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attain their second object-prolongation of life. To develop the true Magic we must make a Kalendar of inventions, noting also things deemed impossible or not yet invented, and also approximations to inventions; and we must also be careful to value inventions, not in proportion to their immediate use, but for the light they throw on the further discovery of causes.

Thus far concerning Natural Philosophy, wherein, if any readers contradict, the Author will not contend. If it be truth, the voice of Nature will consent.

"And as Alexander Borgia was wont to say of the expedition of the French for Naples, that they came with chalk in their hands to mark up their lodgings and not with weapons to fight; so I like better that entry of truth which cometh peaceably with chalk to mark up those minds which are capable to lodge and harbour it, than that which cometh with pugnacity and contention."

It will be well, however, to add a Kalendar of doubts or problems, and of popular errors in particular matters; and also an account of differences of opinion touching the principles of nature. (Adv. II. viii. 3-6; Augm. III. v. ad fin.)

§ 65 THE "ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING." HUMAN PHILOSOPHY; MAN "SEGREGATE": THE UNDERSTANDING

The third subdivision of Philosophy, it will be remembered, was Human Philosophy. This includes, first the knowledge of the connection and mutual influence of body and mind; secondly, knowledge concerning the body; thirdly, knowledge concerning the mind.

Again, Human Philosophy may be either simple or particular, considering man segregate; or else conjugate and civil, considering man congregate and in society.

The knowledge of "human nature entire," that is, of the connection between body and mind, has been attempted, but with doubtful success. (Adv. II. ix. 1-3; Augm. IV. i.) As to the knowledge of the body, medical science has been more professed than laboured, and there is a deficience in the registration of cases and in the "inquiry which is made by anatomy;" wherein, although men might not be utilized, the needful results might be obtained from the dissection of beasts alive.1 Cosmetic and athletic are deficient, but the deficiencies are not worth supplying. (Adv. II. x. 1-13;

1 Bacon's position in the antivivisection controversy is here clearly defined.

Augm. IV. ii.) The investigation into the human mind may inquire the nature of the soul or mind, or the faculties thereof.

The soul, being inspired immediately from God, and not extracted out of the mass of heaven and earth, is therefore not a subject for philosophy, but to be inquired of by religion. As for divination and fascination-the two appendices to this part of the knowledge concerning the soul-they are deficient, not in mass, but because of the undetected mixture of verity and vanity. (Adv. II. xi. 1-3; Augm. IV. iii. ad fin.)

As to the faculties of the mind, since we described three above, the Memory, the Imagination, and the Reason, it might be supposed that the knowledge of the mental faculties would deal with these three. But we were then speaking of the parts of learning produced by the several parts of the mind; now we are speaking of the sciences which handle the parts of the mind, and for this purpose we shall divide the subject into two parts, the one being the Understanding and Reason, the other, the Will, Appetite, and Affection. For whereas the Reason produces "position or decree," and the Will produces action or execution, the Imagination moves in both provinces. For Sense delivers its images to the Imagination before Reason can judge of them, and Reason delivers its judgments to Imagination before the Will can execute them. It is true that the Imagination is not always servant but sometimes dominant, for example, in matters of faith and Religion: "Nevertheless, because I find not any science that doth properly or fitly pertain to the Imagination, I see no cause to alter my former division." The knowledge of the Reason is the art of arts; for as the hand is the Instrument of Instruments, so is the mind the Form of Forms; and the intellectual arts are four-(1) invention, (2) judgment, (3) retention or memory, and (4) tradition. (Adv. II. xii. 1-3; Augm. V. 1.)

(1) As for invention of arts and sciences, all confess that at present it has no existence. The beasts, which were gods to the Egyptians, have been as reasonable inventors as men. The ordinary Induction, concluding upon enumeration of particulars without instance contradictory, is a mere conjecture, which may be overthrown by some new instance; as if Samuel had rested upon those sons of Jesse which were brought before him, and failed of David, who was in the field. It is not possible from mere particulars to rise at once to the principles of sciences. Even if the principles could be in some cases rightly ascertained, yet it is impossible by syllogisms to deduce middle propositions 1 from them in natural philosophy. For the syllogism consists of propositions, and propositions consist of words, and words are often only the current tokens of popular unscientific notions, having nothing in reality corresponding to them; so that no amount of

1 That is, general propositions about concretes, distinguished from an abstract proposition such as "things that are equal to the same thing are equal to one another." A particular proposition about concretes would be ranked as lowest; a general proposition about concretes as middle; and an abstract proposition as highest. See the second paragraph of the summary of the Delineatio, above, p. 358, and the fourth paragraph of the Cogitata, p. 362.

