H.-Much. And amongst many other things, I think he would not have talked of the composition of ideas; but would have seen that it was merely a contrivance of Language: and that the only composition was in the terms; and consequently that it was as improper to speak of a complex idea, as it would be to call a constellation a complex star: And that they are not ideas, but merely terms, which are general and abstract. I think too that he would have seen the advantage of " thoroughly weighing" not only (as he says) "the imperfections of Language," but its perfections also: For the perfections of Language, not properly understood, have been one of the chief causes of the imperfections of our philosophy. And indeed, from numberless passages throughout his Essay, Mr. Locke seems to me to have suspected something of this sort and especially from what he hints in his last chapter; where, speaking of the doctrine of signs, he says,-"The consideration then of Ideas and Words, as the great instruments of knowledge, makes no despicable part of their contemplation who would take a view of human knowledge in the whole extent of it. And perhaps, if they were distinctly weighed and duly considered, they would afford us another sort of Logick and Critick than what we have hitherto been acquainted with."

B.-Do not you think that what you now advance will bear a dispute; and that some better arguments than your bare assertion are necessary to make us adopt your opinion?

H.-Yes, To many persons much more would be necessary; but not to you. I only desire you to read the Essay over again with attention, and see whether all that its immortal author has justly concluded will not hold equally true and clear, if you substitute the composition, &c. of terms, wherever he has supposed a composition, &c. of ideas. And if that shall upon strict examination appear to you to be the case, you will need

sounds; or any thing less than a part, at least, of that living soul which God is said to have breathed into man." This method of referring words immediately to God as their framer, is a short cut to escape inquiry and explanation. It saves the philosopher much trouble; but leaves mankind in great ignorance, and leads to great error.-Non dignus vindice nodus.—God having furnished man with senses and with organs of articulation, as he has also with water, lime and sand; it should seem no more necessary to form the words for man, than to temper the mortar.

no other argument against the composition of Ideas: It being exactly similar to that unanswerable one which Mr. Locke himself declares to be sufficient against their being innate. For the supposition is unnecessary: Every purpose for which the composition of Ideas was imagined being more easily and naturally answered by the composition of Terms: whilst at the same time it does likewise clear up many difficulties in which the supposed composition of Ideas necessarily involves us. And, though this is the only argument I mean to use at present, (because I would not willingly digress too far, and it is not the necessary foundation for what I have undertaken,) yet I will venture to say, that it is an easy matter, upon Mr. Locke's own principles and a physical consideration of the Senses and the Mind, to prove the impossibility of the composition of Ideas.

B.-Well. Since you do not intend to build any thing upon it, we may safely for the present suppose what you have advanced; and take it for granted that the greatest part of Mr. Locke's Essay, that is, all which relates to what he calls the composition, abstraction, complexity, generalization, relation, &c. of Ideas, does indeed merely concern Language. But, pray, let me ask you, if so, what has Mr. Locke done in the Third Book of his Essay, in which he professedly treats of the nature, use, and signification of Language?

H.-He has really done little else but enlarge upon what he had said before, when he thought he was treating only of Ideas: that is, he has continued to treat of the composition of Terms. For though, in the passage I have before quoted, he says, that "unless the force and manner of signification of words are first well observed, there can be very little said clearly and pertinently concerning knowledge;"—and though this is the declared reason of writing his Third Book concerning Language, as distinct from Ideas; yet he continues to treat singly, as before, concerning the Force' of words, and has not advanced one syllable concerning their Manner of signification.

The only Division Mr. Locke has made of words, is, intoNames of Ideas and Particles. This division is not made regularly and formally, but is reserved to his seventh Chapter. And

1 The Force of a word depends upon the number of Ideas of which that word is the sign.

even there it is done in a very cautious, doubting, loose, uncertain manner, very different from that incomparable author's usual method of proceeding. For, though the general title of the seventh Chapter is,―Of Particles;-yet he seems to chuse to leave it uncertain whether he does or does not include Verbs in that title, and particularly what he calls "the Marks of the Mind's affirming or denying." And indeed he himself acknowledges, in a letter to Mr. Molyneux, that-" Some parts of that Third Book concerning Words, though the thoughts were easy and clear enough, yet cost him more pains to express than all the rest of his Essay; and that therefore he should not much wonder if there were in some parts of it obscurity and doubtfulness." Now whenever any man finds this difficulty to express himself, in a language with which he is well acquainted, let him be persuaded that his thoughts are not clear enough: for, as Swift (I think) has somewhere observed, "When the water is clear you will easily see to the bottom."

