roses an ounce; let it be spread upon a linen cloth, | mallows, one ounce; of anise and fennel seeds, toand applied lukewarm, and continued for three hours gether, one ounce and a half; of flax seed two space. drams. Make a decoction in spring water. 2. The bath or fomentation. Take of sage leaves half a handful; of the root of hemlock sliced six drams; of briony roots half an ounce; of the leaves of red roses two pugils; let them be boiled in a pottle of water, wherein steel hath been quenched, till the liquor come to a quart. After the straining, put in half a handful of bay salt. Let it be used with scarlet cloth, or scarlet wool, dipped in the liquor hot, and so renewed seven times; all in the space of a quarter of an hour, or little more. 3. The plaster. Take emplastrum diachalciteos, as much as is sufficient for the part you mean to cover. Let it be dissolved with oil of roses, in such a consistence as will stick; and spread upon a piece of holland, and applied. His Lordship's broth and fomentation for the stone. The broth. Take one dram of eryngium roots, cleansed and sliced; and boil them together with a chicken. In the end, add of elder flowers, and marigold flowers together, one pugil; of angelica-seed half a dram, of raisins of the sun stoned, fifteen; of rosemary, thyme, mace, together, a little. In six ounces of this broth or thereabouts, let there be dissolved of white cremor tartari three grains. Every third or fourth day, take a small toast of manchet, dipped in oil of sweet almonds new drawn, and sprinkled with a little loaf sugar. You may make the broth for two days, and take the onehalf every day. If you find the stone to stir, forbear the toast for a course or two. The intention of this broth is, not to void, but to undermine the quarry of the stones in the kidneys. The fomentation. Take of leaves of violets, mallows, pellitory of the wall, together, one handful; of flowers of camomile and melilot, together, one pugil; the root of marsh The second receipt, showing the way of making a certain ointment, which his Lordship called Unguentum fragrans, sive Romanum, the fragrant or Roman unguent. Take of the fat of a deer half a pound; of oil of sweet almonds two ounces: let them be set upon a very gentle fire, and stirred with a stick of juniper till they are melted. Add of root of flower-de-luce powdered, damask roses powdered, together, one dram; of myrrh dissolved in rose-water half a dram ; of cloves half a scruple; of civet four grains; of musk six grains; of oil of mace expressed one drop; as much of rose-water as sufficeth to keep the unguent from being too thick. Let all these be put together in a glass, and set upon the embers for the space of an hour, and stirred with a stick of juniper. Note, that in the confection of this ointment, there was not used above a quarter of a pound, and a tenth part of a quarter of deer's suet: and that all the ingredients, except the oil of almonds, were doubled when the ointment was half made, because the fat things seemed to be too predominant. The third receipt. A manus Christi for the Take of the best pearls very finely pulverised, one dram; of sal nitre one scruple; of tartar two scruples; of ginger and galingal, together, one ounce and a half; of calamus, root of enula campana, nutmeg, together, one scruple and a half; of amber sixteen grains; of the best musk ten grains; with rosewater and the finest sugar, let there be made a manus Christi. The fourth receipt. A secret for the stomach. Take lignum aloes in gross shavings, steep them in sack, or alicant, changed twice, half an hour at a time, till the bitterness be drawn forth. Then take the shavings forth, and dry them in the shade, and beat them to an excellent powder. Of that powder, with the syrup of citron, make a small pill, to be taken before supper. WORKS MORAL. A FRAGMENT OF THE COLOURS OF GOOD AND EVIL. TO THE LORD MOUNTJOYE. I SEND you the last part of the best book of Aristotle of Stagira, who, as your Lordship knoweth, goeth for the best author. But saving the civil respect which is due to a received estimation, the man being a Grecian, and of a hasty wit, having hardly a discerning patience, much less a teaching patience, hath so delivered the matter, as I am glad to do the part of a good house-hen, which without any strangeness will sit upon pheasants' eggs. And yet perchance, some that shall compare my lines with Aristotle's lines, will muse by what art, or rather by what revelation, I could draw these conceits out of that place. But I, that should know best, do freely acknowledge, that I had my light from him; for where he gave me not matter to perfect, at the least he gave me occasion to invent. Wherein as I do him right, being myself a man that am as free from envying the dead in contemplation, as from envying the living in action or fortune: so yet, nevertheless, still I say, and I speak it more largely than before, that