1497

HENRY'S TRIUMPH.

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obtained, and the vice of avarice, first conspicuously displayed in CHAP. 1495, grew steadily upon him. But if he was not a favourite with his people, he was alert in his study of the popular temper, knowing what his subjects would stand, and careful not to transgress the limit. "My masters of Ireland," he is reported

to have said once to some lords of the Pale, "ye will crown apes at last," and the spirit of humorous contempt embalmed in this famous phrase is characteristic of his whole attitude during a period of anxieties calculated to sour the temper and perplex the judgment of less discerning men.

IV.

CHAPTER IV.

FOREIGN AND COMMERCIAL POLICY.

CHAP. To outside observers the victory of Blackheath followed by the capture of Perkin appeared to have established the Tudor dynasty firmly upon the throne. The Milanese envoy Soncino," writing on September 8, 1497, to his master, spoke with confidence of the outlook. "The kingdom," he said, "is perfectly stable by reason first of the king's wisdom, whereof every one stands in awe; and secondly on account of the king's wealth; for I am informed that he has upwards of six millions of gold and it is said that he puts by annually five hundred thousand ducats." The truth was that the new flame of Italian conquest which had caught hold of the imagination and the policy of France cleared away a good many traditional perils from the path of England. As France was anxious to be assured of Henry's neutrality in order that she should not be molested by England in the prosecution of her southern policy, so Spain was anxious to fortify the new dynasty in order that the King of England might be free to help her on the continent, free to prevent Charles becoming "King of Italy," free to prevent the pope from becoming Charles's "sacristan". The internal stability of England became therefore a matter of intimate concern to the court of Spain. That Arthur should ascend the English throne, that he should marry Catharine, that his sister Margaret should wed the King of Scotland, that an end should be made of Yorkist intrigues and Yorkist pretenders, and Scottish raids on the border, was considered to be almost as essential to the permanent emancipation of Italy from French control as the triumphs of Cordova's infantry in the Neapolitan kingdom.

It is true that for the moment these splendid troops had carried all before them, that France, foiled in Italy and threat

1497

THE TREATY OF MARCOUSSIS.

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IV.

ened on the Pyrenean border, was glad to come to terms, that CHAP. an armistice was signed at Lyons on February 27, 1497, and that on August 5, 1498, a treaty was agreed upon at Marcoussis, based in reality though not explicitly upon the policy of dividing the Neapolitan kingdom between France and Spain. But although the desertion of Ferdinand broke up the Holy league and seemed to portend a subversion of all the political relations of the western states, this was in reality not the case. Louis XII., the new lord of France-for Charles had died suddenly on April 7, 1498-was that Louis of Orleans who had played so turbulent and unscrupulous a part during the troubles of Brittany. But once seated on the throne he adopted the policy of his predecessor. Divorcing his own wife he married Charles's widow, Anne of Brittany, and secured the continuance of the union between that province and France. As Duke of Orleans he had laid claim to the Milanese in the right of an ancestress, Valentina Visconti, and he now boldly adopted the title of Duke of Milan. It was clear that at an early opportunity Italy might expect to suffer a new French invasion, an invasion better prepared and more skilfully led than the brilliant but ineffectual raid of Charles VIII. The proposal that Spain should have a slice of the spoil was an unscrupulous insurance against risk; but the risk remained, and Ferdinand was shrewd enough to see that if a corrupt and secret bargain with France was one form of insurance an open alliance with England was another. In the treaty of Marcoussis the right to assist England was fully reserved to Spain.

Meanwhile Henry had drawn closer to France. His adherence to the Holy league had gratified Spain and obtained for him a sword and a cap of maintenance from the pope, but it had neither involved him in military engagements abroad, nor had it prevented the signature of a commercial treaty between the two countries in May, 1497. France had political reasons for cultivating Henry's friendship, and Henry had pecuniary reasons for standing well with France, for so long as the treaty of Etaples was in force English courtiers drew pensions, and the English king received a revenue from the French treasury. But it was an alliance unseasoned by generosity or goodwill. Next year, when Henry learnt that Charles was dead, he told De Puebla that it was most desirable that civil war should break

IV.