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argument can ever correct the initial error or deduce a true conclusion. Not that the senses are in fault; but the intellectual powers are weak, and make false inferences from the reports of the senses.

This part of invention the Author purposes in a future treatise to expound in two parts, one termed Experientia Literata, the other Interpretatio Naturae. These terms are explained in the Latin translation, which states that there are three ways of advancing, 1st groping in the darkness, that is, with unmethodical and casual experiment, 2nd being led by a guide's hand, that is, passing from one experiment to another (Experientia Literata), 3rd being led by the light itself (Interpretatio Naturae.) (Adv. II. xiii. 1-5; Augm. V. ii.)

As to invention of speech or argument, it is not properly invention, but resumption of that which has been already invented; and it implies two courses, preparation (Promptuaria) and suggestion (Topica). Both Cicero and Demosthenes approve the premeditation of theses, to be particularized and utilized as occasion may allow; and their authority may outweigh Aristotle's ridicule of the Sophists (who, as he says, exhibit shoes ready made instead of teaching how to make a shoe) and may warn us against changing a rich wardrobe for a pair of shears. Suggestion-which directs us to marks that may excite our mind to return and reproduce its collected knowledge-is useful for inquiry as well as for invention; for a faculty of wise inquiry is half a knowledge. Topics may be particular as as well as general; and, in every special inquiry, we shall gain by drawing forth the subject into questions or places of inquiry. (Adv. II. xiii. 6-10; Augm. V. iii.)

(2) From invention we pass to judgment. The judgment of proofs and demonstrations may deal with inductive or deductive proof. But in Induction the same action of the mind which invents, judges. Therefore, for judgment of Induction, the reader is referred to what has been said above concerning the Interpretation of Nature. But in deductive proof the case is different; for the invention of the middle proposition is one thing, and judging of the consequence of the syllogism is another thing, and therefore necessitates separate consideration. This art (of judging deductive proof) has two parts, a part of Direction, and a part of Caution; viz. Analytic (representing Direction) which frames a true form of syllogism, by deflections from which we may judge erroneous deductions; and Elenche (representing Caution) which exhibits the more subtle forms of sophisms with their refutations. Under the latter head should come the great sophism of sophisms, the equivocation or ambiguity of words and phrase, especially such as express the common adjuncts of essences; majority, minority, priority, posterity, identity, diversity, possibility, act, totality, part, existence, privation and the like.

But there is a much more profound and important kind of fallacies into which no inquiry has been made. These are not external but situate in the mind itself. For the mind of man, not being a clear and equal glass, but rather like an enchanted glass, is full of inherent misrepresentations.1 For example, it is more affected by a few affirmatives than by many negatives (an error which is the root of all superstition), and it supposes in nature a greater uniformity than there really is (an error that has perverted astronomy). Secondly, there are the false appearances imposed upon us by our individual nature, imprisoned as we are in the caves of our own complexions and customs; so, Plato intermingled hisphilosophy with theology, Aristotle with logic, Proclus with mathematics, and, while the alchemists extracted a philosophy from the furnace, Gilbert made one out of his observations of a load-stone. Thirdly, there are the false appearances imposed by words, which are framed according to the notions and capacities of the vulgar; and although we think we govern our words, yet oftentimes, as a Tartar's bow, they shoot back upon the understanding, and mightily entangle the judgment. Lastly, the application of different kinds of proof to different subjects is an important part of judgment; and it is deficient (Adv. II. xiv. 1-12; Augm. V. iv.). Passing rapidly over (3) memory, which is noted as "weakly inquired of," we come to the fourth intellectual art, tradition; wherein we may discuss the organ, the method, and the illustration.