in perusing the writings of this person so much celebrated, whether it were the impediment of his wit, or that he did it upon glory and affectation to be subtile, as one that if he had seen his own conceits clearly and perspicuously delivered, perhaps would have been out of love with them himself; or else upon policy, to keep himself close, as one that had been a challenger of all the world, and had raised infinite contradiction to what cause soever it is to be ascribed, I do not find him to deliver and unwrap himself well of that he seemeth to conceive; nor to be a master of his own knowledge. Neither do I for my part also, though I have brought in a new manner of handling this argument, to make it pleasant and lightsome, pretend so to have overcome the nature of the subject; but that the full understanding and use of it will be somewhat dark, and best pleasing the taste of such wits as are patient to stay the digesting and soluting unto themselves of that which is sharp and subtile. Which was the cause, joined with the love and honour which I bear to your Lordship, as the person I know to have many virtues, and an excellent order of them, which moved me to dedicate this writing to your Lordship after the ancient manner: choosing both a friend, and one to whom I conceived the argument was agreeable. OF THE COLOURS OF GOOD AND EVIL. IN deliberatives, the point is, what is good, and what is evil; and of good, what is greater, and of evil, what is less. So that the persuader's labour is, to make things appear good or evil, and that in higher or lower degree; which as it may be performed by true and solid reasons, so it may be represented also by colours, popularities, and circumstances; which are of such force, as they sway the ordinary judgment either of a weak man, or of a wise man, not fully and considerately attending and pondering the mat | ter. Besides their power to alter the nature of the subject in appearance, and so to lead to error, they are of no less use to quicken and strengthen the opinions and persuasions which are true; for reasons plainly delivered, and always after one manner, especially with fine and fastidious minds, enter but heavily and dully: whereas if they be varied, and have more life and vigour put into them by these forms and insinuations, they cause a stronger apprehension, and many times suddenly win the mind to a resolution. Lastly, to make a true and safe judgment, nothing can be of greater use and defence to the mind, than the discovering and reprehension of these colours, showing in what cases they hold, and in what they deceive: which, as it cannot be done but out of a very universal knowledge of the nature of things, so being performed, it so cleareth man's judgment and election, as it is the less apt to slide into any error. A Table of the colours or appearances of Good and Evil, and their degrees, as places of persuasion and dissuasion, and their several fallacies, and the elenches of them. I. Cui cæteræ partes vel sectæ secundas unanimiter deferunt, cum singulæ principatum sibi vindicent, | melior reliquis videtur. Nam primas quæque ex zelo videtur sumere, secundas autem ex vero et merito tribuere. Sometimes because the nature of some kinds is to be more equal, and more different, and not to have very distant degrees; as hath been noted, in the warmer climates the people are generally more wise, but in the northern climates the wits of chief are greater. So in many armies, if the matter should be tried by duel between two champions, the victory should go on the one side; and yet if it be tried by the gross, it would go on the other side: for excellencies go as it were by chance, but kinds go by a more certain nature; as by discipline in war. Lastly; many kinds have much refuse, which countervail that which they have excellent: and therefore generally metal is more precious than stone; and yet a diamond is more precious than gold. III. Quod ad veritatem refertur, majus est, quam quod ad opinionem. Modus autem et probatio ejus, quod ad opinionem pertinet, hæc est: quod quis, si clam putaret fore, facturus non esset. So the Epicures say of the Stoics' felicity placed in virtue, that it is like the felicity of a player, who if he were left of his auditory and their applause, he would straight be out of heart and countenance; and therefore they call virtue bonum theatrale : but of riches the poet saith, So Cicero went about to prove the sect of Academics, which suspended all asseveration, for to be the best. For, saith he, ask a Stoic which philosophy is true, he will prefer his own. Then ask him, which approacheth next to the truth, he will confess the Academics. So deal with the Epicure, that will scarce endure the Stoic to be in sight of him; so soon as he hath placed himself, he will place the Academics next him. So if a prince took divers And of pleasure, competitors to a place, and examined them severally, whom