his Majesty how much the liberties of the subject and the privilege of the Parliament were impeached by this inhibition to debate his Prerogative." In order to divert the House from their purpose, Bacon made a clever speech, admitting indeed that "if the matter debated concerned the right or interest of any subject or the Commonwealth," he would not advise the House to desist; but alleging that, if the matter concerned the Prerogative, the House always desisted upon inhibition; as, for example, when Elizabeth had inhibited them from discussing her marriage, the succession, the appointment of a fast, and other matters: "and therefore he persuaded the House to present these matters of Impositions as grievances to the Commonwealth (which the King had given us leave to do) but not to question his power and prerogative to impose." But the House was not to be persuaded that the King's power of levying Impositions did not "concern the right or interest of any subject or the Commonwealth," or that it was on the same footing as a royal marriage or the appointment of a fast. They resolved to remonstrate, and accordingly sent messengers to the King with a Petition of Right. The King replied by disavowing the plain meaning of the message conveyed through the Privy Council. He had not meant-so he now declared to prohibit absolutely a discussion of the question, but only to suspend it in order that he might understand their intentions. The petition of the Commons was granted as they themselves had set it down. In the discussion which followed (27 June 1610) on the King's right to levy Impositions, Bacon defended the Prerogative in a speech dealing almost solely with the point of law. The extract or manuscript of the speech is left unfinished; and Mr. Spedding's opinion is, that upon further consideration of the point of law or closer scrutiny of the records, Bacon saw reason to alter his conclusions, and consequently left the fair copy of the speech incomplete. However the House decided not to put the question of right, whereby they would have condemned the judgment of the Court of the Exchequer, "but to frame a petition by way of grievance, implying the right, though not in express terms." In answer to the Petition two or three of the Impositions were removed, and the King (10 July 1610) expressed his willingness to assent to an Act by which his power should be suspended from "imposing" any more upon merchandise, without consent of Parliament. But the new Impositions, amounting to £80,000 a year, remained unaltered; and both the King and Cecil defended the right of Imposition in such a manner as to excite suspicions that, even if suspended, it might be revived. The Commons were not likely to forget the rather unlucky saying of Bacon in his recent speech, that "Kings shall not be bound by general words. Samson [is] not to be bound by cobwebs but by cords;" and accordingly, a few days afterwards, we find a member relating how the House was considering "with what cords we shall bind Samson's hands, that is to say, his Majesty's Prerogative." Meantime they went away ill satisfied: which they testified in their next day's meeting, whenas subsidies were proposed and no more could be obtained but one subsidy and a single fifteen: which a knavish burgess said (but in the hearing of few) would do the King much good, and serve as a subpæna ad melius respondendum.” 1 On 13 July 1610, the Commons-though many of them suspected that the Government was not in earnest-offered £180,000 for the proposed concessions. But Salisbury, after reading a letter from the King offering to take £200,000, informed them that, in the event of refusing, Parliament would be dissolved, and the offer never repeated. In consequence of this pressure they consented, in return for eight specified concessions, to give the King a perpetual revenue of £200,000 a year. On 21 July, the memorials of the Contract were exchanged; on the 23rd, after the King's answer to their other grievances had been read, Parliament was prorogued till 16 October 1610. The Crown would have been decidedly the gainer if the contract had been carried out. The average proceeds from subsidies, from 1605 to 1609, had been about £81,000. Add to this the money value of the burdens from which the Commons had purchased exemption (estimated at £80,000 a year), and we obtain a total of £161,000 a year. Instead of this sum, the Crown was now to receive from the Commons a 1 Carleton, 13 July; Spedding, iv. 206. perpetual yearly tax of £200,000, to be secured to the Crown "by Act of Parliament in as strong sort as could be devised." What had the Commons received for this extra gift of £40,000 a year, and for the unconditional permanence which they were attaching to their contribution? Possibly they had gained something in exemption from annoyances and occasional extortions of money which passed out of the pockets of the subject, but not into the Treasury. But, if we set that aside the answer must be that they had gained nothing except a "gracious answer to very important statements of grievances, including those of deprived and silenced ministers, pluralities and non-residents, abuse of excommunication, abuse of the ecclesiastical commission, Prohibitions, Proclamations, and jurisdiction of provincial councils. To those who were dissatisfied with the "gracious answer," the Contract of the Commons may naturally have seemed too favourable to the King; and they might well feel that the permanent endowment of the Crown might render it difficult for them to obtain a more "gracious answer" hereafter. No longer able to make Supply conditional