signs of sounds; but again, for the sake of abbreviation, signs of those signs, one under another in a continued progression. B.-I think I begin to comprehend you. You mean to say that the errors of Grammarians have arisen from supposing all words to be immediately either the signs of things or the signs of ideas whereas in fact many words are merely abbreviations employed for despatch, and are the signs of other words. And that these are the artificial wings of Mercury, by means of which the Argus eyes of philosophy have been cheated.

H.-It is my meaning.

B.--Well. We can only judge of your opinion after we have heard how you maintain it. Proceed, and strip him of his wings. They seem easy enough to be taken off: for it strikes me now, after what you have said, that they are indeed put on in a peculiar manner, and do not, like those of other winged deities, make a part of his body. You have only to loose the strings from his feet, and take off his cap. ComeLet us see what sort of figure he will make without them.

H.-The first aim of Language was to communicate our thoughts; the second, to do it with despatch. (I mean intirely to disregard whatever additions or alterations have been made for the sake of beauty, or ornament, ease, gracefulness, or pleasure.) The difficulties and disputes concerning Language have arisen almost intirely from neglecting the consideration of the latter purpose of speech: which, though subordinate to the former, is almost as necessary in the commerce of mankind, and has a much greater share in accounting for the different sorts of words'. Words have been called winged; and they well deserve that name, when their abbreviations are compared with the progress which speech could make without these inven

1 M. Le Président de Brosses, in his excellent treatise De la Formation mechanique des Langues, tom. 2. says—“ On ne parle que pour être entendu. Le plus grand avantage d'une langue est d'être claire. Tous les procédés de Grammaire ne devroient aller qu'à ce but." And again

Le vulgaire et les philosophes n'ont d'autre but en parlant que de s'expliquer clairement." Art. 160. Pour le vulgaire, he should have added-et promptement. And indeed he is afterwards well aware of this for Art. 173, he says, "L'esprit humain veut aller vîte dans son opération; plus empressé de s'exprimer promptement, que curieux de s'exprimer avec une justesse exacte et réfléchie. S'il n'a pas l'instrument qu'il faudroit employer, il se sert de celui qu'il a tout prêt."

tions; but compared with the rapidity of thought, they have not the smallest claim to that title. Philosophers have calculated the difference of velocity between sound and light but who will attempt to calculate the difference between speech and thought! What wonder then that the invention of all ages should have been upon the stretch to add such wings to their conversation as might enable it, if possible, to keep pace in some measure with their minds.-Hence chiefly the variety of words.

Abbreviations are employed in language three ways:

1. In terms.

2. In sorts of words.

3. In construction.

Mr. Locke's Essay is the best guide to the first; and numberless are the authors who have given particular explanations of the last. The second only I take for my province at present; because I believe it has hitherto escaped the proper notice of all.

CHAPTER II.

SOME CONSIDERATION OF MR. LOCKE'S ESSAY.

B. I CANNOT recollect one word of Mr. Locke's that corresponds at all with any thing that you have said. The third Book of his Essay is indeed expressly written-" On the Nature, Use, and Signification of Language." But there is nothing in it concerning abbreviations.

H.-I consider the whole of Mr. Locke's Essay as a philosophical account of the first sort of abbreviations in Language.

B. Whatever you may think of it, it is certain, not only from the title, but from his own declaration, that Mr. Locke did not intend or consider it as such: for he says,-"When I first began this discourse of the Understanding, and a good while after, I had not the least thought that any consideration of words was at all necessary to it'."

Perhaps it was for mankind a lucky mistake (for it was a mistake) which Mr. Locke made when he called his book, An Essay on Human Understanding. For some part of the inestimable benefit of that book

2

H.-True. And it is very strange he should so have imagined'. But what immediately follows?—" But when, having passed over the original and composition of our ideas, I began to examine the extent and certainty of our knowledge; I found it had so near a connexion with words, that unless their force and manner of signification were first well observed, there could be very little said clearly and pertinently concerning knowledge which being conversant about truth, had constantly to do with propositions. And though it terminated in things, yet it was for the most part so much by the intervention of words, that they seemed scarce separable from our general knowledge."

And again," I am apt to imagine that, were the imperfections of Language, as the instrument of knowledge, more

has, merely on account of its title, reached to many thousands more than, I fear, it would have done, had he called it (what it is merely) A Grammatical Essay, or a Treatise on Words, or on Language. The human mind, or the human understanding, appears to be a grand and noble theme; and all men, even the most insufficient, conceive that to be a proper object for their contemplation: whilst inquiries into the nature of Language (through which alone they can obtain any knowledge beyond the beasts) are fallen into such extreme disrepute and contempt, that even those who "neither have the accent of christian, pagan, or man," nor can speak so many words together with as much propriety as Balaam's ass did, do yet imagine words to be infinitely beneath the concern of their exalted understanding.

"Aristotelis profecto judicio Grammaticam non solum esse Philosophie partem, (id quod nemo sanus negat,) sed ne ab ejus quidem cognitione dissolvi posse intelligeremus."-J. C. Scaliger de Causis. Præfat. And lastly," says Bacon, "let us consider the false appearances that are imposed upon us by words, which are framed and applied according to the conceit and capacities of the vulgar sort: and although we think we govern our words, and prescribe it well-loquendum ut vulgus, sentiendum ut sapientes ;-yet certain it is, that words, as a Tartar's bow, do shoot back upon the understanding of the wisest, and mightily entangle and pervert the judgment. So as it is almost necessary in all controversies and disputations to imitate the wisdom of the mathematicians, in setting down in the very beginning the definitions of our words and terms, that others may know how we accept and understand them, and whether they concur with us or no. For it cometh to pass, for want of this, that we are sure to end there where we ought to have begun, which is in questions and differences about words."-Of the Advancement of Learning.