(4) The inquiry into one kind of organ, the written signs of language (hieroglyphics, &c.), is deficient; the inquiry into words, as being "the footsteps and prints of reason" (philology), is reported not as deficient but as "very worthy to be reduced into a science by itself." Method should be of two kinds, one, ("magistral") for teaching what is old, the other for progression toward what is new. For the latter purpose, knowledge should be delivered in the same method wherein it was discovered, transplanted as it were with the roots. The method of enigmatical tradition, once in credit, has been disgraced by the impostures of many vain persons; but a far better method is that of aphorisms; which test solidity, point more directly to action, and stimulate inquiry. To embody doctrine in Problems and Solutions is tedious and destructive of unity. Methods should be adapted to the subject and to the audience; and herein should be considered the manner and limitation of the propositions and the degree of detail required (for what avails Ortelius' universal map to direct the way between London and York?)-a subject whereof the inquiry is deficient. (Adv. II. xvi. 1xvii. 14; Augm. V. v.-VI. ii.)

The illustration of tradition is Rhetoric, a science excellent and excellently well laboured, whose object is "to apply Reason to Imagination for the better moving of the Will," or again "to fill the Imagination to second Reason." 5 For whereas Reason beholds the future and the

1 See pp. 379-80, above, for this metaphor in connection with the Idols.

2 These are the Idols of the Tribe, although the name is not here mentioned. For the Idols, as discussed in the Novum Organum, see p. 381, above.

3 These are the Idols of the Cave. For an account of the depreciated Gilbert, see above, p. 336.

4 These are the Idols of the Forum or Market-place.

5 The De Augmentis has it thus: "Munus Rhetoricae non aliud est quam ut Rationis dictamina Phantasiae applicet et commendet, ad excitandum appetitum et

sum of time, affection (i.e. passion) beholds merely the present; and therefore, as the present fills the Imagination more, Reason is commonly vanquished; but when Rhetoric makes things future and remote appear as present, then Imagination revolts to the side of Reason, and Reason prevails. As deficiencies in Rhetoric, there are marked, first, a collection of the Colours or Sophisms which disguise good and evil; secondly, a collection of Antitheta, i.e. theses argued pro et contra ready for oratorical applications; thirdly, a collection of Formulæ to serve as prefaces, conclusions, digressions, transitions, excusations, &c. (Adv. II. xviii. 1-9; Augm. VI. iii.)

There remain two appendices, one concerning editions, commentaries, and critical apparatus; the other concerning the art of teaching. The latter appendix includes the order of subjects taught; the variation of easy subjects with difficult; the application of different kinds of learning to the different natures of pupils; and the intermission or continuance of exercises so as to perpetuate good habits and break off bad ones. (Adv. II. xix. 1-3; Augm. VI. iv-fin.)

§ 66 THE "ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING:" HUMAN PHILOSOPHY; MAN "SEGREGATE;" THE WILL

Having discussed the knowledge that deals with Reason, in all its branches, Bacon now proceeds to the knowledge that treats of the Will.

Herein most have been content to set forth patterns of virtue, without giving precepts how to conform one's life to those patterns; probably because the subject consists not in novelties nor subtleties but in common matters in which men have despised to be conversant. A treatise on the Tillage or "Georgics" of the Mind should treat, first, of the nature of good; secondly, of the rules for confirming man's will thereunto.

Concerning the nature of Good men have discoursed well and divided it well, according as it refers to mind, body, or estate (i.e. circumstances). But it should be more clearly recognized that all things animate or inanimate have tendencies towards a double nature of Good; first towards the Good of the individual, second towards the Good of the whole or class to which the individual belongs. Of these two tendencies the latter is the nobler.

This consideration must induce us to award the palm to the active over the contemplative life; it decides for Socrates or Zeno, and virtue, against the Cyrenaics or Epicurus, and pleasure. Hence we must censure

voluntatem." And the "filling" of the Imagination is thus explained: "Finis, denique Rhetoricae Phantasiam implere observationibus et simulacris, quae Rationi suppetias ferant." Hence we see that "applying Reason to the Imagination" means "adapting arguments so as to appeal to the Imagination;" and Imagination is to be "filled with such images and observations as may assist Reason."

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