-- CHAP. VI. seem to lie more level to our understandings. For as to the BOOK IV. operations of spirits, both their thinking and moving of bodies, we at first sight find ourselves at a loss; though perhaps, when we have applied our thoughts a little nearer to the consideration of bodies and their operations, and examined how far our notions, even in these, reach with any clearness beyond sensible matter of fact, we shall be bound to confess that, even in these too, our discoveries amount to very little beyond perfect ignorance and incapacity. complex stances not ideas stitutions, we can few them. 15. This is evident, the abstract complex ideas of Whilst our substances, for which their general names stand, not compre- Ideas of hending their real constitutions', can afford us very little Subuniversal certainty. Because our ideas of them are not contain made up of that on which those qualities we observe in them, of their and would inform ourselves about, do depend, or with which real Conthey have any certain connexion: v. g. let the ideas to which we give the name man be, as it commonly is, a body of the make but ordinary shape, with sense, voluntary motion, and reason general joined to it. This being the abstract idea, and consequently proposithe essence of our species, man, we can make but very few tions congeneral certain propositions concerning man, standing for cerning such an idea. Because, not knowing the real constitution on which sensation, power of motion, and reasoning, with that peculiar shape, depend, and whereby they are united together in the same subject, there are very few other qualities with which we can perceive them to have a necessary connexion: and therefore we cannot with certainty affirm: That all men sleep by intervals; That no man can be nourished by wood or stones; That all men will be poisoned by hemlock: because these ideas have no connexion nor repugnancy1 4 with this our nominal essence of man, with this abstract idea that name stands for. We must, in these and the like, appeal to trial in particular subjects, which can reach but a little 1 Only their superficial appearances patent to our senses, their 'real constitutions,' on which their behaviour ultimately depends, being (by us) imperceptible. 24 Four ideas of them,' i. e. the abstract or general ideas we can form of them, and which the common names 3 6 ideas '-qualities, when regarded as in the substances. I. e. necessary 'connexion or repugnancy.' CHAP. VI. BOOK IV. way. We must content ourselves with probability in the rest: but can have no general certainty, whilst our specific idea of man contains not that real constitution which is the root wherein all his inseparable qualities are united, and from whence they flow. Whilst our idea the word man stands for1 is only an imperfect collection of some sensible qualities and powers in him, there is no discernible connexion or repugnance between our specific idea, and the operation of either the parts of hemlock or stones upon his constitution. There are animals that safely eat hemlock, and others that are nourished by wood and stones: but as long as we want ideas of those real constitutions of different sorts of animals whereon these and the like qualities and powers depend, we must not hope to reach certainty in universal propositions concerning them. Those few ideas only which have a discernible connexion with our nominal essence, or any part of it, can afford us such propositions. But these are so few, and of so little moment 3, that we may justly look on our certain general knowledge of substances as almost none at all. Wherein 16. To conclude: general propositions, of what kind soever, lies the are then only capable of certainty, when the terms used in general Certainty them stand for such ideas, whose agreement or disagreement, of Proposi- as there expressed, is capable to be discovered by us. And tions. we are then certain of their truth or falsehood, when we perceive the ideas the terms stand for to agree or not agree, according as they are affirmed or denied one of another. Whence we may take notice, that general certainty is never to be found but in our ideas. Whenever we go to seek it elsewhere, in experiment or observations without us, our knowledge goes not beyond particulars. It is the contemplation of our own abstract ideas that alone is able to afford us general knowledge+. 1 The abstract idea, or concept, which our observation of the individuals we call 'men' induces us to apply to them. "Only probability. 3 He mentions a few elsewhere. Cf. ch. vii. § 5. This section, in which empirical propositions, concerned with our concrete ideas of substances, are distinguished from truths of reason, discoverable in the relations of abstract ideas, is one of the passages alleged in proof of the extreme nominalism of Locke. CHAPTER VII. OF MAXIMS. 1. THERE are a sort of propositions, which, under the name BOOK IV. of maxims and axioms1, have passed for principles of science: 1 By maxims or axioms Locke means supposed first principles, or selfevident truths, in their ultimate or most general form of expression. Hence they are called the maxima, or greatest propositions, which by implication contain all other propositions, and determine the articulation of our reasonings; and which are also of chief intellectual worth and dignity (aflos). Locke's application of maxim differs from its common meaning of prudential probable proposition, which may be converted into a rule of conduct; and from Kant's, whose maxims are principles only of subjective or personal validity. Axiom too is ambiguous, for it is occasionally limited to the selfevident assumptions of the mathematician, and by others extended to propositions generally. Aristotle recognises both of these meanings, and also applies the term to the ultimate presuppositions of knowledge. With Bacon it means propositions formed by generalisation, and he distinguishes axiomata generalissima from the axiomata media (intermediate between the former and particular facts), to which he is drawn as the sphere of fruitful inquiry. See Novum Organum, Dr. Fowler's edition, note 7, pp. 189-90. 