Before the forthcoming meeting of Parliament, Bacon was again engaged before the Star Chamber in prosecuting one Talbot, who had refused to repudiate the doctrine of Zuares concerning the duty of Catholic subjects towards heretical kings. In the execution of this task he delivered a speech in which he exhibits his usual detestation of the Church of Rome as being the head-quarters of those "Roman soldiers" who "do either thrust the spear into the sides of God's anointed or at least crown them with thorns." As for Professor Zuares himself, the Attorney can despise "a fellow that thinks with his magistrality and goose-quill to give laws and manages1 to crowns and sceptres;" but abhorrence, not contempt, is due to a superstition through which Henry III., in the face of his army, was stabbed by a wretched Jacobin friar; 2 Henry IV. likewise was "stiletted by a rascal votary;" Queen Elizabeth oftentimes "attempted by like votaries;" and "our excellent Sovereign King James, the sweetness and clemency of whose nature were enough to quench and mortify all malignity (in the chair of majesty, his vine and olive branches about him) attended by his nobles and the third estate in Parliament, ready in the twinkling of an eye, as if it had been a particular doom's day, to have been brought to ashes dispersed to the four winds." But from these contests in the Law Courts we must now turn to the great impending struggle between King and Commons to be fought in the approaching Parliament; and so we pass from Bacon the Attorney-General to Bacon the King's Counsellor. § 27 THE POLICY “È GEMINO” We have now to see an attempt to give practical effect to Bacon's policy è gem. -as he was in the habit of calling it-in other words, the policy of filling the King's coffers and at the same time contenting the people. Our view of this practical application of his theory may help us to some additional insight into the theory itself, which at present is probably not very clear to the reader. The problem was definite enough, being simply this, to reconcile and harmonise a king who claims the right of imposing taxes on merchandise at his own pleasure, and a House of Commons which protests against that right. Upon the decision of this question depended the possession of ultimate supremacy in the State. If the King could "impose" at his will, then the Commons had already little practical power over the national purse, and consequently little security for the redress of grievances; and when an increasing commerce increased the amount resulting from the "Impositions," the King might very soon become altogether independent of subsidies, and the Commons might lose every vestige of power. On the other hand, if the King had not the right of "imposing," he was dependent upon the contributions of the Commons, and consequently ultimately dependent upon their good-will. 1 i.e. "curbs." 2 Essays, xxxix, 13. The state of the royal exchequer cried for some prompt remedy. The Sub-Committee, appointed to investigate the finances, had proposed curtailments and improvements; but the adoption of their plans resulted in little benefit. The King could not pay even his most pressing debts. Ambassadors without allowances, sailors without pay, fortifications on the coast falling into decay, liabilities to the amount of £680,000, a probable standing deficit of £200,000 a year-all this was beyond a Sub-Committee, beyond any Imposition except such as would have raised an insurrection, beyond all remedy except such as could be supplied by Parliament. Northampton and his friends, who hated the very name of the House of Commons, were forced at last to give way; but it was not till 16 February, 1614, that the Council resolved to recommend that a Parliament should be summoned. We are fortunate in possessing two papers clearly setting forth Bacon's reasons for recommending that a Parliament should be called: the first, a paper of private notes; the second (based upon the first), a letter addressed to the King. The private paper consists of two sections: the former, dealing with the reasons for attempting to obtain the desired result from a Parliament and from no other source; the latter, dealing with the means by which a good result might be secured. Under the first heading he states that Parliament is the ordinary remedy; that the avoidance and implied distrust of Parliaments weaken the King in the eyes of foreigners; that the opposition in the Commons is "dissolved, or gained over;" that, through the death of Salisbury and Dunbar, the King is now on better terms with the people, because "few actions of Estate that are harsh, have been in agitation or rumour of late; and the old grievances, having been long broached, wax dead and flat." He characteristically concludes with the argument that "in his own particular"1 it will be expedient to advise the calling of a Parliament; for "if any man dissuade a Parliament, he is exposed to the imputation of creating or nourishing diffidence between the King and his people; he draweth upon himself the charge of the consequences of the King's wants; and he is subject to interpretation that he doth it for private doubts and ends." How utterly Bacon was at fault here, how very far the "old grievances" were from being "dead and flat," or the popular party was from being "dissolved or gained over," the history of the forthcoming Parliament will speedily show; how much Bacon had himself done to give point to the old grievances and to give unity to the popular party by flaunting the Prerogative before the eyes of the people, and by justifying an irregular taxation that would dispense with Parliaments, and an