thing to itself: and therefore may be termed a representing faculty,

Proof. In every thought, conception, knowledge, judgment, idea, &c., the mind always represents some object to itself; or the thought, conception, &c., is perfectly empty, and completely senseless.

2. Every representation requires a representing subject and a represented object.

Proof. The representing subject, by acting upon the object that has occurred in the mind, produces the representation. The subject and object taken together are the cause, and the repre

sentation is the effect. And no representation whatever is possible without these three parts: that is to say, subject and object as cause; and representation as effect.

3. In every representation, thought, conception, knowledge, &c., there must be an object consisting of parts; and these must be united

into a whole.

Proof. For that which hath no parts is absolutely nothing, and therefore cannot be representable as an object; and, unless these parts are connected into a whole, or unity, no representation of any one thing would be possible.

SENSE.

1. Sense is the passive faculty of the mind, that receives the parts of which the object in the representation consists, and connects them into a whole, or unity, which is called intuition.

Proof.-For, if sense do not receive the parts of which the object or matter of every representation consists, then we create the objects, which is absurd. And until these parts are connected into a whole, or unity, no object could occur in a representation.

Explanation of terms employed in the science of metaphysics.

Sense in its passive capacity is called receptivity; for it receives the variety or matter of all representations which the mind could not

create.

Sense in its active function is called spontaneity of the first degree, as merely uniting the parts which are received by the mind into that species of unity which is called intuition.

Remark. An intuition is not an intelligible object, for the intellect has not yet operated upon it; still we are conscious of the presence of an object, though we do not know what it is.

2. As sense receives, it is clear that it must receive a variety of parts, otherwise it has nothing at all to receive. Now there are only two general varieties, the one whose parts co-exist, the other whose parts are in strict succession.

Proof. All objects in space have their parts co-existing; all objects which are in time only, have their parts following one another. The former comprehend all external sensible objects; the latter the effects and relations of these external objects, or the internal sensible state of the subject. But these two descriptions include every possible object.

3. As the receptivity of sense receives objects, the parts of which are either co-existent or successive, it may be divided into two parts.

Remark. This division is not only very natural, but it is also indispensable; for, without it, we should be unable to give accurate definitions of time and space.

4. The receptivity which receives an object whose parts co-exist is external receptivity, or space.

Proof.-For, when we analyse our notion of space, we find it to consist of a variety of coexisting parts, connected together into a unity. But space alone is that whereby an object consisting of a variety of co-existent parts can occur; which is precisely the case with the external receptivity; therefore space is external receptivity.

5. The receptivity which receives an object whose parts are successive, that is, merely the effect of some external object; and which, therefore, exist in time only, and can only be an internal object; is internal receptivity, or time. Proof.-For, when we analyse our notion of 1 me, we find it to consist of a variety of parts in strict succession, connected together into a unity; and time is that alone wherein an object consisting of a variety of parts in succession can occur; which is precisely the case with internal receptivity; therefore time is internal receptivity.

Explanation of terms.

Sensation is an alteration which takes place when the receptivity is affected, and is the ground of intuition.

Intuition is a sensible representation which arises immediately upon the receptivity being affected, and is either external intuition, when its object is in space, that is, an external phenomenon; or internal intuition, when its object is in time only; that is, an internal phenomenon, or the effect of an external one.

Phenomenon means appearance, and is used to distinguish the object in the representation from the object out of it, which is its cause, and i called noumenon.

Noumenon is the thing in itself, that is, independent of our faculties; for it is then out of time and space; that is, out of the sphere of knowledge. Of noumena, therefore, we can

know nothing.

Conclusion. Thus we have seen that the mind is both active and passive. Its receptivity receives the matter of knowledge, which it could not create. Its spontaneity connects this matter into a unity or form, and thus produces an intuition. Hence, sense or the first degree of spontaneity, constitutes the power of forming intuitions.

UNDERSTANDING.

1. Understanding is an active faculty, a spontaneity of the second degree. It comprehends an intuition under a conception, or under the objective unity; that is, renders it an intelligible object.

Proof.-For, until an object is classed by the understanding, it is a mere intuition, or an unintelligible object; but, the instant the intellect has operated upon it, it becomes intelligible; I may then say I understand it, and know what it is.

2. To render an object intelligible is to give to it a precise quantity, a particular quantity, a determinate relation, and a distinct degree of certainty, called modality.

Proof. For that thing which has no precise quantity, e. g. that is neither a mathematical point nor an entire world, nor any part of a world; and which has no particular qualities, e. g. is neither hard, soft, &c., and which stands perfectly alone, without any relation to other things, neither being a body, nor an effect of a body, nor a part of a whole; is completely unintelligible.

