whence this folly seemeth chiefly to have flown, never had it but only in practice and toleration, and never as authorized by law; and yet now of late they have been fain to purge their folly with extreme rigour, in so much as many gentlemen, left between death and life in the duels, as I spake before, were hastened to hanging with their wounds bleeding. For the state found it had been neglected so long, as nothing could be thought cruelty which tended to the putting of it down. As for the second defect pretended in our law, that it hath provided no remedy for lies and fillips, it may receive like answer. It would have been thought a madness amongst the ancient lawgivers, to have set a punishment upon the lie given, which in effect is but a word of denial, a negative of another's saying. Any lawgiver, if he had been asked the question, would have made Solon's answer: that he had not ordained any punishment for it, because he never imagined the world would have been so fantastical as to take it so highly. The civilians, they dispute whether an action of injury lie for it, and rather resolve the contrary. And Francis the First of France, who first set on and stamped this disgrace so deep, is taxed by the judgment of all wise writers for beginning the vanity of it; for it was he, that when he had himself given the lie and defy to the emperor, to make it current in the world, said in a solemn assembly, "That he was no "honest man that would bear the lie:" which was the fountain of this new learning. As for words of reproach and contumely, whereof the lie was esteemed none, it is not credible, but that the orations themselves are extant, what extreme and exquisite reproaches were tossed up and down in the senate of Rome and the places of assembly, and the like in Græcia, and yet no man took himself fouled by them, but took them but for breath, and the style of an enemy, and either despised them or returned them, but no blood spilt about them. So of every touch or light blow of the person, they are not in themselves considerable, save that they have got upon them the stamp of a disgrace, which maketh these light things pass for great matter. The law of England, and all laws, hold these degrees of injury to the person, slander, battery, maim, and death; and if there be extraordinary circumstances of despite and contumely, as in case of libels, and bastinadoes, and the like, this court taketh them in hand, and punisheth them exemplarily. But for this apprehension of a disgrace, that a fillip to the person should be a mortal wound to the reputation, it were good that men did hearken unto the saying of Consalvo, the great and famous commander, that was wont to say, a gentleman's honour should be de tela crassiore, of a good strong warp or web, that every little thing should not catch in it; when as now it seems they are but of cob-web lawn, or such light stuff, which certainly is weakness, and not true greatness of mind, but like a sick man's body, that is so tender that it feels every thing. And so much in maintenance and demonstration of the wisdom and justice of the law of the land. For the capacity of this court, I take this to be a ground infallible: that wheresoever an offence is capital, or matter of felony, though it be not acted, there the combination or practice tending to that offence is punishable in this court as a high misdemeanor. So practice to impoison, though it took no effect; waylaying to murder, though it took no effect, and the like; have been adjudged heinous misdemeanors punishable in this court. Nay, inceptions and preparations in inferior crimes, that are not capital, as suborning and preparing of witnesses that were never deposed, or deposed nothing material, have likewise been censured in this court, as appeareth by the decree in Garnon's case. Why then, the major proposition being such, the minor cannot be denied: for every appointment of the field is but combination and plotting of murder; let them gild it how they list, they shall never have fairer terms of me in place of justice. Then the conclusion followeth, that it is a case fit for the censure of the court. And of this there be precedents in the very point of challenge. It was the case of Wharton, plaintiff, against Ellekar and Acklam, defendants, where Acklam being a follower of Ellekar's, was censured for carrying a challenge from Ellekar to Wharton, though the challenge was not put in writing, but delivered only by word of message; and there are words in the decree, that such challenges are to the subversion of govern ment. These things are well known, and therefore I needed not so much to have insisted upon them, but that in this case I would be thought not to innovate any thing of my own head, but to follow the former precedents of the court, though I mean to do it more thoroughly, because the time requires it more. Therefore now to come to that which concerneth my part; I say, that by the favour of the king and the court, I will prosecute in this court in the cases following. If any man shall appoint the field, though the fight be not acted or performed. If any man shall send any challenge in writing, or any message of challenge. If any man carry or deliver any writing or message of challenge. If any man shall accept or return a challenge. If any man shall accept to be a second in a challenge of either side. If any man shall depart the realm, with intention and agreement to perform the fight beyond the seas. If any man shall revive a quarrel by any scandalous bruits or writings, contrary to a former proclamation published by his majesty in that behalf. Nay, I hear there be some counsel learned of duels, that tell young men when they are before-hand, and when they are otherwise, and thereby incense and incite them to the duel, and make an art of it; I hope I shall meet with some of them too: and I am sure, my lords, this course of preventing duels in nipping them in the bud, is fuller of clemency and providence than the suffering them to go on, and hanging men with their wounds bleeding, as they did in France. To conclude, I have some petitions to make first to your lordship, my lord chancellor, that in case I be advertised of a purpose in any to go beyond the sea to fight, I may have granted his majesty's writ of Ne exeat regnum to stop him, for this giant bestrideth the sea, and I would take and snare him by the foot on this side; for the combination and plotting is on this side, though it should be acted beyond sea. And your lordship said notably the last time I made a motion in this business, that a man may be as well fur de se, as felo de se, if he steal out of the realm for a bad purpose; as for the satisfying of the words of the writ, no man will doubt but he doth machinari contra coronam, as the words of the writ be, that seeketh to murder a subject; for that is ever contra coronam et dignitatem. I have also a suit to your lordships all in general, that for justice sake, and for true honour's sake, honour of religion, law, and the king our master, against this fond and false disguise or puppetry of honour, I may in my prosecution, which, it is like enough, may sometimes stir coals, which I esteem not for my particular, but as it may hinder the good service, I may, I say, be countenanced and assisted from your lordships. Lastly, I have a petition to the nobles and gentlemen of England, that they would learn to esteem themselves at a just price. Non hos quæsitum munus in usus, their blood is not to be spilt like water or a vile thing; therefore that they would rest persuaded there cannot be a form of honour, except it be upon a worthy matter. But for this, ipsi viderint, I am resolved. And thus much for the general, now to the present case. THE DECREE OF THE STAR-CHAMBER AGAINST DUELS. In Camera stellata coram concilio ibidem, 26 Januarii, 11 Jac. regis. PRESENT, George Lord Archbishop of Charles Earl of Nottingham, Thomas E. of Suffolk, Lord John Lord Bishop of London. William Lord Knolles, Trea- Edward Lord Wotton, Comp troller. John Lord Stanhope, Vicechamberlain. Sir Edward Coke, Knight, Sir Henry Hobart, Knight, Sir Julius Cæsar, Knight, THIS day was heard and debated at large the several matters of informations here exhibited by Sir Francis Bacon, knight, his majesty's attorney-general, the one against William Priest, gentleman, for writing and sending a letter of challenge, together with a stick, which should be the length of the weapon: and the other against Richard Wright, esquire, for carrying and delivering the said letter and stick unto the party challenged, and for other contemptuous and insolent behaviour used before the justices of the peace in Surry, at their sessions,before whom he was convented. Upon the opening of which cause, his highness's said attorney-general did first give his reason to the court, why, in a case which he intended should be a leading case for the repressing of so great a mischief in the |