on the redress of grievances, they were surrendering one of the most important of the privileges of the House of Commons. a Meantime the Government was preparing to meet the Commons in October; and among other matters they had to consider the abuse of Proclamations; in which, by forbidding certain acts under penalties (which could be enforced by the Star Chamber), the Crown virtually assumed power of legislation. On 20 September the Council considered the subject, and in particular the Proclamation forbidding building in and near London. The Lord Chancellor was of opinion that if the King had not this power, he ought to have it; and that, if it could not be justified by precedent, a precedent should now be made by the Judges. Such an enlargement of the Prerogative by Judge-made law was obviously most unwise in the face of the opposition of the Commons; and Sir Edward Coke, the Lord Chief Justice, naturally desired time for conference with the other judges before giving his opinion. But Bacon, partly perhaps because of his habitual enmity to Coke, partly because his policy was invariably to amplify the Prerogative both in season and out of season, reminded the Chief Justice that he had already virtually sanctioned Proclamations by his decisions on the bench, and that "he [Coke] had himself given sentence in divers cases" for the Proclamation against building. In this argumentum ad hominem Bacon had a manifest advantage over his adversary; but he took a course likely to be most injurious to the real interests of the Crown, however much it might for the moment commend him to James, as being a "peremptory royalist." Coke showed more wisdom in replying that "it was better to go back than to go on in the wrong way.' After conference, the judges decided that "the King by his Proclamation cannot create any offence which was not an offence before;" and to this decision the King conformed. But although (in spite of Bacon's courtier-like and mischievous opposition) this obstacle to an understanding between the Crown and the Commons was removed, other obstacles soon arose. Courtiers and officials who were interested in collecting the dues of the Crown, could not acquiesce in a commutation which impoverished them; and it was natural that they should attempt to make the King suspect that he had been cheated in his bargain, reminding him that, until his debt was cleared off, he would still be at the mercy of Parliament. On the other hand the Commons feared that the King, by means of his permanent income, would be independent of them and neglectful of their grievances; and hence they hesitated to commit themselves. On 31 October, 1610 (fifteen days after Parliament had met), the King, incensed at their delay, required from the Commons a "resolute and speedy answer whether they would proceed with the Contract, yea, or no." Their discussion revealed their suspicious humour: provision was to be made "that this £200,000 be not doubled or trebled by enhancing of the coin by the King;" that Parliaments should be regularly held; and that the £200,000 be not alienated from the King; but no attempt was made to recede from their bargain. Meantime the King had come to the conclusion finally to break off the Contract; and he did this effectually by announcing (5 November, 1610) that in addition to the annual £200,000 and in addition to the subsidy and fifteenth last given, he expected K . a Supply of £500,000 for the payment of his debts: without this, he said, it had never been his intention, much less his agreement, to proceed with the Contract. It can hardly be doubted that here again the King broke loose from his chief adviser, and that he, and he alone, was responsible for the quashing of the Contract on which Salisbury had set his heart. The Commons of course replied that they could not proceed in the matter. An attempt was made by the King (after conference with some thirty members of the Lower House) to reopen the question; but it completely failed. On 25 November, 1610, James wrote a furious letter to Salisbury protesting that he had "had patience with this assembly these seven years, and from them received more disgraces, censures, and ignominies than ever Prince did endure." He complains that at the last meeting of the Council they "parted irresolute." He had followed their Lordships' advice "in having patience, hoping better issue. He cannot have asinine patience." He therefore gave orders for the immediate adjournment of Parliament; which was dissolved in the following February. And so ends the story of Cecil's Great Contract. § 18 BACON'S PRIVATE THOUGHTS ON POLITICS Meantime, while Cecil was thus active, what was Bacon thinking of his activity, and of politics in general, of the coming Revolution, and of the best means for averting it? The answer to these questions will be found in a private note-book of his, called the Commentarius Solutus-i.e. "Loose, or Miscellaneous, Commentary"-in which he set down his thoughts, small and great, about all subjects, political, private, literary, philosophical, as they suggested themselves to him in July, 1608, about a month after Cecil had laid on the new Impositions. These jottings are, obviously, far more trustworthy, as an index of Bacon's inmost convictions, than letters to the King, or speeches for the King, advocating the Prerogative. In 1 Spedding, iv. 39-95. The pages bear the running title of Transportata, i.e. transferred (from a former note-book). Some of the notes may therefore be of older date than July, 1608; some, from internal evidence, are seen to have been written in July. See Spedding, iv. 22. |