perfections of things hath brought in that help to is in hell thinks there is no other heaven. "Satis piece them up; as it is said, "Martha, Martha, quercus." Acorns were good till bread was attendis ad plurima, unum sufficit." So likewise found, &c. And of the other side, the forms to make it conceived, that that was good which was changed for the worse, are, "Bona magis carendo quam fruendo sentimus: Bona a tergo formosissima;" Good things never appear in their full beauty, till they turn their back and be going away, &c. The reprehension of this colour is, that the good or evil which is removed may be esteemed good or evil comparatively, and not positively or simply. So that if the privation be good, it follows not the former condition was evil, but less good; for the flower or blossom is a positive good, although the remove of it to give place to the fruit, be a comparative good. So in the tale of Esop, when the old fainting man in the heat of the day cast down his burden and called for Death; and when Death came to know his will with him, said, it was for nothing but to help him up with his burden again: it doth not follow, that because Death, which was the privation of the burden, was ill, therefore the burden was good. And in this part, the ordinary form of " malum necessarium" aptly reprehendeth this colour, for "privatio mali necessarii est mala," and yet that doth not convert the nature of the necessary evil, but it is evil. hereupon Esop framed the fable of the fox and the cat; whereas the fox bragged what a number of shifts and devices he had to get from the hounds, and the cat said she had but one, which was to climb a tree, which in proof was better worth than all the rest; whereof the proverb grew, "Multa novit vulpes, sed felis unum magnum." And in the moral of this fable it comes likewise to pass, that a good sure friend is a better help at a pinch than all the stratagems and policies of a man's own wit. So it falleth out to be a common error in negotiating, whereas men have many reasons to induce or persuade, they strive commonly to utter and use them all at once, which weakeneth them. For it argueth, as was said, a neediness in every of the reasons, by itself, as if one did not trust to any of them, but fled from one to another, helping himself only with that: "Et quæ non prosunt singula, multa juvant." Indeed in a set speech in an assembly, it is expected a man should use all his reasons in the case he handleth, but in private persuasions it is always a great error. A fourth case wherein this colour may be reprehended, is in respect of that same "vis unita fortior," according to the tale of the French king, that when the emperor's ambassador had recited his master's style at large, which consisteth of many countries and dominions; the French king willed his chan, cellor, or other minister, to repeat and say over France as many times as the other had recited the several dominions; intending it was equivalent with them all, and besides more compacted and united. There is also appertaining to this colour another point, why breaking of a thing doth help it, not by way of adding a show of magnitude unto it, but a note of excellency and rarity; whereof the forms are, Where shall you find such a concurrence; Great but not complete; for it seems a less work of nature or fortune, to make any thing in his kind greater than ordinary, than to make a strange composition. Yet if it be narrowly considered, this colour will be reprehended or encountered, by imputing to all excellencies in the nature to spread, multiply, and infect in simi compositions a kind of poverty, or at least a casualty or jeopardy; for from that which is excellent in greatness, somewhat may be taken, or there may be decay, and yet sufficiency left; but from that which hath his price in composition, if you take away any thing, or any part do fail, all is disgrace. VI. "Cujus privatio bona, malum; cujus privatio mala, bonum."* THE forms to make it conceived, that that was evil which is changed for the better, are, He that *"That whose privation (or the want of which) is good, is in itself evil; that whose privation (or the want whereof) is an evil, is in itself good." Again it cometh sometimes to pass, that there is an equality in the change of privation, and as it were a "dilemma boni," or a "dilemma mali:" so that the corruption of the one good, is a generation of the other. "Sorti pater æquus utrique est:" and contrary, the remedy of the one evil is the occasion and commencement of another, as in Scylla and Charybdis. VII. "Quod bono vicinum, bonum, quod a bono remotum, malum."t SUCH is the nature of things, that things contrary, and distant in nature and quality, are also severed and disjoined in place; and things like and consenting in quality, are placed, and as it were quartered together: for, partly in regard of litude; and partly in regard of the nature to break, expel, and alter that which is disagreeable and contrary, most things do either associate, and draw near to themselves the like, or at least assimilate to themselves that which approacheth near them, and do also drive away, chase and exterminate their contraries. And that is the reason commonly yielded, why the middle region of the air should be coldest, because the sun and stars are either hot by direct beams, or by reflection. The direct beams heat the upper region, the reflected beams from the earth and seas heat the lower region. That which is in the midst, + "What is near to good, is good; what is at a distance from