next themselves they would rarest commend, it were like the ablest man should have the most second voices. The fallax of this colour happeneth oft in respect of envy, for men are accustomed, after themselves and their own faction, to incline unto them which are softest, and are least in their way, in despite and derogation of them that hold them hardest to it. So that this colour of meliority and pre-eminence is a sign of enervation and weakness. II. Cujus excellentia vel exuperantia melior, id toto genere melius. Appertaining to this are the forms: "Let us not wander in generalities: Let us compare particular with particular," &c. This appearance, though it seem of strength, and rather logical than rhetorical, yet is very oft a fallax. Sometime because some things are in kind very casual, which if they escape prove excellent; so that the kind is inferior, because it is so subject to peril, but that which is excellent being proved is superior: as the blossom of March, and the blossom of May, whereof the French verse goeth: "Burgeon de Mars, enfans de Paris, So that the blossom of May is generally better than "Populus me sibilat; at mihi plaudo." "Grata sub imo Gaudia corde premens, vultu simulante pudorem." The fallax of this colour is somewhat subtile, though the answer to the example be ready, for virtue is not chosen propter auram popularem; but contrariwise, maxime omnium teipsum reverere; so as a virtuous man will be virtuous in solitudine, and not only in theatro, though percase it will be more strong by glory and fame, as a heat which is doubled by reflexion. But that denieth the supposition, it doth not reprehend the fallax; whereof the reprehension is: Allow that virtue, such as is joined with labour and conflict, would not be chosen but for fame and opinion: yet it followeth not that the chief motive of the election should not be real and for itself: for fame may be only causa impulsiva, and not causa constituens or efficiens. As if there were two horses, and the one would do better without the spur than the other: but again, the other with the spur would far exceed the doing of the former, giving him the spur also: yet the latter will be judged to be the better horse. And the form, as to say, "Tush, the life of this horse is but in the spur," will not serve as to a wise judgment: for since the ordinary instrument of horsemanship is the spur, and that it is no matter of impediment or burden, the horse is not to be accounted the less of, which will not do well without the spur; but rather the other is to be reckoned a delicacy than a virtue. So glory and honour are the spurs of virtue; and although virtue would languish without them, yet since they be always at hand to attend virtue, virtue is not to be said the less chosen for itself, because it needeth the spur of fame and reputation and therefore that position, "nota ejus, quod propter opinionem et non propter veritatem eligitur, hæc est; quod quis, si clam putaret fore, facturus non esset," is reprehended. IV. what is set down by order and division, doth demonstrate that nothing is left out or omitted, but all is there; whereas, if it be without order, both the mind comprehendeth less than that which is set down; and besides, it leaveth a suspicion, as if more might be said than is expressed. This colour deceiveth, if the mind of him that is Quod rem integram servat, bonum; quod sine receptu to be persuaded, do of itself over-conceive, or preest, malum: nam se recipere non posse, impoten-judge of the greatness of any thing; for then the tiæ genus est; potentia autem bonum. Hereof Æsop framed the fable of the two frogs, that consulted together in the time of drought, when many plashes, that they had repaired to, were dry, what was to be done; and the one propounded to go down into a deep well, because it was like the water would not fail there; but the other answered, "Yea, but if it do fail, how shall we get up again?" And the reason is, that human actions are so uncertain and subject to perils, as that seemeth the best course which hath most passages out of it. Appertaining to this persuasion, the forms are: You shall engage yourself; on the other side, "Tantum, quantum voles, sumes ex fortunâ," &c. You shall keep the matter in your own hand. The reprehension of it is, that proceeding and resolving in all actions is necessary. For as he saith well, Not to resolve, is to resolve; and many times it breeds as many necessities, and engageth as far in some other sorts, as to resolve. So it is but the covetous man's disease, translated in power; for the covetous man will enjoy nothing, because he will have his full store and possibility to enjoy the more; so by this reason a man should execute nothing, because he should be still indifferent, and at liberty to execute any thing. Besides, necessity and this same jacta est alea, hath many times an advantage, because it awaketh the powers of the