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reserve for the last of all, as the haven and sabbath of all man's contemplations) we will now proceed to Natural Philosophy.

If then it be true that Democritus said, "That "the truth of nature lieth hid in certain deep mines " and caves :" and if it be true likewise that the alchemists do so much inculcate, that Vulcan is a second nature, and imitateth that dexterously and compendiously, which nature worketh by ambages and length of time, it were good to divide natural philosophy into the mine and the furnace; and to make two professions or occupations of natural philosophers, some to be pioneers and some smiths; some to dig, and some to refine and hammer and surely I do best allow of a division of that kind, though in more familiar and scholastical terms; namely, that these be the two parts of natural philosophy, the inquisition of causes, and the production of effects; speculative, and operative; natural science, and natural prudence. For as in civil

matters there is a wisdom of discourse, and a wisdom of direction; so is it in natural. And here I will make a request, that for the latter, or at least for a part thereof, I may revive and reintegrate the misapplied and abused name of Natural Magic; which, in the true sense, is but natural wisdom, or natural prudence; taken according to the ancient acceptation, purged from vanity and superstition. Now although it be true, and I know it well, that there is an intercourse between causes and effects, so as both these knowledges,

speculative and operative, have a great connection between themselves; yet because all true and fruitful natural philosophy hath a double scale or ladder, ascendent and descendent; ascending from experiments to the invention of causes, and descending from causes to the invention of new experiments; therefore I judge it most requisite that these two parts be severally considered and handled.

Natural Science or Theory is divided into Physique and Metaphysique: wherein I desire it may be conceived that I use the word metaphysique in a differing sense from that that is received: and in like manner, I doubt not but it will easily appear to men of judgment, that in this and other particulars, wheresoever my conception and notion may differ from the ancient, yet I am studious to keep the ancient terms. For hoping well to deliver myself from mistaking, by the order and perspicuous expressing of that I do propound; I am otherwise zealous and affectionate to recede as little from antiquity, either in terms or opinions, as may stand with truth and the proficience of knowledge. And herein I cannot a little marvel at the philosopher Aristotle, that did proceed in such a spirit of difference, and contradiction towards all antiquity undertaking not only to frame new words of science at pleasure, but to confound and extinguish all ancient wisdom: insomuch as he never nameth or mentioneth an ancient author or opinion, but to confute and reprove; wherein

for glory, and drawing followers and disciples, he took the right course. For certainly there cometh to pass, and hath place in human truth, that which was noted and pronounced in the highest truth: "Veni in nomine Patris, nec recipitis me; "si quis venerit in nomine suo, eum recipietis." But in this divine aphorism, (considering to whom it was applied, namely to Antichrist, the highest deceiver,) we may discern well that the coming in a man's own name, without regard of antiquity or paternity, is no good sign of truth, although it be joined with the fortune and success of an "Eum "recipietis." But for this excellent person Aristotle, I will think of him that he learned that humour of his scholar, with whom, it seemeth, he did emulate; the one to conquer all opinions, as the other to conquer all nations: wherein nevertheless, it may be, he may at some men's hands, that are of a bitter disposition, get a like title as his scholar did:


"Felix terrarum prædo, non utile mundo
"Editus exemplum, &c."

"Felix doctrinæ prædo."


But to me, on the other side, that do desire as much as lieth in my pen to ground a sociable intercourse between antiquity and proficience, it seemeth best to keep way with antiquity usque ad aras ;" and therefore to retain the ancient terms, though I sometimes alter the uses and definitions, according to the moderate proceeding in civil government; where

although there be some alteration, yet that holdeth which Tacitus wisely noteth," eadem magistratuum "vocabula."

To return therefore to the use and acceptation of the term Metaphysique, as I do now understand the word; it appeareth, by that which hath been already said, that I intend "philosophia prima," Summary Philosophy, and Metaphysique, which heretofore have been confounded as one, to be two distinct things. For, the one I have made as a parent or common ancestor to all knowledge; and the other I have now brought in as a branch or descendent of natural. science. It appeareth likewise that I have assigned to Summary Philosophy the common principles and axioms which are promiscuous and indifferent to several sciences: I have assigned unto it likewise the inquiry touching the operation of the relative and adventitious characters of essences, as quantity, similitude, diversity, possibility, and the rest: with this distinction and provision; that they be handled as they have efficacy in nature, and not logically. It appeareth likewise, that Natural Theology, which heretofore hath been handled confusedly with Metaphysique, I have inclosed and bounded by itself. It is therefore now a question what is left remaining for Metaphysique; wherein I may without prejudice preserve thus much of the conceit of antiquity, that Physique should contemplate that which is inherent in matter, and therefore transitory; and metaphysic that which is abstracted and fixed. And again, that Physique should handle that which

supposeth in nature only a being and moving; and Metaphysique should handle that which sup poseth further in nature a reason, understanding, and platform. But the difference, perspicuously

expressed, is most familiar and sensible. For as we divided natural philosophy in general into the inquiry of causes, and productions of effects; so that part which concerneth the inquiry of causes we do subdivide according to the received and sound division of causes; the one part, which is Physique, inquireth and handleth the material and efficient causes; and the other, which is Metaphysique, handleth the formal and final


Physique, taking it according to the derivation, and not according to our idiom for medicine, is situate in a middle term or distance between natural history and Metaphysique. For natural history describeth the variety of things: Physique, the causes, but variable or respective causes; and Metaphysique, the fixed and constant causes.

"Limus ut hic durescit, et hæc ut cera liquescit,
"Uno eodemque igni:"

Fire is the cause of induration, but respective to clay; fire is the cause of colliquation, but respective to wax; but fire is no constant cause either of induration or colliquation: so then the physical causes are but the efficient and the matter. Physique hath three parts; whereof two respect nature united or collected, the third contemplateth nature diffused or distributed.

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