ЕПЕА ПТEPOENTA,

&c.

PART I.

CHAPTER I.

OF THE DIVISION OR DISTRIBUTION OF LANGUAGE.

H.-THE purpose of Language is to communicate our thoughts

B.-You do not mention this, I hope, as something new, or wherein you differ from others?

H.-You are too hasty with me. No. But I mention it as that principle, which, being kept singly in contemplation, has misled all those who have reasoned on this subject.

B. Is it not true, then?

H.-I think it is. And that on which the whole matter

rests.

B. And yet the confining themselves to this true principle, upon which the whole matter rests, has misled them!

H.-Indeed I think so.

B. This is curious!

H.-Yet I hope to convince you of it. *soned Words are the signs of things.

For thus they rea

There must there

fore be as many sorts of words, or parts of speech, as there are sorts of things'. The earliest inquirers into language proceeded then to settle how many sorts there were of things; and from thence how many sorts of words, or parts of speech. Whilst this method of search strictly prevailed, the parts of

"Dictio rerum nota: pro rerum speciebus partes quotque suas sortietur."-J. C. Scaliger de Causis L. I..

speech were very few in number: but two.

four.

At most three, or

All things, said they, must have names'. But there are two sorts of things:

viz.

1. Res quæ permanent.

2. Res quæ fluunt.

There must therefore be two sorts of words or parts of speech:

1. Nota rerum quæ permanent.

2. Nota rerum quæ fluunt.

Well; but surely there are words which are neither nota rerum permanentium, nor yet note rerum fluentium. What will you do with them?-We cannot tell: we can find but these two sorts in rerum natura: call therefore those other words, if you will, for the present, particles, or inferior parts of speech, till we can find out what they are. Or, as we see they are constantly interspersed between nouns and verbs, and seem therefore in a manner to hold our speech together, suppose you call them conjunctions or connectives.

This seems to have been the utmost progress that philosophical Grammar had made till about the time of Aristotle, when a fourth part of speech was added,-the definitive, or

article.

From this moment Grammar quits the day-light; and plunges into an abyss of utter darkness.,

2

A good convenient name for all the words which we do not understand; for, as the denomination means nothing in particular, and contains no description, it will equally suit any short word we may please to refer thither. There has latterly been much dispute amongst Grammarians concerning the use of this word, particle, in the division and distribution of speech: particularly by Girard, Dangeau, the authors of the Encyclopédie, &c. In which it is singular that they should all be right in their arguments against the use made of it by others; and all wrong in the use which each of them would make of it himself. S. Johnson adopts N. Bailey's definition of a particle-" a word unvaried by inflection." And Locke defines particles to be-" the words whereby the mind signifies what connection it gives to the several affirmations and negations that it unites in one continued reasoning or narration."

Dr.

3 The Latin Grammarians amuse themselves with debating whether Zuvdeoμos should be translated Convinctio or Conjunctio. The Danes and the Dutch seem to have taken different sides of the question: for the Danish language terms it Bindeord, and the Dutch Koppelwoord.

Here concluded the search after the different sorts of words, or parts of speech, from the difference of things: for none other apparently rational, acknowledged, or accepted difference has been suggested.

According to this system, it was necessary that all sorts of words should belong to one of these four classes. For words being the signs of things, their sorts must necessarily follow the sorts of the things signified. And there being no more than four differences of things, there could be but four parts of speech. The difficulty and controversy now was, to determine to which of these four classes each word belonged. In the attempting of which, succeeding Grammarians could neither satisfy themselves nor others: for they soon discovered some words so stubborn, that no sophistry nor violence could by any means reduce them to any one of these classes. However, by this attempt and dispute they became better acquainted with the differences of words, though they could not account for them; and they found the old system deficient, though they knew not how to supply its defects. They seem therefore to have reversed the method of proceeding from things to signs, pursued by the philosophers; and, still allowing the principle, (viz. that there must be as many sorts of words as of things,) they travelled backwards, and sought for the things from the signs: adopting the converse of the principle; namely, that there must be as many differences of things as of signs. Misled therefore by the useful contrivances of language, they supposed many imaginary differences of things: and thus added greatly to the number of parts of speech, and in consequence to the errors of philosophy.

Add to this, that the greater and more laborious part of Grammarians (to whose genius it is always more obvious to remark a multitude of effects than to trace out one cause) confined themselves merely to notice the differences observable in words, without any regard to the things signified.

