CHAP. the idea of a triangle, and found the ways to measure its BOOK IV. angles and their magnitudes, is certain that its three angles are equal to two right ones; and can as little doubt of that, as of this truth, that, It is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be. XIII. in Natural 4. He also that hath the idea of an intelligent, but frail Instance and weak being, made by and depending on another, who is Religion. eternal, omnipotent, perfectly wise and good, will as certainly know that man is to honour, fear, and obey God, as that the sun shines when he sees it. For if he hath but the ideas of two such beings in his mind, and will turn his thoughts that way, and consider them, he will as certainly find that the inferior, finite, and dependent, is under an obligation to obey the supreme and infinite, as he is certain to find that three, four, and seven are less than fifteen; if he will consider and compute those numbers: nor can he be surer in a clear morning that the sun is risen; if he will but open his eyes, and turn them that way. But yet these truths, being ever so certain, ever so clear, he may be ignorant of either, or all of them, who will never take the pains to employ his faculties, as he should, to inform himself about them 1. 1 'The touchstone of science is the universal validity of its results for all normally constituted and duly instructed minds.' (Pearson's Grammar of Science, p. 30.) The touchstone of metaphysical or theological truth in like manner presupposes due instruc- BOOK IV. СНАР. XIV. Our ledge CHAPTER XIV. OF JUDGMENT'. 1. THE understanding faculties being given to man, not barely for speculation, but also for the conduct of his life, man would be at a great loss if he had nothing to direct him but what has the certainty of true knowledge. For that being very short and scanty, as we have seen, he would be often utterly in the dark, and in most of the actions of his life, short, we perfectly at a stand, had he nothing to guide him in the something absence of clear and certain knowledge. He that will not eat till he has demonstration that it will nourish him; he that will not stir till he infallibly knows the business he goes about will succeed, will have little else to do but to sit still and perish. want else. What twilight State. 2. Therefore, as God has set some things in broad daylight; as he has given us some certain knowledge, though limited to a few things in comparison, probably as a taste of what intellectual creatures are capable of to excite in us a desire and endeavour after a better state: so, in the greatest part of our concernments, he has afforded us only the twilight, as I may so say, of probability; suitable, I presume, to that state of mediocrity and probationership he has been pleased to place us in here; wherein, to check our over-confidence and presumption, we might, by every day's experience, be made 'Locke's restricted application of the term 'judgment,' which he opposes to 'knowledge,' has been already noted. In the more usual meaning of judg ment, every affirmation and negation, certain or probable, is so named. Locke limits 'judgment' to (more or less) probable assertions in contrast to the self-evident and demonstrated ones which constitute knowledge proper, or absolute certainty. СНАР. XIV. sensible of our short-sightedness and liableness to error; the BOOK IV. sense whereof might be a constant admonition to us, to spend the days of this our pilgrimage with industry and care, in the search and following of that way which might lead us to a state of greater perfection 1. It being highly rational to think, even were revelation silent in the case, that, as men employ those talents God has given them here, they shall accordingly receive their rewards at the close of the day, when their sun shall set, and night shall put an end to their labours. or assent supplies ledge. 3. The faculty which God has given man to supply the Judgment, want of clear and certain knowledge, in cases where that to Probacannot be had, is judgment: whereby the mind takes its bility, ideas to agree or disagree; or, which is the same, any propo- our want sition to be true or false, without perceiving a demonstrative of Knowevidence in the proofs. The mind sometimes exercises this judgment out of necessity, where demonstrative proofs and certain knowledge are not to be had; and sometimes out of laziness, unskilfulness, or haste, even where demonstrative and certain proofs are to be had 2. Men often stay not warily to examine the agreement or disagreement of two ideas, which they are desirous or concerned to know; but, either incapable of such attention as is requisite in a long train of gradations, or impatient of delay, lightly cast their eyes on, or wholly pass by the proofs; and so, without making out the demonstration, determine of the agreement or disagreement of two ideas, as it were by a view of them as they are at a distance, and take it to be the one or the other, as seems most likely to them upon such a loose survey. This faculty of the mind, when it is exercised immediately about things, is called judgment; when about truths delivered in words, is most commonly called assent or dissent: which being the most 1 Probable evidence is relative to a finite intelligence of the universe. Men must more or less rest in faith on probability, in lack of omniscience. The application of this faith, in a due response to moral evidence, is a better test of moral and spiritual character than either intuitive or demonstrative knowledge of matters which admit of 2 As when a conclusion in mathe- BOOK IV. - CHAP. XIV. Our Know ledge being CHAPTER XIV. OF JUDGMENT 1. 1. THE understanding faculties being given to man, not barely for speculation, but also for the conduct of his life, man would be at a great loss if he had nothing to direct him but what has the certainty of true knowledge. For that being very short and scanty, as we have seen, he would be often utterly in the dark, and in most of the actions of his life, short, we perfectly at a stand, had he nothing to guide him in the something absence of clear and certain knowledge. He that will not eat till he has demonstration that it will nourish him; he that will not stir till he infallibly knows the business he goes about will succeed, will have little else to do but to sit still and perish. want else. What this State. 2. Therefore, as God has set some things in broad daylight; as he has given us some certain knowledge, though limited to a few things in comparison, probably as a taste of what intellectual creatures are capable of to excite in us a desire and endeavour after a better state: so, in the greatest part of our concernments, he has afforded us only the twilight, as I may so say, of probability; suitable, I presume, to that state of mediocrity and probationership he has been pleased to place us in here; wherein, to check our over-confidence and presumption, we might, by every day's experience, be made 141 СНАР. XIV. sensible of our short-sightedness and liableness to error; the BOOK IV. sense whereof might be a constant admonition to us, to spend the days of this our pilgrimage with industry and care, in the search and following of that way which might lead us to a state of greater perfection 1. It being highly rational to think, even were revelation silent in the case, that, as men employ those talents God has given them here, they shall accordingly receive their rewards at the close of the day, when their sun shall set, and night shall put an end to their labours. or assent ledge. 3. The faculty which God has given man to supply the Judgment, want of clear and certain knowledge, in cases where that to Probacannot be had, is judgment: whereby the mind takes its bility: supplies ideas to agree or disagree; or, which is the same, any propo- our want sition to be true or false, without perceiving a demonstrative of Knowevidence in the proofs. The mind sometimes exercises this judgment out of necessity, where demonstrative proofs and certain knowledge are not to be had; and sometimes out of laziness, unskilfulness, or haste, even where demonstrative and certain proofs are to be had 2. Men often stay not warily to examine the agreement or disagreement of two ideas, which they are desirous or concerned to know; but, either incapable of such attention as is requisite in a long train of gradations, or impatient of delay, lightly cast their eyes on, or wholly pass by the proofs; and so, without making out the demonstration, determine of the agreement or disagreement of two ideas, as it were by a view of them as they are at a distance, and take it to be the one or the other, as seems most likely to them upon such a loose survey. mind, when it is exercised imme judgment; when al This faculty of the about things, is called in words, is most ch being the most which admit of sion in mathea man on the natical expert, erception of its |