'Cette recherche,' says Leibniz, with reference to the opening sentence of this chapter, 'cette recherche est fort utile et même importante. Mais il ne faut point vous figurer, monsieur, qu'elle ait été entièrement négligée. Vous trouverez en cent lieux que les philosophes de l'École ont dit que ces propositions sont évidentes ex terminis, aussitôt qu'on en entend les termes; de sorte qu'ils étaient persuadés, que la force de la conviction était fondée dans l'intelligence des termes, c'est-àdire dans la liaison de leurs idées... Pour ce qui est des maximes, on les prend quelquefois pour des propositions établies, soit qu'elles soient évidentes ou non. Cela pourra être bon pour les commençants; mais quand il s'agit de l'établissement de la science, c'est autre chose. C'est ainsi qu'on les prend souvent dans la morale, et même chez les logiciens dans leurs topiques.... Au reste, il y a longtemps que j'ai dit publiquement et en particulier qu'il serait important de démontrer tous nos axiomes secondaires, dont on se sert ordinairement, en les réduisant aux axiomes primitifs, ou immédiats et indémonstrables, qui sont ce que j'appelais dernièrement les identiques.' (Nouveaux Essais.) As related to this chapter, see Note A on the Philosophy of Common Sense,' in Hamilton's Reid (pp. 742-803), and Reid's Essays, VI. chh. iv-vii. CHAP. VII. FOORT and because they are zijenient have been supposed innate1, without that anybody that I know ever went about to show the reason and foundation of their clearness or cogency. It Anoms may, however, be wori ville to inquire into the reason of ther evidence and see whether it be peculiar to them alone; and also to examine how far they influence and govern our other knowledge+. are Sef **** dent emeace 1. Knowledge, as has been shown, consists in the perception mat Sef of the agreement or disagreement of ideas. Now, where that agreement or disagreement is perceived immediately by itself, without the intervention or help of any other, there our knowledge is self-evident. This will appear to be so to any who will bet consider any of those propositions which, without any proof he assents to at first sight': for in all of them he will find that the reason of his assent is from that agreement or disagreement which the mind, by an immediate comparing them, finds in those ideas answering the affirmation or negation in the proposition. Sef evidence not 3. This being so, in the next place, let us consider whether this self-evidence be peculiar only to those propositions which peculiar to commonly pass under the name of maxims, and have the Axioms. dignity of axioms allowed them. And here it is plain, that several other truths, not allowed to be axioms, partake received 1 In rejecting ‘innate principles,' it has been supposed that Locke intends to reject the claim of any proposition to be self-evident, notwithstanding that in this chapter and in many other parts of the Essay he insists upon the fact of self-evident propositions, and the need for them in order to constitute human knowledge. What follows may be compared with the argument in the first Book against 'innate ideas and principles,' and in proof of the dependence of all our ideas and asser. tions about things upon our experience of their behaviour in their relations to one another. Innateness and selfevidence are contrasted, not identified, by Locke. See third Letter to Stillingfleet, pp. 340-44. Locke recognises self-evidence only in mental propositions, not in ideas, which can be neither true nor false, unless a proposition regarding the idea is implied. When he is charged by Stillingfleet with holding that some of the most obvious ideas are far from being self-evident,' he asks, 'where it is that I once mention any such thing as a self-evident idea! For self-evident is an epithet that I do not remember I ever gave to any idea, or thought belonged at all to ideas.' (Third Letter, p. 322.) And as regards propositions, he refuses to limit selfevidence exclusively to 'maxims or axioms.' 3 In maxims or axioms to wit. CHAP. VII. equally with them in this self-evidence1. This we shall see, BOOK IV. if we go over these several sorts of agreement or disagreement of ideas which I have above mentioned, viz. identity, relation, co-existence, and real existence; which will discover to us, that not only those few propositions which have had the credit of maxims are self-evident, but a great many, even almost an infinite number of other propositions are such. and all Pro self 4. I. For, First, The immediate perception of the agree- As to ment or disagreement of identity being founded in the mind's Identity having distinct ideas, this affords us as many self-evident Diversity, propositions as we have distinct ideas. Every one that has positions any knowledge at all, has, as the foundation of it, various and are equally distinct ideas: and it is the first act of the mind (without evident. which it can never be capable of any knowledge) to know every one of its ideas by itself, and distinguish it from others. Every one finds in himself, that he knows the ideas he has; that he knows also, when any one is in his understanding, and what it is; and that when more than one are there, he knows them distinctly and unconfusedly one from another; which always being so, (it being impossible but that he should perceive what he perceives,) he can never be in doubt when any idea is in his mind, that it is there, and is that idea it is; and that two distinct ideas, when they are in his mind, are there, and are not one and the same idea. So that all such affirmations and negations are made without any possibility of doubt, uncertainty, or hesitation, and must necessarily be assented to as soon as understood; that is, as soon as we have in our minds [2determined ideas,] which the terms in the 1 He does not deny that the maxims or axioms in question are self-evident. He only denies that a perception of them, and of their self-evidence, with the energy of abstract thought which this perception would imply, is in all cases necessary to the knowledge in which they are latent. Their unconscious presupposition is a point of view at which, as we saw in the first Book, Locke declines to regard them; as well as their exclusive claim to selfevidence, since there are millions of concrete propositions that are self- 2 In first edition-'the ideas clear |