3. The understanding consists of twelve primary and original connecting acts called categories, and classed under the four heads of quantity, quality, relation, and modality.

Remark. The whole fabric of metaphysics either stands or falls upon the proof of this position, which will be given in the sequel, under each head as it arises; and, should it fail, then indeed will metaphysics be thrown into the utmost confusion, and be again the stumblingblock of the learned; but should it succeed, as it is presumed it will, we may then boast, that at length metaphysics has become a science which surpasses geometry, since it explains what the geometrician always assumes or takes for granted,

namely, his axioms, together with time and

space.

4. Quantity consists of unity, multitude, and totality; and must belong to every thing,

Proof-For that which is without quantity, that is to say, which is neither one, many, nor all, is no intelligible object; consequently not representable: i. e. it is nothing.

5. Quality consists of reality, negation, and limitation; which means that a thing either is, or is not; and, if it is, that it is limited.

Proof. To say that a thing is, and yet is not a real thing, is to contradict ourselves. And to say that there can be any real thing, and yet without limits, is certainly going beyond the bounds of intelligibility, which confines to limits; for we know nothing of the infinite.

6. Relation includes only that of a substance to its properties, of a cause to its effect, or of action to re-action.

Proof.-For, when we examine really existing things, we find they stand in relation to other existing things; and without such relation they are by no means conceivable; e. g. we cannot conceive a substance without its properties, a cause without its effect, or a whole without its parts.

7. To constitute an intelligible object means to comprehend the intuition produced by sense under the objective unity; i. e. to judge.

Proof.-For, until an intuition is comprehended under the objective unity, it is perfectly unintelligible. That is to say, that the understanding, by classing an intuition under quantity, quality, and relation, constitutes the intelligibility of the given matter or object in the intuition; so that it perfectly harmonises with the fact to say, that sense receives the matter of all knowledge, and understanding produces its

form.

castle.

9. Modality consists of possibility, existence, and necessity. This expresses the mode or manner in which the intuition belongs to time; namely, it may be in any time, or it is in a certain time, or it must be in all time.

Proof. Nothing can be more evident than that an intuition may be possible; that is, such that it may exist in any time; or it may be actual, that is, really exist in a certain time; or it may be necessary, that is must exist in all time; as the very contrary is impossible, e. g. a circle

without a centre.

10. The twelve categories of the understanding, as arranged under the four heads of quantity, quality, relation, and modality, are not only essentially necessary to the intelligibility of objects of sense, but they are actually complete in their number, is, neither deficient nor redundant. Proof. It is quite impossible to add one more category to the understanding; and, if we

take one away, the whole faculty will be destroyed. For, if we speak of a number, it must either be one, many, or all; and no other case is possible. Secondly, if we have any thing in our thoughts, it must be a reality, or the absence of a reality; but, if a reality, it cannot be infinite, therefore it must be limited by negation; that is, there may either be a reality or no reality; but, if there be a reality, it must be limited; and no other case is possible.. Thirdly, We can only be affected by things and their properties, by causes and their effects, or by parts and their wholes. Nothing more than this is conceivable, therefore much less knowable; for experience consists entirely of these relations. Lastly, With respect to modality; things may either be in any time, that is merely possible; or in a certain time, that is actual; or they may be in all time, and to be destroyed only with the destruction of time, that is, they may be necessary. Of this nature are the categories themselves, for without them there could not possibly be any experience whatever.

Explanation of Terms.

Quantity is that which is produced by adding one to one; and expresses the conception of a number in general.

Quality is the quantity of being in time; for every sensible reality has a being in time, that is, a beginning, middle, and end. But this series of sensations can only be measured by a degree; therefore quality is expressed in our conception of a degree in general.

Substance is that which lasts in time, and has properties that change; or it is the permanent in space, in which the properties or accidents inhere.

Cause is a power in one substance to act upon another, and thus to produce a third thing called effect. The first substance, or intuition is called the subject or agent; the second or substance intuition is called the object, or patient, being the thing acted upon; and thence arise necessarily and immediately the effect. Hence cause may be defined to be the action of the subject upon the object, whereby the effect is produced. Cause precedes in time, and effect succeeds; but not

versa.

Concurrence means the mutual action and re

action of co-existing substances or intuitions, whereby one determines the other's place in space, and vice versa, as parts of a whole.

Conclusion. Thus we have shown that the understanding is purely an active faculty which gives unity or form to the matter received by sense; that is, renders an intuition an intelligible object. This faculty is therefore a spontaneity of the second degree, but strictly limited to time and space; or it is the power of forming conceptions.

REASON.

1. Reason is an active faculty, or spontaneity of the third or highest degree. It comprehends a conception together with its intuition, under an idea, and thus renders a conclusion possible.