mind, and strengtheneth endeavour; "Cæteris pares, necessitate certe superiores estis. V. Quod ex pluribus constat et divisibilibus est majus, quam quod ex paucioribus, et magis unum; nam omnia per partes considerata majora videntur : quare et pluralitas partium magnitudinem præ se fert: fortius autem operatur pluralitas partium si ordo absit; nam inducit similitudinem infiniti, et impedit comprehensionem. This colour seemeth palpable; for it is not plurality of parts without majority of parts, that maketh the total greater; yet nevertheless it often carries the mind away, yea, it deceiveth the sense; as it seemeth to the eye a shorter distance of way, if it be all dead and continued, than if it have trees or buildings, or any other marks whereby the eye may divide it. So when a great monied man hath divided his chests, and coins, and bags, he seemeth to himself richer than he was; and therefore a way to amplify any thing is, to break it, and to make anatomy of it in several parts, and to examine it according to several circumstances. And this maketh the greater show if it be done without order, for confusion maketh things muster more; and besides, breaking of it will make it seem less, because he maketh it to appear more according to the truth: and therefore if a man be in sickness or pain, the time will seem longer without a clock or hour-glass, than with it; for the mind doth value every moment, and then the hour doth rather sum up the moments, than divide the day. So in a dead plain the way seemeth the longer, because the eye hath preconceived it shorter than the truth, and the frustrating of that maketh it seem longer than the truth. Therefore if any man have an over-great opinion of any thing, then if another think by breaking it into several considerations he shall make it seem greater to him, he will be deceived; and therefore in such cases it is not safe to divide, but to extol the entire still in general. Another case wherein this colour deceiveth, is when the matter broken or divided is not comprehended by the sense or mind at once, in respect of the distracting or scattering of it; and being entire and not divided, is comprehended: as a hundred pounds in heaps of five pounds will show more than in one gross heap, so as the heaps be all upon one table to be seen at once, otherwise not: as flowers growing scattered in divers beds will show more than if they did grow in one bed, so as all those beds be within a plot, that they be objects to view at once, otherwise not: and therefore men, whose living lieth together in one shire, are commonly counted greater landed than those whose livings are dispersed, though it be more, because of the notice and comprehension. A third case wherein this colour deceiveth, and it is not so properly a case of reprehension, as it is a counter colour, being in effect as large as the colour itself; and that is, "omnis compositio indigentiæ cujusdam in singulis. videtur esse particeps," because if one thing would serve the turn, it were ever best, but the defect and imperfections of things hath brought in that help to piece them up; as it is said, " Martha, Martha, attendis ad plurima, unum sufficit." So likewise hereupon Æsop framed the fable of the fox and the cat; whereas the fox bragged what a number of shifts and devices he had to get from the hounds, and the cat said he had but one, which was to climb a tree, which in proof was better worth than all the rest; whereof the proverb grew, "Multa novit vulpes, sed felis unum magnum." And in the moral of this fable it comes likewise to pass, that a good sure friend is a better help at a pinch, than all the stratagems and policies of a man's own wit. So it falleth out to be a common error in negotiating, whereas men have many reasons to induce or persuade, they strive commonly to utter and use them all at once, which weakeneth them. For it argueth, as was said, a neediness in every of the reasons by itself, as if one doth not convert the nature of the necessary evil, but it is evil. Again, it cometh sometimes to pass, that there is an equality in the change of privation, and as it were a dilemma boni, or a dilemma mali: so that the corruption of the one good, is a generation of the other. Sorti pater equus utrique est: and contrary, the remedy of the one evil is the occasion and commencement of another, as in Scylla and Charybdis. VII. Quod bono vicinum, bonum; quod à bono remotum, malum. did not trust to any of them, but fled from one to another, helping himself only with that: "Et quæ non prosunt singula, multa juvant." Indeed in a set speech in an assembly, it is expected a man should use all his reasons in the case he handleth, but in private persuasions it is always a great error. A fourth case wherein this colour may be reprehended, is in respect of that same "vis unita fortior," according to the tale of the French king, that when the emperor's ambassador had