good, is evil." being farthest distant in place from these two the other, it is a kind of compensation: so the regions of heat, are most distant in nature, that is, poets in tragedies do make the most passionate coldest; which is that they term cold or hot "per lamentations, and those that forerun final despair, antiperistasin," that is, environing by contraries: which was pleasantly taken hold of by him that said, that an honest man, in these days, must needs be more honest than in ages heretofore, "propter antiperistasin," because the shutting of him in the midst of contraries, must needs make the honesty stronger and more compact in itself. to be accusing, questioning, and torturing of a man's self. The reprehension of this colour is: first, many things of amplitude in their kind do as it were ingross to themselves all, and leave that which is next them most destitute: as the shoots or underwood, that grow near a great and spread tree, is the most pined and shrubby wood of the field, because the great tree doth deprive and deceive them of sap and nourishment; so he saith well, " divitus servi maxime servi;" and the comparison was pleasant of him, that compared courtiers attendant in the courts of princes without great place or office, to fasting-days, which were next the holydays, but otherwise were the leanest days in all the week. Another reprehension is, that things of greatness and predominancy, though they do not extenuate the things adjoining in substance, yet they drown them and obscure them in show and appearance; and therefore the astronomers say, That whereas in all other planets conjunction is the perfectest amity; the sun contrariwise is good by aspect, but evil by conjunction. A third reprehension is, because evil approacheth to good sometimes for concealment, sometimes for protection; and good to evil for conversion and reformation. So hypocrisy draweth near to religion for coverts and hiding itself; "sæpe latet vitium proximitate boni:" and sanctuary-men, which were commonly inordinate men and malefactors, were wont to be nearest to priests and prelates, and holy men; for the majesty of good things is such, as the confines of them are revered. On the other side, our Saviour, charged with nearness of publicans and rioters, said, "The physician approacheth the sick rather than the whole." VIII. "Quod quis culpa sua contraxit, majus malum, quod ab externis imponitur, minus malum."* THE reason is, because the sting and remorse of the mind accusing itself doubleth all adversity: contrariwise, the considering and recording inwardly, that a man is clear and free from fault and just imputation, doth attempter outward calamities. For if the evil be in the sense, and in the conscience both, there is a gemination of it; but if evil be in the one, and comfort in • "That which a man hath procured by his own default is a greater mischief, (or evil:) that which is laid on him by others is a lesser evil." "Seque unum clamat causamque caputque malorum." And contrariwise, the extremities of worthy persons have been annihilated in the consideration of their own good deserving. Besides, when the evil cometh from without, there is left a kind of evaporation of grief, if it come by human injury, either by indignation, and meditating of revenge from ourselves, or by expecting or foreconceiving that Nemesis and retribution will take hold of the authors of our hurt: or if it be by for tune or accident, yet there is left a kind of expostulation against the divine powers; "Atque deos atque astra vocat crudelia mater." But where the evil is derived from a man's own fault, there all strikes deadly inwards and suffocateth. The reprehension of this colour is, first in respect of hope, for reformation of our faults is "in nostra potestate;" but amendment of our fortune simply is not. Therefore, Demosthenes, in many of his orations, saith thus to the people of Athens: "That which having regard to the time past is the worst point and circumstance of all the rest; that as to the time to come is the best: what is that? Even this, that by your sloth, irresolution, and misgovernment, your affairs are grown to this declination and decay. For had you used and ordered your means and forces to the best, and done your parts every way to the full, and, notwithstanding, your matters should have gone backward in this manner, as they do, there had been no hope left of recovery or reparation; but since it hath been only by your own errors," &c So Epictetus in his degrees saith, "The worst state of man is to accuse external things, better than that to accuse a man's self, and best of all to accuse neither." Another reprehension of this colour is, in respect of the well-bearing of evils wherewith a man can charge nobody but himself, which their friends' consents, if they be never so ill used, | therefore open to be imitated and followed; whereyet you shall seldom see them complain, but set as felicity is inimitable: so we generally see that a good face on it. IX. "Quod opera et virtute nostra partum est, majus bonum; quod ab alieno beneficio vel ab indulgentia fortunæ delatum, est minus bonum."