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" of our reign, than ever it was before in the reigns of "divers princes immediately preceding us, that we will "no longer endure that popular and unlawful liberty; "and therefore we were justly moved to send you that "direction to forbear to meddle in a cause of so tender "a nature, till we had farther thought upon it. We "have cause indeed to rejoice of your zeal for your speedy execution of justice; but we would be glad "that all our subjects might so find the fruits thereof, as that no pleas before you were of older date than "this is. But as to your argument, which you found upon your oath, you give our predecessors, who first "founded the oath, a very charitable meaning, in perverting their intention and zeal to justice, to make "a weapon of it to use against their successors; for "although your oath be, that you shall not delay

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justice between any private persons or parties, yet "was it not meant that the king should thereby re"ceive harm, before he be forewarned thereof; neither "can you deny, but that every term you will out of "your own discretions, for reasons known unto you, "put off either the hearing or determining of any ordinary cause betwixt private persons till the next "term following. Our pleasure therefore is, who are "the head and fountain of justice under God in our "dominions, and we out of our absolute power and "authority royal do command you, that you forbear "to meddle any farther in this plea till our coming to "town, and that out of our own mouth you hear our

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pleasure in this business; which we do out of the "care we have, that our prerogative may not receive "an unwitting and indirect blow, and not to hinder "justice to be administered to any private parties, "which no importunities shall persuade us to move you "in. Like as, only for the avoiding of the unreason"able importunity of suitors in their own particular, "that oath was by our predecessors ordained to be "ministered unto you: so we wish you heartily well "to fare.

Postscript. "You shall upon the receipt of this "letter call our attorney-general unto you, who will

"inform you of the particular points which we are unwilling to be disputed of in this case."

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This letter being read, his majesty resolved to take into his consideration the parts of the judges letter and other their proceedings in that cause, and the errors therein contained and committed; which errors his majesty did set forth to be both in matter and manner : in matter, as well by way of omission as commission; for omission, that it was a fault in the judges, that when they heard a counsellor at the bar presume to argue against his majesty's prerogative, which in this case was in effect his supremacy, they did not interrupt and reprove sharply that base and bold course of defaming or impeaching things of so high a nature by discourse; especially since his majesty hath observed, that ever since his coming to the crown, the popular sort of lawyers have been the men, that most affrontedly in all parliaments have trodden upon his prerogative: which being most contrary to their vocation of any men, since the law or lawyers can never be respected, if the king be not reverenced; it doth therefore best become the judges of any, to check and bridle such impudent lawyers, and in their several benches to disgrace them that bear so little respect to their king's authority and prerogative: that his majesty had a double prerogative, whereof the one was ordinary and had relation to his private interest, which might be, and was every day, disputed in WestminsterHall; the other was of an higher nature, referring to his supreme and imperial power and sovereignty, which ought not to be disputed or handled in vulgar argument: but that of late the courts of the common law are grown so vast and transcendent, as they did both meddle with the king's prerogative, and had incroached upon all other courts of justice; as the high commission, the councils established in Wales and at York, the court of requests.

Concerning that which might be termed commission, his majesty took exception at the judges letter both in matter and form: for matter, his majesty plainly demonstrated, that whereas it was contained

in the judges letter, that the signification of his majesty's letter as aforesaid was contrary to law, and not agreeable to the oath of a judge; that could not be: first, for that the putting off any hearing or proceeding upon any just or necessary cause, is no denying or delaying of justice, but wisdom and maturity of proceeding; and that there cannot be a more just and necessary cause of stay, than the consulting with the king, where the cause concerns the crown; and that the judges did daily put off causes upon lighter occasions; and likewise his majesty did desire to know of the judges, how his calling them to consult with him was contrary to law, which they could never answer unto.

Secondly, That it was no bare supposition or surmise, that this cause concerned the king's prerogative; for that it had been directly and plainly disputed at the bar; and the very disputing thereof in a public audience is both dangerous and dishonourable to his majesty.

