends, praise, reproof, exhortation, fame, laws, books, studies. Of these, we can but touch on one or two. Aristotle was careless in saying that of those things which consist by nature nothing can be changed by custom; for it is not true of those things wherein nature admits a latitude. The following precepts are useful for the formation of good habit: (1) Do not begin with too difficult exercises (which may discourage), nor with too easy (which stop progress); (2) practise when the mind is best disposed, so as to gain rapidity; and when it is worst disposed, so as to make the mind more supple; (3) bear ever towards the contrary extreme of that whereunto we are by nature inclined; (4) since we all naturally hate constraint, the mind is brought to anything better, and with more sweetness and happiness, when that to which you tend is not ostensibly the primary, but a secondary, object. Lastly, as regards books and studies, it is obvious that moral philosophy and political philosophy are unfit studies for youth; and as to scholastic morality, there is a danger lest it make men too precise, arrogant, and incompatible. Many other precepts might be given both as to studies, and the other points, company, fame, &c., enumerated above. But the best kind of culture of the mind is based on the fact that the minds of all men are at some times in a state more perfect and at others more depraved; whence arises the precept to fix and cherish the "good hours" of the mind and to obliterate the evil; the former object being accomplished by vows, constant resolutions, and exercises, the latter by some kind of expiation of that which is past, and the re-commencement of a new course. But this part seems sacred to religion. Wherefore we will conclude with the most compendious and noble of all methods of culture, that a man propound unto himself honest and good ends, and that he be resolute, constant, and true unto them, so that he may "mould himself into all virtue at once," not artificially and by pieces, but by a natural and general growth. For no preceptor can frame a man so excellently for the duties of life as can Love; and "if a man set before himself the good of others, and be truly inflamed with charity, it doth work him suddenly into greater perfection than all the doctrine of morality can do." Thus we conclude the Culture of the Mind, which has for its object to make the mind sound, beautiful, and active for all the duties of life. (Adv. II. xxii. 1-17; Augm. VII. iii. 3.)

§ 67 THE "ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING:"HUMAN PHILOSOPHY; MAN "CONGREGATE"

Having now considered man "segregate," Bacon proceeds to that part of Human Philosophy which considers him in his congregate" or civil aspect.

Civil knowledge has three parts, conversation (i.e. social intercourse), negotiation (i.e. the carrying on of business) and government-corresponding to the three objects sought by man in society, viz. comfort, use, and protection. Wisdom of conversation deals with behaviour; which, being the garment of the mind, ought to have the conditions of a garment; it should be in fashion, not too elaborate, so shaped as to set forth the better qualities of the mind, and hide the worse ; and above all it ought not to be too restrictive for exercise or motion. But this subject has been elegantly handled. (Adv. II. xxiii. 1-3; Augm. VIII. i.)

On the other hand the wisdom of business, or negotiation, has not been collected into writing; the principal treatise on it being the Proverbs of Solomon. There are also some fables to the point. But now that the times abound with history, living examples are better than fictitious; and the best form of writing on the variable necessities of public or private business will be found in histories, or in biographies and letters, with inferences deduced from them; for knowledge drawn freshly from particulars before our eyes is most readily applied to particular occasions.

But there is another part of the wisdom of business quite different from the above; for we have been talking of the wisdom of counsel to others; but there is also a wisdom for oneself consisting in the Architecture of one's own fortune; and this is deficient and deserving of inquiry, partly because Science should embrace every knowledge, partly because fortune, as an organ of virtue and merit, deserves its due consideration.

The Architect of Fortune must study the particular natures of present actions and persons; for these are as it were the minor propositions in his syllogisms; and without these, no major propositions, however true, can issue in true conclusions. But a few general precepts may be given. For example, the Architect must trust countenances and deeds rather than words; yet he must consider the motives of deeds, and not despise words uttered under the influence of passion; he may study men from the evidence of their enemies, servants, and friends; but better by consideration of their natures and objects; judging weak impulsive men by their natures, strong and self-controlled men by their objects. For all these purposes the shortest way is to have acquaintance with men of general knowledge, and to be intimate with at least one friend who has perfect intelligence in each special subject; you should also be frank enough to

provoke others to openness of speech, without revealing what you yourself would keep secret. Also the politic wise man should resolve in every conference and action, besides the present action, to learn something new for future action.

