national life, what we may call its faith or ideas. Of the very highest import ance is it then that this faith be sound, that these ideas be just and true; for with a false faith, with false ideas, its life can be only death.

Here is wherefore we insist so strenuously upon correct political theories. In relation to government, we are always to distinguish three things: 1. Principles;

2. Measures; 3. Men.

Between measures and the men who are to carry out or execute them, we in this country rarely fail to make the proper distinction. The question as to men is for the most part looked upon as subordinate, and he is held to be the proper man to be supported, who will best and most ably support true measures of public policy. But between principles and measures we do not always make the proper distinction; nay, we often fail to distinguish between them at all; or if we do distinguish between them, it is only to sneer at the man who concerns himself with principles, and to allege that it matters not what principles one contends for, in case that he supports the right practical

measures.

And yet this indifference to principles is neither wise nor safe, for mistakes as to principles will always sooner or later lead to the adoption of false or mischievous measures. Our own history affords us numerous examples of this. The Declaration of Independence by the Congress of 1776, was a wise, just, and patriotic measure, deserving the warmest admiration and approval of every American citizen; but the principles laid down as self-evident truths in the preamble of the instrument by which the Independence was declared, were not only not called for as the ground of the justification of the measure, but were, to say the least, of questionable soundness, and have led to the adoption by a large portion of our people, of theories practically incompatible with government itself, and everything like social order. "We hold," say this heroic and true-hearted Congress, "these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. That to secure

these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed; that, whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or to abolish it, and to institute a new government, laying its foundation on such principles, and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness."

Now here is a questionable philosophy laid down as the basis of a measure, which stood firm enough without it. There were before the Congress only two questions:-1. Have the Colonies the right to assert their political independence of Great Britain? 2. Is it expedient for them to exercise this right at this time? To establish their right to assert their political independence, it was not necessary to go beyond the principle, that each people, or political community, has the inherent right to self-government; for this, as I have shown in my previous essay on the Origin and Ground of Government, was all that was necessarily involved in the controversy with the mother country. The inhabitants of the colonies were never for a moment in rebellion against their own government, and, therefore, a principle to justify such rebellion was not needed. All then that the Declaration says about the original equality of all men, their unalienable rights as individuals, the origin of government in the consent of the governed, and the right of the people,-unless we understand by people, the state, community, or body politic,—to alter or abolish government, &c., was uncalled for and out of place; so to speak, extra-judicial.

Man

But of these truths, said to be selfevident, one only, in the plain and obvious sense of the terms, is even a truth at all. "All men are created equal." This is not a self-evident truth. kind are created not equal, but unequal ; unequal in their position, in their capacities, whether moral, intellectual, or physical. The only sense in which they are equal is that they were equally created, and are all equally human beings, members, though unequal members, of one and the same family, and alike morally accountable to one and the same Divine Master. Nothing is or can be more false than to assume the equality of all men as the basis of gov

ernment; we should rather assume the natural inequality of men as the ground of the necessity of government; and thus make it the duty of government to maintain that equality before the law which men do not hold before nature. Men 66 are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights; among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." This again is not true, repeat we it over and over again ever so often. If it were true, government could never rightfully command the life of an individual, never, for any cause whatever, restrain his liberty, or throw any impediment in the way of his pursuing his own happiness according to his own judgment and pleasure. Grant this, and what government could stand twenty-four hours? Am I not bound, if my country calls, to rush to the frontier and make a rampart of my body for her protection? May not my country, that is, the government of my country, command my services even unto death in a war of self-defence, or in defence of liberty, of justice, of humanity? May not society, when necessary for her protection, take the life of the base wretch that would endanger her existence? May she not imprison, restrain the natural liberty of offenders? What mean we then by saying liberty is an "unalienable right ?" Does not every felon, in every civil society on earth, alienate what is here called his natural liberty? Furthermore, may government never interfere with the individual in "pursuit of happiness?" This individual affirms that he must pursue happiness by engaging in piracy, in the slave trade, or by taking to the highway; must government say that the pursuit of happiness is an unalienable right, and leave him to pursue it in his own way? This other individual chooses to pursue happiness by selling lottery tickets, by smuggling, by pandering to men's cupidity, or to their vices; may not government interrupt him? What is government for, if indeed it be not to restrain men and direct them in a path they would not go in but for government? In fact, there is no right that can be mentioned that may not be, that is not, at times and under certain circumstances, alienable, and alienable too without the consent of the individual it concerns; that is, there is no

specific right that does not under certain circumstances cease to be a right.