Thirdly, That the manner of the putting off that which the king required, was not infinite nor long time, but grounded upon his majesty's weighty occasions, which were notorious; by reason whereof he could not speak with the judges before the argument; and that there was a certain expectation of his majesty's return at Whitsuntide: and likewise that the cause had been so lately handled and argued, and would not receive judgment by the Easter term next, as the judges themselves afterwards confessed.

And afterwards, because there was another just cause of absence for the two chief justices, for that they ought to have assisted the lord chancellor the same day in a great cause of the king's followed by the lord Hunsdon against the lord William Howard in chancery; which cause of the king's, especially being so worthy, ought to have had precedency before any cause betwixt party and party. Also whereas it was contained in the judges letter that the cause of Commendams was but a cause of private interest between party and party, his majesty shewed plainly the

contrary; not only by the argument of serjeant Chiborne, which was before his commandment, but by the argument of the judges themselves, namely justice Nicholls, which was after; but especially since one of the parties is a bishop who pleaded for the Commendams by the virtue of his majesty's prerogative.

Also whereas it was contained in the judges letter, that the parties called upon them earnestly for justice, his majesty conceived it to be but pretence; urging them to prove that there was any solicitation by the parties for expedition, otherwise than in an ordinary course of attendance; which they could not prove.

As for the form of the letter, his majesty noted, that it was a new thing, and very indecent and unfit for subjects to disobey the king's commandment, but most of all to proceed in the mean time, and to return to him a bare certificate; whereas they ought to have concluded with the laying down and representing of their reasons modestly to his majesty, why they should proceed; and so to have submitted the same to his princely judgment, expecting to hear from him whether they had given him satisfaction.

After this his majesty's declaration, all the judges fell down upon their knees, and acknowledged their error for matter and form, humbly craving his majesty's gracious favour and pardon for the same.

But for the matter of the letter, the lord chief justice of the king's bench entered into a defence thereof; the effect whereof was, that the stay required by his majesty was a delay of justice, and therefore contrary to law and the judges oath; and that the judges knew well amongst themselves, that the case, as they meant to handle it, did not concern his majesty's prerogative of granting of Commendams: and that if the day had not held by the not coming of the judges, the suit had been discontinued, which had been a failing of justice, and that they could not adjourn it, because Mr. Attorney's letter mentioned no day certain, and that an adjournment must always be to a day certain.

Unto which answer of the chief justice his majesty did reply; that for the last conceit, it was mere sophis

try, for that they might in their discretions have prefixed a convenient day, such as there might have been time for them to consult with his majesty before, and that his majesty left that point of form to themselves.

And for that other point, that they should take upon them peremptorily to discern whether the plea concerned the king's prerogative, without consulting with his majesty first, and informing his princely judgment, was a thing preposterous; for that they ought first to have made that appear to his majesty, and so to have given him assurance thereof upon consulting with him.

And for the matter, that it should be against the law and against their oath, his majesty said he had spoken enough before; unto which the lord chief justice in effect had made no answer, but only insisted upon the former opinion; and therefore the king required the lord chancellor to deliver his opinion upon that point, Whether the stay that had been required by his majesty were contrary to law, or against the judges oath.

The chancellor stood up and moved his majesty, that because this question had relation to matter of law, his majesty would be informed by his learned counsel first, and they first to deliver their opinions, which his majesty commanded them to do.

Whereupon his majesty's attorney-general gave his opinion, that the putting off of the day in manner as was required by his majesty, to his understanding was without all scruple no delay of justice, nor danger of the judges oath; insisting upon some of the reasons which his majesty had formerly opened, and adding, that the letter he had formerly written by his majesty's command was no imperious letter; as to say his majesty for certain causes, or for causes known to himself, would have them put off the day but fairly and plainly expressed the causes unto them; for that the king conceived upon my lord of Winton's report, that the cause concerned him; and that his majesty would have willingly spoken with them before, but by reason of his important business could not; and therefore required a stay till they might conveniently speak with