Proof.-For what is a conclusion, but the comprehending the individual under the particular, and this under the universal? as illustrated by the following figure :

mode of action is applied to the other categories, the following ideas result.

Hence the conclusion; therefore Kant is mortal. But how could a conclusion take place without a, faculty capable of producing an absolute totality, or a totality free from time and space, and which admits of no exceptions whatever? If the highest conception of idea in a ratiocination were particular, instead of universal, no conclusion would be possible. But of the fact of conclusion no one doubts; therefore the faculty to produce it must be admitted.

2. To render an object comprehensible is to class it under an idea of reason, or under a conclusion.

Proof. If the intuition Kant were only classed under a conception of understanding, it would then be an intelligible object, but limited in all respects as to its duration and every other property; for, as an object of experience, it would only be necessary on account of its cause; and we could not predicate of it any thing absolutely; but, reason being a faculty that acts free from time and space, and their conditions, it enlarges our views by allowing what the understanding has done, and yet hinting that this does not include all the properties of which objects of nature are possessed, that they may have a nature of their own, independent of that connected with our mode of representing them; but this it can only do by classing the object under an idea: hence the judgment, all men are mortal.

3. Reason is only capable of exerting three modes of concluding; namely the categorical, the hypothetical, and the disjunctive.

Proof. For this faculty can only arrange ideas of things and their properties by its categorical concluding act; causes and effects by its hypothetical; and parts and wholes by its disjunctive concluding act. But besides things and properties, causes and effects, and parts and wholes, there are no other things in the whole universe the ideas of which reason could arrange one under another. Therefore there are no other concluding acts but the categorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive.

4. Reason arranges the categories of quantity one under another, thus: unity under multitude, and these under totality; and thereby produces the idea of absolute totality.

Proof. Every thing connected by the understanding is strictly limited. But we really have the idea of something which goes far beyond the limited things of nature; and the only way in which this idea is obtained is by a conclusion of reason; for it is evident that the categories unity, multitude, and totality, are themselves unconditioned things, and that, being connected into a unity by reason, this unity must also be absolute or unconditioned. Thus reason will have absolute completeness; and, when this

5. Reason connects the categories of qualitywhich are reality, negation, and limitation, into the idea of absolute limitation.

Proof. For every reality in time and space is limited by negations. It is a variety whose parts can be measured by degrees only, and these by other degrees still smaller; and this without end. But reason will have absolute completeness, and thus forms the idea of absolute limitation.

6. Reason connects the categories of relation, which are each of them already compound notions, into the following ideas.

First, substance and accident into the idea of absolute substance.

Proof. For all the substances in the world are nothing more than a collection of properties existing in time and space; and every analysis of these substances only produces another set of properties without end; but reason, which acts free from time and space, and will have absolute completeness from the category of substance and accident, raises the idea of an absolute substance, which can never again become a predicate of any other substance.

Secondly, Cause and effect into the idea of an absolute cause.

Proof. For all he causes in time and space are nothing more than effects from preceding causes, and these causes are again effects of other causes ad infinitum. But reason, which will have absolute completeness in a series of causes and effects, raises to itself an idea of an absolute cause which cannot be the effect of any other cause.

Thirdly, Action and re-action into the idea of absolute concurrence.

Proof. For all the substances in the world are endowed with causes which work upon other substances, and thus mutually determine each other's place in space. All these substances are themselves only effects of other substances, and so on ad infinitum. But reason, which acts free from time and space, will have an absolutely complete series of causes and effects, and thus raises the idea of absolute concurrence.

Remark. The most important notions that concern us, as accountable beings, depend entirely upon this peculiar faculty of reason in raising these ideas. For how otherwise could we obtain the idea of our own soul, a first cause, or the deity? and without these notions we should not differ from the brute creation, and must for ever give up our claim to the rank of rational beings. It may further be remarked that the sciences of psychology, cosmology, and theology, have their roots in these important ideas of rea

son.

For the idea of absolute substance leads to psychology, the idea of a first cause leads to cosmology, and the idea of an absolute mutual concurrence leads to the science of theology.

7. Reason connects the categories of modality, which are possibility, existence, and necessity, into the idea of absolute necessity.

Proof. For in time every change is determined by a preceding change, and consequently there is no absolute necessity. But reason, which acts free from time, forms an idea of something which does not depend on a preceding change, and which is exempt from conditions time; that is, an idea of absolute necessity.