From this time the number of parts of speech has been variously reckoned: you will find different Grammarians contending for more than thirty. But most of those who admitted the fewest, acknowledged eight. This was long a favourite number; and has been kept to by many who yet did not include the same parts to make For those who rethat number. up

jected the article reckoned eight: and those who did not allow the interjection still reckoned eight. But what sort of difference in words should intitle them to hold a separate rank by themselves, has not to this moment been settled.

B.-You seem to forget, that it is some time since words have been no longer allowed to be the signs of things. Modern Grammarians acknowledge them to be (as indeed Aristotle called them, ovußоλа #alημаτwv) the signs of ideas: at the same time denying the other assertion of Aristotle, that ideas are the likenesses of things'. And this has made a great alteration in the manner of accounting for the differences of words.

H.-That has not much mended the matter. No doubt this alteration approached so far nearer to the truth; but the nature of Language has not been much better understood by it. For Grammarians have since pursued just the same method with mind, as had before been done with things. The different operations of the mind are to account now for what the different things were to account before: and when they are not found sufficiently numerous for the purpose, it is only supposing an imaginary operation or two, and the difficulties are for the time shuffled over. So that the very same game has been played over again with ideas, which was before played with things. No satisfaction, no agreement has been obtained. But all has been dispute, diversity, and darkness. Insomuch that many of the most learned and judicious Grammarians, disgusted with absurdity and contradictions, have prudently contented themselves with remarking the differences of words, and have left the causes of language to shift for themselves.

B. That the methods of accounting for Language remain to this day various, uncertain, and unsatisfactory, cannot be denied. But you have said nothing yet to clear up the paradox you set out with; nor a single word to unfold to us by what means you suppose Hermes has blinded Philosophy.

II.-I imagine that it is, in some measure, with the vehicle. of our thoughts, as with the vehicles for our bodies. Necessity produced both. The first carriage for men was no doubt invented to transport the bodies of those who from infirmity, or

1 Έστι μεν ουν τα εν τῇ φωνῇ των εν τῇ ψυχῇ παθηματων συμβολα—και ων ταυτα ὁμοιωματα, πραγματα.-Aristot. de Interpretat.

otherwise, could not move themselves: But should any one, desirous of understanding the purpose and meaning of all the parts of our modern elegant carriages, attempt to explain them upon this one principle alone, viz.-That they were necessary for conveyance ; he would find himself wofully puzzled to account for the wheels, the seats, the springs, the blinds, the glasses, the lining, &c. Not to mention the mere ornamental parts of gilding, varnish, &c.

Abbreviations are the wheels of language, the wings of Mercury. And though we might be dragged along without them, it would be with much difficulty, very heavily and tediously.

There is nothing more admirable nor more useful than the invention of signs: at the same time there is nothing more productive of error when we neglect to observe their complication. Into what blunders, and consequently into what disputes and difficulties, might not the excellent art of Short-hand writing' (practised almost exclusively by the English) lead foreign philosophers; who not knowing that we had any other alphabet, should suppose each mark to be the sign of a single sound! If they were very laborious and very learned indeed, it is likely they would write as many volumes on the subject, and with as much bitterness against each other, as Grammarians have done from the same sort of mistake concerning Language : until perhaps it should be suggested to them, that there may be not only

"The art of Short-hand is, in its kind, an ingenious device, and of considerable usefulness, applicable to any language, much wondered at by travellers that have seen the experience of it in England: and yet, though it be above threescore years since it was first invented, it is not to this day (for aught I can learn) brought into common practice in any other nation."-Wilkins. Epist. Dedicatory. Essay towards a Real Cha

racter.

"Short-hand, an art, as I have been told, known only in England." -Locke on Education.

In the Courier de l'Europe, No. 41. November 20, 1787, is the following article:

"Le Sieur Coulon de Thevenot a eu l'honneur de présenter au roi sa méthode d'écrire aussi vîte que l'on parle, approuvée par l'Académie Royale des Sciences, et dont Sa Majesté a daigné accepter la dédicace. On sait que les Anglois sont depuis très-long temps en possession d'une pareille méthode adaptée à leur langage, et qu'elle leur est devenue extrêmement commode et utile pour recueillir avec beaucoup de précision les discours publics: la méthode du Sieur Coulon doit donc être trèsavantageux à la langue Françoise."