* things of nature seem more excellent than things of art, because they be inimitable; for "quod imitabile est, potentia quadam vulgatum est." "THE reasons are, first, the future hope, because upon Plutarch saith elegantly of the acts of Ti in the favours of others, or the good winds of fortune, we have no state or certainty; in our endeavours or abilities we have. So as when they have purchased us one good fortune, we have them as ready, and better edged, and inured to procure another. The forms be: you have won this by play, you have not only the water, but you have the receipt, you can make it again if it be lost, &c. Next, because these properties which we enjoy by the benefit of others, carry with them an obligation, which seemeth a kind of burden; whereas the other, which derive from ourselves, are like the freest parents, "absque aliquo inde reddendo;" and if they proceed from fortune or providence, yet they seem to touch us secretly with the reverence of the divine powers, whose favours we taste, and therefore work a kind of religious fear and restraint: whereas in the other kind, that comes to pass which the prophet speaketh, "lætantur et exultant, immolant plagis suis, et sacrificant reti suo." Thirdly, because that which cometh unto us without our own virtue, yieldeth not that commendation and reputation: for actions of great felicity may draw wonder, but praise less; as Cicero said to Cæsar, "Quæ miremur, habemus; quæ laudemus, expectamus." Fourthly, because the purchases of our own industry are joined commonly with labour and strife, which gives an edge and appetite, and makes the fruition of our desires more pleasant. "Suavis cibus a venatu." On the other side, there be four countercolours to this colour, rather than reprehensions, because they be as large as the colour itself. First, because felicity seemeth to be a character of the favour and love of the divine powers, and accordingly worketh both confidence in ourselves, and respect and authority from others. And this felicity extendeth to many casual things, whereunto the care or virtue of man cannot extend, and therefore seemeth to be a larger good; as when Cæsar said to the sailor, " Cæsarem portas et fortunam ejus;" if he had said, " et virtutem ejus," it had been small comfort against a tempest, otherwise than if it might seem upon merit to induce fortune. Next, whatsoever is done by virtue and industry, seems to be done by a kind of habit and art, and * "That which is gotten by our own pains and industry is a greater good; that which comes by another man's courtesy, or the indulgence of fortune, is a lesser good." G2 Thirdly, felicity commendeth those things which come without our labour; for they seem gifts, and the other seem pennyworths; wheremoleon, who was so fortunate, compared with the acts of Agesilaus and Epaminondas; that they were like Homer's verses, they ran so easily and so well. And therefore it is the word we give unto poesy, terming it a happy vein, because fa cility seemeth ever to come from happiness. Fourthly, this same "præter spem, vel præter expectatum," doth increase the price and pleasure of many things: and this cannot be incident to those things that proceed from our own care and compass. x. "Gradus privationis major videtur, quam gradus diminutionis; et rursus gradus inceptionis major videtur, quam gradus incrementii."† It is a position in the mathematics, that there is no proportion between something and nothing, therefore the degree of nullity and quiddity or act, seemeth larger than the degree of increase and decrease; as to a "monoculus" it is more to lose one eye than to a man that hath two eyes. So if one have lost divers children, it is more grief to him to lose the last than all the rest; because he is "spes gregis." And therefore Sibylla, when she brought her three books, and had burned two, did double the whole price of both the other, because the burning of that had been "gradus privationis," and not "diminutionis." This colour is reprehended first in those things, the use and service whereof resteth in sufficiency, competency, or determinate quantity: as if a man be to pay one hundred pounds upon a penalty, it is more to him to want twelve pence, than after that twelve pence supposed to be wanting, to want ten shillings more; so the decay of a man's estate seems to be most touched in the degree, when he first grows behind, more than afterwards, when he proves nothing worth. And hereof the common forms are, "Sera in fundo parsimonia," and, as good never a whit, as never the better, &c. It is reprehended also in respect of that notion, "Corruptio unius, generatio alterius:" so that " gradus privationis" is many times less matter, because it gives the cause and motive to some new course. As when Demosthenes reprehended the people for hearkening to the conditions offered by King Philip, being not honourable nor equal, he saith they were but aliments of their sloth and weakness, +"The degree of privation seems greater than the degree of diminution; and again, the degree of inception (or beginning) seems greater than the degree of increase." which if they were taken away, necessity would and come to no substance without an iteration; teach them stronger resolutions. So Doctor so as in such cases the second degree seems the Hector was wont to say to the dames of London, when they complained they were they could not tell how, but yet they could not endure to take any medicine; he would tell them their way was only to be sick, for then they would be glad to take any medicine. Thirdly, this colour may be reprehended, in respect that the degree of decrease is more sensitive than the degree of privation; for in the mind of man "gradus diminutionis" may work a wavering between hope and fear, and so keep the mind in suspense, from settling and accommodating in patience and resolution. Hereof the common forms are, better eye out than always ache; make or mar, &c. For