Conclusion. Thus we have shown that reason, or the highest degree of spontaneity, is an active faculty of so pure a nature as to be able to connect parts which are already out of time and space into wholes called ideas. For what are the categories of understanding, but parts of this description? On these ideas is founded the erroneous notion, that we can know immaterial existences; whereas we can only have ideas of them. Hence reason, or the third degree of spontaneity, is the power of forming ideas.'

Mr. Horne Tooke, having made some quotations from Mr. Harris and lord Monboddo, exclaims, with too much levity perhaps, 'If this be philosophy, give me back my Tom Thumb again. But what shall we say to the 'critic' of pure reason? If this be transcendental philosophy, give us back the philosophy of Aristotle again; for, taking chimera for chimera, as Gassendi said of the vortices of Descartes and the atoms of Epicurus, we cannot help having some partiality for the one that is 2000 years older than the other. According to Dr. Willich 'The whole critique of pure reason is established upon this principle, that there is a free reason independent of all experience and sensation.' If we may believe madame de Staël this notable critique of pure reason is to be regarded as having given the impulse to all that has since been done in Germany both in literature and philosophy; but, according to the respectable testimony of Degerando, a pure Kantian is not to be found at present in Germany. In short, he remarks, the Critique of Pure Reason, announced with pomp, received with enthusiasm, disputed about with fury, after having effected the overthrow of the doctrines of Leibnitz and Wolff, could no longer maintain itself, and has produced no permanent result but divisions and enmities, and a general disgust towards all systematic creeds.' But enough and more than enough.

Indignandum de isto, non disputandum est. *** Quid te torques et maceras, in ea quæstione quam subtilius est contempsisse quam solvere?' How applicable is the import of these quotations to many more than Kant, who is indeed a most worthy successor of Leibnitz, and a fit specimen of German philosophers.

LOCKE.

Having attempted to clear away some metaphysical rubbish, we now return to the celebrated author of the Essay concerning Human Understanding; a work which we think with Mr. Stewart has been much more applauded than read. Indeed inuch of the applause, we suspect, is owing to the very circumstance that it has been little read; and, if there be any truth in Voltaire's criticism on Dante, the praise of Locke is likely to continue and increase 'aye more and more;' for it may now almost be said that nobody reads him. This we feel confident of, that many of his most zealous eulogists, who have the phrases the great Locke, the immortal Locke, ever and anon in their mouth, neyer carefully read his

great work. We have read it, and re-read it, and attempted inwardly to digest it; but we have all ways found it a laborious task, and we fear that either our digestive system is indifferent, or that much of the Essay concerning Human Understanding is not very convertible into intellectuaaliment. That there are some things in it 'hard to be understood' is evident from the very circumstance so much and so often insisted on by Mr. Stewart, as already noticed. This unintelligibleness we think attributable to the following causes:

1. Mr. Locke, notwithstanding all his sage remarks on the folly of meddling with things above the comprehension of the understanding, is ever and anon attempting to sound depths too profound for the length of his line; or rather he plunges headlong into the abyss and chaos of scholastic subtleties. This is particularly the case in much of Book II., in not a little also of Book IV., as well as in other parts of the essay. It may seem strange indeed that Mr. Locke should have fallen into this error; but it only proves that philosophers, like other men, often transgress against their own maxims, not only in the conduct of life (as in the case of the philosopher so strikingly depicted by Johnson in his Rasselas) but in the conduct of their understanding-even in their speculations. What can be more judicious than the following remarks of Mr. Locke? 'If, by this enquiry into the nature of the understanding, I can discover the powers thereof; how far they reach, to what things they are in any degree proportionate, and where they fail us; I suppose it may be of use to prevail with the busy mind of man to be more cautious in meddling with things exceeding its comprehension; to stop when it is at the utmost extent of its tether; and to sit down in a quiet ignorance of those things which, upon examination, are found to be beyond the reach of our capacities. We should not then perhaps be so forward, out of affectation of a universal knowledge, to raise questions and perplex ourselves and others with disputes about things to which our understandings are not suited, and of which we cannot frame in our minds any clear or distinct perception, or whereof (as it has perhaps too often happened) we have not any notions at all. If we can find out, how far the understanding can extend its view; how far it has faculties to attain certainty; and in what cases it can only judge and guess, we may learn to content ourselves with what is attainable by us in this state.' * * This was that which gave the first rise to this Essay concerning the Understanding. thought that the first step towards satisfying several enquiries the mind of man is apt to run into was, to take a survey of our own understanding, examine our own powers, and see to what things they were adapted. Till that was done, I suspected we began at the wrong end, and in vain sought for satisfaction in a quiet and sure possession of truths that most concerned us, whilst we let loose our thoughts into the vast ocean of being; as if all that boundless extent were the natural and undoubted possession of our understandings, wherein there was nothing exempt from its decisions, or that escaped its

For I