Further, the Architect must study his own weakness and defects, giving himself more or less scope, according as the times suit his nature or otherwise; choosing his course of life, his friends, and his models, in conformity with his own nature, so that he may excel. He must always set forth his own merits, not neglecting the Art of Ostentation, which, "if it be carried with decency and government, doth greatly add to reputation." Not less important is the art of covering one's defects, which a man may accomplish in three ways: by caution in avoiding tasks too great; by "colour," in tinging every defect with a hue of some corresponding virtue (representing his cowardice as mildness, dulness as gravity, &c.); and, thirdly by confidence, the last but surest of all remedies.

Another precept is to make the mind pliant and obedient to occasion (for nothing is more politic than to make the wheels of our mind concentric and voluble with the wheels of fortune), though we must not neglect also the art of forming our own plans and making our own occasions. Further, the Architect must not always be reserved or dissembling, but must observe a happy mean between the habits of futility and dissimulation; for the greatest politicians have in a natural and free manner professed their desires. Lastly, men must judge aright not only of the consequences of things, but also of proportions and comparisons, preferring things of substance to things of show.

In the marshalling of men's pursuits toward their fortune, the order should be, first, the amendment of their own minds; secondly, wealth ; thirdly, reputation; and fourthly, honour.

Other precepts fit for the Architect of Fortune are to embrace matters which do not occupy too long time; to imitate Nature (who never does anything in vain), and if one cannot attain one's first object, to reach a second, or else a third, or at least something; never to commit oneself irrevocably; and, lastly, in friendship, to remember the precept of Bias, "Love as though you may hate, and hate as though you may love."

All these arts may be called Good Arts; with Evil Arts, such as Machiavelli has enumerated, no doubt the pressing of a man's fortune may be more compendious; but "the shortest way is commonly the foulest, and surely the fairer way is not much about." Again, even though men refrain from Evil Arts, yet the Sabbathless pursuit of Fortune leaves no room for the duty to God. Men of the world should remember that Fortune is coy when she is much wooed; but a better caution is "Seek ye first the Kingdom of God;" which we may apply to the mind and say, "Seek ye first the virtues of the Mind; " and although the human foundation (of virtue) has somewhat of the sand, the divine foundation is on a rock. (Adv. II. xxiii. 3-46; Augm. VIII. ii.)

As for Government, to the governed it is for the most part secret, though. to Governors it should be clear; even as this world, which to us seems dark, is in the sight of God as a sea of glass before His throne. In handling such a subject, reverence is due; for next to the crime of rebellion is the crime of futility, for which Sisyphus and Tantalus were punished. Writing to a King that is a master of this science, the Author thinks it becoming to pass over this subject in silence. But touching the more public part of government, the laws, he notes this deficience, that men have handled them either as philosophers imaginatively and unpractically (in discourses like the stars, which give little light because they are so high,) or else as lawyers treating of what is received as law, and not of what ought to be law.

A middle course should be pursued in discussing this subject. Men should write as statesmen, laying down what ought to be, and may be, law; not omitting the means for making laws certain and easy of execution; suggesting how they are to be penned, revised, expounded, pressed, or mitigated; considering how far laws that regulate private rights may influence the commonweal; and generally discussing all the means by which laws may be administered and endowed with such elasticity and adaptability to circumstances as to receive "animation." As for the superiority of the Laws of England to the Civil Law, to enlarge upon it would be to intermix practical details with general science. (Adv. II. xxiii. 47-50; Augm. VIII. iii.)

Here the Author concludes the subject of Human Philosophy which, with History and Poetry, made up the totality of human Learning. Before passing to divine learning, he looks back upon his work and compares it to the mere tuning of instruments, which is in no way pleasant to hear, but yet is the cause why the music is sweeter afterwards. He has hopes that posterity may play better on the instruments which he has been content to tune. Among these grounds for hope are, the revival of learning; the intellectual ability of the present age; the accumulated learning of the past; the art of printing; the extension of navigation, introducing an extension of Natural History; the leisure for study (greater than was possible in the small republics of Greece and in the vast empire of Rome, where politics or government absorbed almost all attention); the present disposition to peace; the consumption of all that ever can be said in controversies of religion, the perfection of the King's learning, inciting others to imitation; and, lastly, the inseparable tendency of time to disclose truth. Now he passes to sacred and inspired divinity, the Sabbath and port of all men's labours and peregrinations. (Adv. II. xxiv.)