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two Precedents alone, (forgetting his own description and distinction of the crime to the Jury,) he decided against me'.

For

I say, on the strength of these two precedents alone. the gross perversion and misapplication of the technical term de bene esse, was merely pour éblouir, to introduce the proceedings on the trial, and to divert the attention from the only point in question-the sufficiency of the charge in the Record. -And I cannot believe that any man breathing (except Lord

1 The Attorney General, in his reply, said to the Jury, "Let us a little see what is the nature of the observations he makes. In the first place, that I left it exceedingly short: and the objection to my having left it short, was simply this; that I had stated no more to you but this, that of imputing to the conduct of the King's troops the crime of murder. Now I stated it, as imputed to the troops, ORDERED as they were upon the PUBLIC SERVICE.'

"

Lord Mansfield to the Jury: "Read the paper. What is it? Why it is this; that our beloved American Fellow-subjects-in REBELLION against the State-not beloved so as to be abetted in their REBELLION." Again,- What is the employment they (the troops) are ORDERED upon? Why then what are they who gave the ORDERS? Draw the conclusion." Again,-" The unhappy resistance to the LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY of this kingdom by many of our Fellow-subjects in America: the LEGISLATURE of this kingdom have avowed that the Americans REBELLED: Troops are EMPLOYED upon this ground. The case is here between a just Government and REBELLIOUS subjects."-Again,-" You will read this paper; you will judge whether it is not denying the Government and Legislative authority of England.” And again," If you are of opinion that they were all murdered (like the cases of undoubted murders, of Glenco, and twenty other massacres that might be named), why then you may form a different conclusion."

And again" If some soldiers, Without authority, had got in a drunken fray, and murder had ensued, and that this paper could relate to that, it would be quite a different thing from the charge in the information: BECAUSE it is charged—as a seditious Libel tending to disquiet the minds of the People." (See the Trial.)

A man must be not only well practised, but even hackneyed in our Courts of Justice to discover the above description of my crime in the Prepositions, or and CONCERNING. Be that as it may: It is evident that the Attorney General and the Chief Justice did not expect the Jury to be so enlightened; and therefore (when I had no longer a right to open my lips) they described a crime to them in that plain language which I still contend I had a right to expect in the Information; BECAUSE " A seditious Libel tending to disquiet the minds of the people,” -has been determined to be mere paper and packthread, and no part of the Charge.

Mansfield) either in the profession or out of it, will think it an argument against the validity of my objection; that it was brought forward only by myself, and had not been alleged before by the learned Counsel for the Printers. This, however, I can truly tell his lordship; that the most learned of them all (absit invidia), Mr. Dunning, was not aware of the objection when I first mentioned it to him; that he would not believe the information could be so defective in all its Counts, till I produced to him an Office Copy: when to his astonishment he found it so, he felt no jealousy that the objection had been missed by himself; but declared it to be insuperable and fatal: and bad me rest assured, that whatever might be Lord Mansfield's wishes, and his courage on such occasions, he would not dare to overrule the objection. And when after the close of the first day, I hinted to him my suspicions of Lord Mansfield's intentions by the "God forbid;" and by the perverted and misapplied "De bene esse," in order to mix the proceedings on the trial with the question of record; he smiled at it, as merely a method which his lordship took of letting the matter down gently, and breaking the abruptness of his fall.

Strange as it may appear! One of those Precedents was merely imagined by the Chief Justice, but never really existed. And the other (through ignorance of the meaning of the Conjunction THAT) had never been truly understood; neither by the Counsel who originally took the exception, nor perhaps by the Judges who made the decision, nor by the Reporter of it, nor by the present Chief Justice who quoted and misapplied it.

Mr. Dunning undertook to prove (and did actually prove in the House of Lords) the non-existence of the main precedent. And I undertook, in that Letter to Mr. Dunning, to shew the real merits and foundation, and consequently Lord Mansfield's misapplication of the other. And I undertook this, because it afforded a very striking instance of the importance of the meaning of words; not only (as has been too lightly supposed) to Metaphysicians and School-men, but to the rights and happiness of mankind in their dearest concerns-the decisions of Courts of Justice.

In the House of Lords these two Precedents (the foundation of the Judgment in the Court of King's Bench) were abandoned:

and the description of my crime against Government was adjudged to be sufficiently set forth by the Prepositions of and

CONCERNING.

Perhaps it may make my readers smile; but I mention it as a further instance of the importance of inquiry into the meaning of words;-that in the decision of the Judges in the House of Lords, the Chief Justice De Grey (who found of and coNCERNING SO comprehensive, clear, and definite) began by declaring that—" the word Certainty [which the Law requires in the description of Crimes] is as indefinite [that is, as Uncertain] as any word that could be used." Now though certainty is so uncertain, we must suppose the word Libel to be very definite and yet if I were called upon for an equivalent term, I believe I could not find in our language any word more popularly apposite than Calumny; which is defined by Cicero, in his Offices, to be-" callida et malitiosa Juris interpretatio."

