CHAP. XV. suspicion attend the relation of that matter of fact. But if BOOK IV. the same thing be told to one born between the tropics, who never saw nor heard of any such thing before1, there the whole probability relies on testimony2: and as the relators are more in number, and of more credit, and have no interest to speak contrary to the truth, so that matter of fact is like to find more or less belief. Though to a man whose experience has always been quite contrary, and who has never heard of anything like it, the most untainted credit of a witness will scarce be able to find belief3. As it happened to a Dutch ambassador, who entertaining the king of Siam The king with the particularities of Holland, which he was inquisitive after, amongst other things told him, that the water in his country would sometimes, in cold weather, be so hard, that men walked upon it, and that it would bear an elephant, if he were there. To which the king replied, Hitherto I have believed the strange things you have told me, because I look upon you as a sober fair man, but now I am sure you lie *. of Siam. arguments Variety. 6. Upon these grounds depends the probability of any Probable proposition and as the conformity of our knowledge, as the capable of certainty of observations, as the frequency and constancy of great experience, and the number and credibility of testimonies do more or less agree or disagree with it, so is any proposition in itself more or less probable. There is another, I confess, So that it has no 'conformity' with the analogies of his experience. 2 That is, on the analogy between the intellectual and moral qualities of the individual witness and one's own standard of trustworthy testimony. Because it more accords with the analogies of his personal experience to find testimony (intentionally or unintentionally) in error, than to suppose the truth of what is wholly out of analogy with all that he has ever experienced. He is thus induced to reject the testimony-his own experience being for him the ultimate standard of probability. This is Hume's reason for rejecting à priori all testimony to miracles. It was probably CHAP. XV. BOOK IV. which, though by itself it be no true ground of probability, yet is often made use of for one, by which men most commonly regulate their assent, and upon which they pin their faith more than anything else, and that is, the opinion of others; though there cannot be a more dangerous thing to rely on, nor more likely to mislead one; since there is much more falsehood and error among men, than truth and knowledge. And if the opinions and persuasions of others, whom we know and think well of, be a ground of assent, men have reason to be Heathens in Japan, Mahometans in Turkey, Papists in Spain, Protestants in England, and Lutherans in Sweden. But of this wrong ground of assent I shall have occasion to speak more at large in another place 1. CHAPTER XVI. OF THE DEGREES OF ASSENT. 1. THE grounds of probability we have laid down in the BOOK IV. foregoing chapter: as they are the foundations on which our СНАР. XVI. Assent Grounds assent is built, so are they also the measure whereby its several degrees are, or ought to be regulated: only we are to take Our notice, that, whatever grounds of probability there may be, ought to they yet operate no further on the mind which searches after be regulated by truth, and endeavours to judge right, than they appear; at the least, in the first judgment or search that the mind makes. of ProbI confess, in the opinions men have, and firmly stick to in the ability. world, their assent is not always from an actual view of the reasons that at first prevailed with them: it being in many cases almost impossible, and in most, very hard, even for those who have very admirable memories, to retain all the proofs which, upon a due examination, made them embrace that side of the question. It suffices that they have once with care and fairness sifted the matter as far as they could; and that they have searched into all the particulars, that they could imagine to give any light to the question; and, with the best of their skill, cast up the account upon the whole evidence: and thus, having once found on which side the probability appeared to them1, after as full and exact an inquiry as they can make, 1 Assent on ground of probability is a better test of the man by whom it is given than intellectual perception of what is intuitively or demonstratively certain; for what is considered probable by each man depends upon the extent and variety of his physical and spiritual experience; also upon the degree of development of his higher VOL. II. B b faculties, under the laws by which they 1 BOOK IV. they lay up the conclusion in their memories, as a truth they have discovered; and for the future they remain satisfied with the testimony of their memories, that this is the opinion that, by the proofs they have once seen of it, deserves such a degree of their assent as they afford it. CHAP. These cannot actually in View; and then we must content with the remem brance that we once saw 2. This is all that the greatest part of men are capable of always be doing, in regulating their opinions and judgments; unless a man will exact of them, either to retain distinctly in their memories all the proofs concerning any probable truth, and that too, in the same order, and regular deduction of conseourselves quences in which they have formerly placed or seen them; which sometimes is enough to fill a large volume on one single question or else they must require a man, for every opinion that he embraces, every day to examine the proofs: both ground which are impossible. It is unavoidable, therefore, that the Degree of memory be relied on in the case, and that men be persuaded of several opinions, whereof the proofs are not actually in their thoughts; nay, which perhaps they are not able actually to recall. Without this, the greatest part of men must be either very sceptics; or change every moment, and yield themselves up to whoever, having lately studied the question, offers them arguments, which, for want of memory, they are not able presently to answer 1. for such a Assent. The ill conse 3. I cannot but own, that men's sticking to their past quence of judgment, and adhering firmly to conclusions formerly made, this, if our is often the cause of great obstinacy in error and mistake. former Judg. ments were not rightly made. But the fault is not that they rely on their memories for what they have before well judged, but because they judged before they had well examined 2. May we not find a great number (not to say the greatest part) of men that think they have formed right judgments of several matters; and that for no other reason, but because they never thought otherwise? that This is virtually faith in myself, as to judgments formerly reached by me, in which I regard myself as having been sufficiently an expert to make them now worthy of acceptance by me as true. 2 In other words, one often exag gerates his own claim to be treated as an expert, in regard to any of his past judgments, even to the extent of taking the mere fact that he has long so judged as a sufficient reason for continuing so to judge. СНАР. XVI. imagine themselves to have judged right, only because they BOOK IV, never questioned, never examined, their own opinions? Which is indeed to think they judged right, because they never judged at all. And yet these, of all men, hold their opinions with the greatest stiffness; those being generally the most fierce and firm in their tenets, who have least examined them. What we once know, we are certain is so: and we may be secure, that there are no latent proofs undiscovered, which may overturn our knowledge, or bring it in doubt. But, in matters of probability, it is not in every case we can be sure that we have all the particulars before us, that any way concern the question; and that there is no evidence behind, and yet unseen, which may cast the probability on the other side, and outweigh all that at present seems to preponderate with us. Who almost is there that hath the leisure, patience, and means to collect together all the proofs concerning most of the opinions he has, so as safely to conclude that he hath a clear and full view; and that there is no more to be alleged for his better information? And yet we are forced to determine ourselves on the one side or other. The conduct of our lives, and the management of our great concerns, will not bear delay: for those depend, for the most part, on the determination of our judgment in points wherein we are not capable of certain and demonstrative knowledge, and wherein it is necessary for us to embrace the one side or the other 1. 4. Since, therefore, it is unavoidable to the greatest part of The right Use of it, men, if not all, to have several opinions, without certain and mutual indubitable proofs of their truth2; and it carries too great an Charity imputation of ignorance, lightness, or folly for men to quit bearance, and For |