CHAP. out in France and Brittany, that he had sent two spies over, one of whom had gone to de Rohan, and that if divisions were to break out he would without loss of time invade the kingdom to reconquer what belonged to him by right. Soon after a messenger came from Maximilian to entreat Henry not to allow an occasion of attacking his old enemy to slip by. Henry, who had some reason for questioning "the constancy, veracity, and perseverance" of his correspondent, replied in his sardonic way, that he should "like to see the King of the Romans at war with France, but only by way of witnessing his wonderful feats and not in order to take part himself in the enterprise". That interesting spectacle was, however, denied to him, for Maximilian was helpless without the active support of Burgundy or the league. Everything combined to secure for Louis XII. a peaceful accession. A solemn funeral service was celebrated for the late King of France in St. Paul's cathedral, and on July 14, 1498, the treaty of Etaples was renewed in Paris, with the article against the reception of English rebels made additionally stringent.

In the history of English diplomacy there are few alliances more momentous than those contracted with Spain and with Scotland upon the subsidence of the civil troubles. Every boy of fifteen and upwards might remember how Spain had suddenly sprung into the first rank of European powers; how she had driven the Moors from their mountain fastnesses, and captured the heathen capital of Granada; how she had sent galleys across the Atlantic Ocean and discovered islands of fabulous wealth; how her veterans, hardened in the Moorish campaigns, had swept the famous French chivalry out of Naples, and revealed to Europe the existence of a military instrument as tenacious, as hardy, and as formidable as the mercenaries of the Alps. That the heir to the English throne should wed a Spanish infanta was a pledge that the Tudor dynasty, however much contested might be its claims, would at least receive the support of a great power in defending them. That the alliance was founded upon a substantial community of interest is proved by its continuance for a space of forty years. That it was ultimately shattered was due to a coincidence of forces so strange, so powerful, and so various that in the act of severance England was swept away from her immemorial moorings to the Church

1497

THE SPANISH MARRIAGE.

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IV.

of Rome. The marriage treaty with Scotland was of a different CHAP. nature, but it was almost equally fertile in immediate benefit, and far more important in its ultimate results. Out of it sprang the union of the two crowns, and out of the union of the two crowns proceeded the fiscal and legislative union of the two kingdoms. It may therefore be regarded as the first important step towards the political consolidation of Great Britain which had been taken since the establishment of the national parliament at the end of the thirteenth century.

There is no circumstance more characteristic of the political standards of the age, than the manner and spirit in which these two large transactions were conducted. In view of the great interests involved, it might have been expected that the diplomacy would have been cordial or at least dignified, that minute occasions of friction would have been carefully avoided, and that every effort would have been made to reach a settlement by the smoothest and most direct route. The very reverse proved to be the case. No sharp-witted, close-fisted huckster chaffering his wares at a country fair could have shown a keener desire to save a halfpenny than the King of England, and no peasants who ever drove their cart to market were more sharpwitted and close-fisted than the King and Queen of Spain. The amount of the marriage portion, the time at which it should be paid, the arrangement for the valuation of that portion of it which was to be paid in kind, the extent of the dower, the reduction or retention of English duties on Spanish merchandise: these considerations gave matter for protracted and anxious debate. In both treaties the pecuniary advantage of the King of England was safeguarded with the most minute and suspicious particularity, and an ineffaceable impression of meanness is imprinted on the two alliances which form the most enduring achievement of Henry's diplomacy.

The marriage treaty between Prince Arthur and the Infanta Catharine was first signed in London on October 1, 1496, and then finally ratified by Henry on July 18, 1497. It was settled, in accordance with the agreement made at Medina del Campo eight years earlier, that the princess should come to England when Prince Arthur had attained his fourteenth year, and that she should succeed to the throne of Castile in the event of the other children of Ferdinand and Isabella dying without heirs.