If there was any Mistake (which however I am very far from believing) in this decision, sanctioned by the Judges and the House of Lords; I shall be justified in applying (with the substitution of the single word Grammatici for Istorici) what Giannone, who was himself an excellent lawyer, says of his countrymen of the same profession :-"Tanta ignoranza avea loro bendati gli occhi, che si pregiavano d'essere solamente Legisti, e non Grammatici; non accorgendosi, che perché non erano Grammatici, eran perciò cATTIVI LEGISTI."-Ist. Civil. di Napoli. Intro.

CHAPTER VI.

OF THE WORD THAT.

B. BUT besides the Articles "properly and strictly so called," I think Mr. Harris and other Grammarians say that there are some words which, according to the different manner of using them, are sometimes Articles and sometimes Pronouns and that it is difficult to determine to which class they ought to be referred'.

1 "It must be confessed indeed that all these words do not always appear as Pronouns. When they stand by themselves and represent

H.-They do so.

And by so doing, sufficiently instruct us (if we will but use our common sense) what value we ought to put upon such classes and such definitions.

B. Can you give us any general rule by which to distinguish when they are of the one sort, and when of the other?

H.-Let them give the rule who thus confound together the Manner of signification of words, and the Abbreviations in their Construction: than which no two things in Language are more distinct, or ought to be more carefully distinguished. I do not allow that Any words change their nature in this manner, so as to belong sometimes to one Part of Speech, and sometimes to another, from the different ways of using them. I never could perceive any such fluctuation in any word. whatever though I know it is a general charge brought erroneously against words of almost every denomination1. But it appears to me to be all, Error: arising from the false measure which has been taken of almost every sort of words. Whilst the words themselves appear to me to continue faithfully and steadily attached, each to the standard under which it was originally inlisted. But I desire to wave this matter for the present; because I think it will be cleared up by what is to follow concerning the other sorts of words: at least, if that should not convince you, I shall be able more easily to satisfy you on this head hereafter.

some Noun, (as when we say-THIS is virtue, or detкTiKws, Give me THAT,) then are they Pronouns. But when they are associated to some Noun, (as when we say-THIS habit is virtue, or deiKTIкws, THAT man defrauded me,) then, as they supply not the place of a Noun, but only serve to ascertain one, they fall rather into the species of Definitives or Articles. That there is indeed a near relation between Pronouns and Articles, the old Grammarians have all acknowledged; and some words it has been doubtful to which class to refer. The best rule to distinguish them is this.-The genuine Pronoun always stands by itself, assuming the power of a noun, and supplying its place. The genuine Article never stands by itself, but appears at all times associated to something else, requiring a noun for its support, as much as Attributives or Adjectives."-Hermes, book 1. chap. 5.

"Certains mots sont Adverbes, Prépositions, et Conjonctions en même temps: et répondent ainsi au même temps à diverses parties d'oraison selon que la grammaire les emploie diversement."-Buffier, art. 150.

And so say all other Grammarians.

you

for it.

B.-I would not willingly put you out of your own way, and am contented to wait for the explanation of many things till shall arrive at the place which you may think proper But really what you have now advanced seems to me so very extraordinary and contrary to fact, as well as to the uniform declaration of all Grammarians, that you must excuse me, if, before we proceed any further, I mention to you one instance.

Mr. Harris and other Grammarians say that the word THAT is sometimes an Article and sometimes a Pronoun. However I do not desire an explanation of that [point]: because I see how you will easily reconcile that [difference], by a subauditur or an abbreviation of Construction: and I agree with you there. But what will you do with the Conjunction THAT?

Is not this a very considerable and manifest fluctuation and difference of signification in the same word? Has the Conjunction THAT, any the smallest correspondence or similarity of signification with THAT, the Article, or Pronoun?

H.-In my opinion the word THAT (call it as you please, either Article, or Pronoun, or Conjunction) retains always one and the same signification. Unnoticed abbreviation in construction and difference of position have caused this appearance of fluctuation; and misled the Grammarians of all languages both ancient and modern: for in all they make the same mistake. Pray, answer me a question. Is it not strange and improper that we should, without any reason or necessity, employ in English the same word for two different meanings and purposes?

B.-I think it wrong: and I see no reason for it, but many reasons against it.

H.-Well! Then is it not more strange that this same im propriety, in this same case, should run through ALL languages? And that they should ALL use an Article, without any reason, unnecessarily, and improperly, for this same Conjunction; with which it has, as you say, no correspondence nor similarity of signification?

B.-If they do so, it is strange.

H.-They certainly do; as you will easily find by inquiry. Now does not the uniformity and universality of this supposed mistake, and unnecessary impropriety, in languages which

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