the second branch of this colour, it depends upon the same general reason: hence grew the common-place of extolling the beginning of every thing: "dimidium facti qui bene cœpit habet." This made the astrologers so idle as to judge of a man's nature and destiny, by the constellation of the moment of his nativity or conception. This colour is reprehended, because many inceptions are but, as Epicurus termeth them, "tentamenta," inat is, imperfect offers and essays, which vanish worthiest, as the body-horse in the cart that draweth more than the fore-horse. Hereof the common forms are, the second blow makes the fray, the second word makes the bargain: "Alter principium dedit, alter modum abstulit," &c. Another reprehension of this colour is in respect of defatigation, which makes perseverance of greater dignity than inception: for chance or instinct of nature may cause inception: but settled affection or judgment maketh the continuance. Thirdly, this colour is reprehended in such things, which have a natural course and inclination contrary to an inception. So that the inception is continually evacuated and gets no start: but there behoveth " perpetua inceptio," as in the common form, " Non progredi est regredi, qui non proficit deficit:" running against the hill, rowing against the stream, &c. For if it be with the stream or with the hill, then the degree of inception is more than all the rest. Fourthly, this colour is to be understood of " gradus inceptionis a potentia ad actum, comparatus cum gradu ab actu ad incrementum." For otherwise "majur videtur gradus ab impotentia ad potentiam, quam a potentia ad actum." MISCELLANEOUS TRACTS UPON HUMAN PHILOSOPHY. MR. BACON IN PRAISE OF KNOWLEDGE. SILENCE were the best celebration of that, menting, maketh us to stumble upon somewhat which I mean to commend; for who would not use silence, where silence is not made? and what crier can make silence in such a noise and tumult of vain and popular opinions? My praise shall be dedicated to the mind itself. The mind is the man, and the knowledge of the mind. A man is but what he knoweth. The mind itself is but an accident to knowledge; for knowledge is a double of that which is. The truth of being, and the truth of knowing, is all one: and the pleasures of the affections greater than the pleasures of the senses. And are not the pleasures of the intellect greater than the pleasures of the affections? Is it not a which is new: but all the disputation of the learned never brought to light one effect of nature before unknown. When things are known and found out, then they can descant upon them, they can knit them into certain causes, they can reduce them to their principles. If any instance of experience stand against them, they can range it in order by some distinctions. But all this is but a web of the wit, it can work nothing. I do not doubt but that common notions which we call reason, and the knitting of them together, which we call logic, are the art of reason and studies. But they rather cast obscurity, than gain light to the true and only natural pleasure, whereof there is contemplation of nature. All the philosophy of no satiety? Is it not knowledge that doth alone nature which is now received, is either the philoclear the mind of all perturbations? How many sophy of the Grecians, or that other of the alche. things are there which we imagine not? How mists. That of the Grecians hath the foundations many things do we esteem and value otherwise in words, in ostentation, in confutation, in sects, than they are? This ill-proportioned estimation, in schools, in disputations. The Grecians were, these vain imaginations, these be the clouds of as one of themselves saith, "you Grecians, ever error that turn into the storms of perturbation. Is children." They knew little antiquity; they there any such happiness as for a man's mind to be raised above the confusion of things; where he may have the prospect of the order of nature, and the error of men? Is this but a vein only of delight, and not of discovery? of contentment, and not of benefit? Shall we not as well discern the riches of nature's warehouse, as the benefit of her shop? Is truth ever barren? Shall he not be knew, except fables, not much above five hundred years before themselves. They knew but a small portion of the world. That of the alchemists hath the foundation in imposture, in auricular traditions and obscurity. It was catching hold of religion, but the principle of it is, " Populus vult decipi." So that I know no great difference between these great philosophers, but that the one able thereby to produce worthy effects, and to is a loud crying folly, and the other is a whisper endow the life of man with infinite commodities? ing folly. The one is gathered out of a few vulBut shall I make this garland to be put upon a gar observations, and the other out of a few exwrong head? Would any body believe me, if I periments of a furnace. The one never faileth to should verify this, upon the knowledge that is multiply words, and the other ever faileth to mulnow in use? Are we the richer by one poor in- tiply gold. Who would not smile at Aristotle, vention, by reason of all the learning that hath when he admireth the eternity and invariableness been these many hundred years? The industry of the heavens, as there were not the like in the of artificers maketh some small improvement of bowels of the earth? Those be the confines and things invented; and chance sometimes in experi- borders of these two kingdoms, where the con 79 |