Of this self-evident truth, that governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed, I have heretofore spoken, and shown that if we admit it, we abandon all government; for government is not a mere agency, accountable to a principal, because the principal would be the government, and not the agency. "Whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or abolish it." In what sense is the word people used here? Does it mean the body politic, the people as a community; or the people regarded merely as individuals outside of civil society? If the first, it is unquestionably a truth, and the very truth it was necessary to assert, as the basis of the right of the Colonies to declare themselves independent of Great Britain; but if the second, it was a principle not necessary to assert on that occasion, and a principle which we have seen is not true, but both false and mischievous. Mr. Jefferson, the author of the Declaration, undoubtedly held to the origin of government in compact, and in consequence of this did not distinguish so clearly between the people in the one sense, and the people in the other, as he should have done when setting forth, as he here does, a fundamental doctrine on the origin and ground of government in general. He,

to

some extent, confounds the two senses one with the other, and in so doing has occasioned some fatal errors, which we his countrymen continue.

This same confusion runs through the minds of the great majority of our politicians, and it is almost impossible to make the mass of our citizens perceive any clear and intelligible distinction between the people as a political organism, and the people outside or independent of that organism. There can be no question that in this country, the supreme political power, that is, the political sovereign, is the people in convention assembled. But our politicians latterly, availing themselves of the ambiguity of the word people as used in the preamble to the Declaration of Independence, confound the people legally convened, that is to say, convened by virtue of a constituted, a competent authority, prescribing the

time, place, and mode of assembling, with the people coming together with out any act of authority convening them, a mere mass of isolated individuals, constituting not a convention, but a caucus; and they go even so far as to contend that the caucus, if it represent an equal or a larger number, is of equal or paramount authority to the convention. Hence the Editor of the Democratic Review writes, in reply to me," If that people"-the population of a given territory, or the numerical people" choose to come together, in their own way, whether inside or outside of the existing forms of law, and to alter the constitution, it is to their will and their act, that my loyalty is morally due, provided I am bona fide satisfied of the fact of the majority. By the truest and highest legitimacy of natural right, and the only divine right' we can know in political affairs, this new constitution subverts the old one, which is left behind like the castoff skin of the serpent, or the moulted feathers of the bird."

This doctrine has unquestionably taken a strong hold of no small portion of the American people. And yet, though implied in the preamble to the Declaration of Independence, it is only recently that it has found its way into practical politics. The French minister, Genet, appears to have held it to be the fundamental principle of democracy, and to have resorted to it in his brief but insane attempt to overthrow the government of Washington; but I find scarcely a practical recognition of it by our own statesmen, till after the election of General Jackson to the Presidency. General Jackson, by his gallant defence of New Orleans, and his successful opposition to the United States Bank, as well as other important services, has written his name in bold and legible characters in the history of his country, where time will not efface it. He needs no eulogium from me. All must always hold him to be a man of rare sagacity, of ardent patriotism, stern integrity, firm will, and great decision and energy in action; nevertheless, as a statesman, he has generally shown himself a man who is more intent on the most effectual means of disposing of the practical question before him, than on the possible prospective effects of adopting the principle involved in his manner of disposing of it. He

has always proved himself one of those great men who have a strong contempt for mere formulas, and in this respect deserves the high praise Carlyle bestows on Cromwell, Mirabeau, and Napoleon. He appears in his administration, to have regarded the people as above the constitution and laws, and to have held that he secured the highest possible sanction for his acts, when he had secured the popular approbation, formally or informally expressed. In his view the President of the United States was not merely an executive officer, chosen under the constitution, simply to administer the government and execute the laws; but a popular tribune, the immediate representative of the people, chosen to speak and act directly in their name; bound to see that they received no evil from the acts of the legislature and the judiciary; and accountable to the people alone. In all this there was much to be commended as noble and heroic, and well adapted to command the love and gratitude of the people. It was assuming the attitude, on the one side, of a direct servant of the people, and, on the other, of their father; and the great mass of us did look up to him as children to a father; nay, and still follow him to his retirement with true filial affection. Nevertheless, the country before any man, however great, wise, noble, or heroic. This disregard of formulas, this readiness to assume responsibility which we so admired in him, and from which no little good in his case resulted, is yet not without danger to constitutional government.

The grand maxim of General Jackson in his administration, as I collect it from the history of that administration, was, "The people are sovereign; if I gain their sanction, it is enough." Was he not right in this? Is not this the fundamental maxim of democracy? Yes, if you rightly interpret and apply it. The people in this country, practically considered, are the political sovereign, and to them, and to them alone, every public officer is accountable. But it is, as we have seen, only the people legally convened, or in authorized convention assembled; not to the people as a mass of individuals; the convention, not to the caucus. Now this fact, it has appeared to me, was not always borne in mind, and General Jackson and his friends did not always observe the dis