The whole of this vague Chapter-Of Particles-(which should have contained an account of every thing but Nouns) is comprised in two pages and a half: and all the rest of the Third Book concerns only, as before, the Force of the names of Ideas. B.-How is this to be accounted for? Do you suppose he was unacquainted with the opinions of Grammarians, or that he despised the subject?

H.-No: I am very sure of the contrary. For it is plain he did not despise the subject, since he repeatedly and strongly recommends it to others and at every step throughout his Essay, I find the most evident marks of the journey he had himself taken through all their works. But it appears that he was by no means satisfied with what he found there concerning Particles: For he complains that "this part of Grammar has been as much neglected, as some others over-diligently cultivated." And says, that "He who would shew the right use of Particles, and what significancy and force they have,” (that is, according to his own division, the right use, significancy, and force of ALL words except the names of Ideas,) “must take a little more pains, enter into his own thoughts, and observe nicely the several postures of his mind in discoursing." these Particles, he says,-" are all marks of some action or intimation of the Mind; and therefore, to understand them rightly,

For

the several views, postures, stands, turns, limitations and exceptions, and several other thoughts of the Mind, for which we have either none or very deficient names, are diligently to be studied. Of these there are a great variety, much exceeding the number of Particles." For himself, he declines the task, however necessary and neglected by all others: and that for no better reason than-“ I intend not here a full explication of this sort of signs." And yet he was (as he professed and thought) writing on the human Understanding; and therefore should not surely have left mankind still in the same darkness in which he found them, concerning these hitherto unnamed and (but by himself) undiscovered operations of the Mind.

In short, this seventh Chapter is, to me, a full confession and proof that he had not settled his own opinion concerning the manner of signification of Words: that it still remained (though he did not chuse to have it so understood) a Desideratum with him, as it did with our great Bacon before him and therefore that he would not decide any thing about it; but confined himself to the prosecution of his original inquiry concerning the first sort of Abbreviations, which is by far the most important to knowledge, and which he supposed to belong to Ideas.

But though he declined the subject, he evidently leaned towards the opinion of Aristotle, Scaliger, and Mess. de Port Royal and therefore, without having sufficiently examined their position, he too hastily adopted their notion concerning the pretended Copula—“ Is, and Is not." He supposed, with them, that affirming and denying were operations of the Mind; and referred all the other sorts of Words to the same source. Though, if the different sorts of Words had been (as he was willing to believe) to be accounted for by the different operations of the Mind, it was almost impossible they should have escaped the penetrating eyes of Mr. Locke.

B.

CHAPTER III.

OF THE PARTS OF SPEECH.

You said some time ago, very truly, that the number of Parts of Speech was variously reckoned: and that it has not to

this moment been settled, what sort of difference in words should entitle them to hold a separate rank by themselves.

By what you have since advanced, this matter seems to be ten times more unsettled than it was before: for you have discarded the differences of Things, and the differences of Ideas, and the different operations of the Mind, as guides to a division of Language. Now I cannot for my life imagine any other principle that you have left to conduct us to the Parts of Speech.

H.-I thought I had laid down in the beginning, the principles upon which we were to proceed in our inquiry into the manner of signification of words.

B.-Which do you mean?

H.-The same which Mr. Locke employs in his inquiry into the Force of words: viz.-The two great purposes of speech. B. And to what distribution do they lead you?

H.-1. To words necessary for the communication of our Thoughts. And,

2. To Abbreviations, employed for the sake of dispatch. B.—How many of each do you reckon? And which are they?

H.—In what particular language do you mean? For, if you do not confine your question, you might as reasonably expect me (according to the fable) to make a coat to fit the moon in all her changes."

are.

B. Why? Are they not the same in all languages?

H.-Those necessary to the communication of our thoughts

B. And are not the others also?

H.-No. Very different.

B.-I thought we were talking of Universal Grammar.

H.—I mean so too. But I cannot answer the whole of your question, unless you confine it to some particular language with which I am acquainted. However, that need not disturb you for you will find afterwards that the principles will apply universally.

B.-Well. For the present then confine yourself to the necessary Parts and exemplify in the English.

H.—In English, and in all Languages, there are only two