irregular judicature that would dispense with juries, has in part already appeared. But we may pass the more rapidly from the first to the second section for the following reason which he himself alleges : "Lastly I conceive the sequel of good or evil not so much to depend upon Parliament, or not Parliament, as upon the course which the King shall hold with his Parliament; and therefore I think good to leave the first question and to apply the case to the second." To the second accordingly we now pass; and, as was fit, the first place in the section (which consists of more than twenty clauses) is assigned to "Impositions," and the second to "Grievances." These indeed were the great questions of the day. But when the paper is searched for a definite policy as to Impositions and Grievances there is not a vestige of one. The Impositions are to be "buried and silenced;" the discussion of the Grievances is to be put off that is absolutely all. The other eighteen clauses, or more, are taken up with details of management, not easily distinguishable from trickery; suggestions of impossible projects to be "given out," with the view of showing that the King did not depend upon Parliament for supplies; suggestions of "actions of estate" that are to be "voiced" (in other words, lies that are to be circulated), as well as "laws that are to be really propounded;" means for conciliating one party and intimidating another; means for electing compliant members and excluding uncompliant; means for securing the judges, for preventing hostile combinations, and so on. Here are the earlier clauses of the paper to speak for themselves: 1 See the extract from the Commentarius Solutus, pp. 150, 158. "INCIDENTS OF A PARLIAMENT "1. The Impositions, and how that matter may be buried and silenced. "2. The Grievances, and how the collection of them in general may be restrained, and the dealing in them at all put back, till the King's business be set in due forwardness. "3. What project may be probably 1 given out to be in hand, whereby the King may repair his estate out of his own means, that the proceeding with his Parliament may be upon terms of majesty and not of necessity. "4. What other opinions are to be sown and dispersed, and what actions of estate are to be set on foot and voiced, as preparatives, whereby men may come to Parliament better affected, and be (when they are met) more forcibly induced and persuaded to supply the King with treasure. "5. What gracious and plausible laws or other matter are really to be propounded and handled in Parliament for the comfort and contentment of the people." The rest of the paper is taken up with the "clauses of management." And here, if we can bring ourselves dispassionately to admire the accuracy of aim with which Bacon, making himself a mere machine in the hands of despotism, directs his blows straight against the chief support of liberty in the House of Commons, we shall praise him for again giving the lawyers the first place among the foes of the King and the friends of freedom. The silent relaxation of the old rule which forbade a member to sit for a place in which he did not reside, had enlarged the scope of the choice of the electors; and the ablest of the barristers, known to the public by their success at 1 i.e. plausibly. the bar, had rapidly come to the front in the House of Commons. The country gentlemen had not yet produced the race of Parliamentary statesmen which was soon to arise: for the present therefore, "the burden of the conflict in the Commons lay upon the lawyers, who at once gave to the struggle against the Crown that strong legal character which it never afterwards lost. The services which this class of men rendered to the cause of freedom were incalculable." 1 So writes our modern historian; and Bacon expresses the same fact in his brief, quaint fashion. The lawyers, he says, are the vowels of the House, the rest of the members, without their aid, being poor helpless consonants, incapable of sound or utterance. "6. What is fit to be done for the winning or bridling of the Lawyers (which are the literæ vocales of the House) that they may further the King's causes, or at least fear to oppose them. "7. What course may be taken for the drawing of that body of the House which consisteth of citizens and burgesses of corporations to be well affected to the King's business." Clauses 8 and 9 mention similarly the "drawing" of the country gentlemen, and the "courtiers and King's servants," that the latter especially may be zealous for the King and not - as in the last Parliament" fearful or popular." Next comes the consideration of the "popular party" and the Judges: "10. What courses may be taken with that combined body, being extracted of all the former sorts, which made the popular party last Parliament; for the severing of them, intimidating of them, or holding them in hopes, or the like, whereby they may be dissolved, weakened, or won. "11. What course may be held to engage and assure the Judges in omnem eventum for any points of law or right which may be foreseen as likely to come in question in Parliament." Next follow-under veils of euphemistic expression, e.g. bonis artibus, and with special protest against "packing"-what must none the less be described as "packing clauses": "12. What persons in particular, in respect of their gravity, discretion, temper, and ability to persuade, are fit to be brought in to be of the House, bonis artibus, without labouring or packing. What persons in particular, as violent and turbulent, are fit to be kept back from the House, bonis artibus, without labouring or packing. 1 Gardiner, History, i. 161. |