2 It may appear presumptuous, but it is necessary here to declare my opinion, that Mr. Locke in his Essay never did advance one step beyond the origin of Ideas and the composition of Terms.

thoroughly weighed, a great many of the controversies that make such a noise in the world would of themselves cease; and the way to knowledge, and perhaps peace too, lie a great deal opener than it does."

So that, from these and a great many other passages throughout the Essay, you may perceive that the more he reflected and searched into the human understanding, the more he was convinced of the necessity of an attention to Language; and of the inseparable connexion between words and knowledge.

B.-Yes. And therefore he wrote the third Book of his Essay, on" the Nature, Use, and Signification of Language." But you say, the whole of the Essay concerns Language; whereas the two first Books concern the Origin and Composition of Ideas: and he expressly declares that it was not till after he had passed over them, that he thought any consideration of words was at all necessary.

H.-If he had been aware of this sooner, that is, before he had treated of (what he calls) the origin and composition of Ideas; I think it would have made a great difference in his Essay. And therefore I said, Mr. Locke's Essay is the best Guide to the first sort of Abbreviations.

B. Perhaps you imagine that, if he had been aware that he was only writing concerning Language, he might have avoided treating of the origin of Ideas; and so have escaped the quantity of abuse which has been unjustly poured upon him for his opinion on that subject.

H.-No. I think he would have set out just as he did,

"This design (says Wilkins) will likewise contribute much to the clearing of some of our modern differences in religion;" (and he might have added, in all other disputable subjects; especially in matters of law and civil government ;)—“ by unmasking many wild errors, that shelter themselves under the disguise of affected phrases; which, being philosophically unfolded, and rendered according to the genuine and natural importance of words, will appear to be inconsistencies and contradictions. And several of those pretended mysterious, profound notions, expressed in great swelling words, whereby some men set up for reputation, being this way examined will appear to be either nonsense, or very flat and jejune. And though it should be of no other use but this, yet were it in these days well worth a man's pains and study; considering the common mischief that is done, and the many impostures and cheats that are put upon men, under the disguise of affected, insignificant phrases."-Epist. Dedicat.

C

with the origin of Ideas; the proper starting-post of a Grammarian who is to treat of their signs. Nor is he singular in referring them all to the Senses, and in beginning an account of Language in that manner'.

B.-What difference then do you imagine it would have made in Mr. Locke's Essay, if he had sooner been aware of the inseparable connexion between words and knowledge; or, in the language of Sir Hugh, in Shakespeare, that "the lips is parcel of the mind "?

1 "Nihil in intellectu quod non prius in sensu," is, as well as its converse, an antient and well known position.

"Sicut in speculo ea quæ videntur non sunt, sed eorum species; ita quæ intelligimus, ea sunt re ipsa extra nos, eorumque species in nobis. Est enim quasi rerum speculum intellectus noster; cui, nisi per sensum represententur res, nihil scit ipse.”—J. C. Scaliger de Causis L. L. cap. lxvi.

I sensi," says Buonmattei, "in un certo modo potrebbon dirsi ministri, nunzj, famigliari, o segretarj dello 'ntelletto. E acciochè lo esempio ce ne faccia piu capaci,-Imaginianci di vedere alcun principe, ilqual se ne stia nella sua corte, nel suo palazzo. Non vede egli con gli occhi propj, ne ode co' propj orecchi quel che per lo stato si faccia : ma col tenere in diversi luoghi varj ministri che lo ragguagliono di cio che segue, viene a sapere intender per cotal relazione ogni cosa, e bene spesso molto piu minutamente e piu perfettamente degli stessi ministri : Perchè quegli avendo semplicemente notizia di quel che avvenuto sia nella lor città o provincia, rimangon di tutto 'l resto ignoranti, e di facile posson fin delle cose vedute ingannarsi. Dove il principe può aver di tutto il seguito cognizione in un subito, che servendogli per riprova d' ogni particolar riferitogli, non lo lascia cosi facilmente ingannare. Cosi, dico, è l' intelletto umano; ilquale essendo di tutte l' altre potenze e signore e principe, se ne sta nella sua ordinaria residenza riposto, e non vede nè ode cosa che si faccia di fuori: Ma avendo cinque ministri che lo ragguaglian di quel che succede, uno nella region della vista, un altro nella giurisdizion dell' udito, quello nella provincia del gusto, questo ne' paesi dell' odorato, e quest' altro nel distretto del tatto, viene a sapere per mezzo del discorso ogni cosa in universale, tanto piu de' sensi perfettamente, quanto i sensi ciascuno intendendo nella sua pura potenza, non posson per tutte come lo 'ntelletto discorrere. E siccome il principe, senza lasciarsi vedere o sentire, fa noto altrui la sua volontà per mezzo degli stessi ministri; cosi ancora l' Intelletto fa intendersi per via de' medesimi sensi."-Buonmattei. Tratt. 2. cap. 2.

Divers philosophers hold that the lips is parcel of the mind." Merry Wives of Windsor, act 1. scene 4.

Rowland Jones agrees with his countryman, Sir Hugh Evans. In his Origin of Language and Nations, Preface, page 17, he says (after others) -"I think that Language ought not to be considered as mere arbitrary