recited his master's style at large, which consisteth of many countries and dominions; the French king willed his chancellor, or other minister, to repeat over France as many times as the other had recited the several dominions; intending it was equivalent with them all, and more compacted and united. There is also appertaining to this colour another point, why breaking of a thing doth help it, not by way of adding a show of magnitude unto it, but a note of excellency and rarity; where-senting in quality, are placed, and as it were quarof the forms are, Where shall you find such a concurrence? Great but not complete; for it seems a less work of nature or fortune, to make any thing in his kind greater than ordinary, than to make a strange composition. Yet if it be narrowly considered, this colour will be reprehended or encountered, by imputing to all excellencies in compositions a kind of poverty, or at least a casualty or jeopardy; for from that which is excellent in greatness, somewhat may be taken, or there may be a decay, and yet sufficient left; but from that which hath his price in composition if you take away any thing, or any part do fail, all is disgrace. VI. Such is the nature of things, that things contrary, and distant in nature and quality, are also severed and disjoined in place: and things like and con tered together; for, partly in regard of the nature to spread, multiply, and affect in similitude; and partly in regard of the nature to break, expel, and alter that which is disagreeable and contrary, most things do either associate, and draw near to themselves the like, or at least assimilate to themselves that which approacheth near them, and do also drive away, chase and exterminate, their contraries. And that is the reason commonly yielded, why the middle region of the air should be coldest, because the sun and stars are either hot by direct beams, or by reflexion. The direct beams heat the upper region, the reflected beams from the carth and seas heat the lower region. That which is in the midst, being farthest distant in place from these two regions of heat, are most distant in nature, that is, Cujus privatio bona, malum; cujus privatio mala, coldest; which is that they term cold or hot per bonum. The forms to make it conceived, that that was evil which is changed for the better, are, He that is in hell thinks there is no other heaven. "Satis quercus," Acorns were good till bread was found, &c.. And of the other side, the forms to make it conceived, that that was good which was changed for the worse, are, "Bona magis carendo quam fruendo sentimus: Bona à tergo formosissima:" Good things never appear in their full beauty, till they turn their back and be going away, &c. The reprehension of this colour is, that the good or evil which is removed, may be esteemed good or evil comparatively, and not positively or simply. So that if the privation be good, it follows not the former condition was evil, but less good: for the flower or blossom is a positive good, although the remove of it to give place to the fruit, be a comparative good. So in the tale of Æsop, when the old fainting man in the heat of the day cast down his burden, and called for Death; and when Death came to know his will with him, said, it was for nothing but to help him up with his burden again: it doth not follow, that because death which was the privation of the burden, waɛ ill, therefore the burden was good. And in this part, the ordinary form of malum necessarium aptly reprehendeth this colour; for "privatio mali necessarii est mala," and yet that antiperistasin, that is, environing by contraries: which was pleasantly taken hold of by him that said, that an honest man, in these days, must needs be more honest than in ages heretofore, propter antiperistasin, because the shutting of him in the midst of contraries, must needs make the honesty stronger and more compact in itself. The reprehension of this colour is: first, many things of amplitude in their kind do as it were engross to themselves all, and leave that which is next them most destitute: as the shoots or underwood that grow near a great and spread tree, is the most pined and shrubby wood of the field, because the great tree doth deprive and deceive them of sap and nourishment; so he saith well," divitis servi maxime servi:" and the comparison was pleasant of him, that compared courtiers attendant in the courts of princes without great place or office, to fastingdays, which were next the holy-days, but otherwise were the leanest days in all the week. Another reprehension is, that things of greatness and predominancy, though they do not extenuate the things adjoining in substance, yet they drown them and obscure them in show and appearance; and therefore the astronomers say, That whereas in all other planets conjunction is the perfectest amity; the sun contrariwise is good by aspect, but evil by conjunction. |