by so many employments in such vast territories | causes of poverty and consumption. The nature as they possess, so that it hath been counted a of this war, you are persuaded, will be matter kind of miracle to see together ten or twelve thousand native Spaniards in an army. And although they have at this time great numbers of miscellany soldiers in their armies and garrisons, yet, if there should be the misfortune of a battle, they are ever long about it to draw on supplies.

of restorative and enriching; so that, if we go roundly on with supplies and provisions at the first, the war in continuance will find itself. That you do but point at this, and will not enlarge it.

Lastly, That it is not a little to be considered, They tell a tale of a Spanish ambassador that that the greatness of Spain is not only distracted was brought to see their treasury of St. Mark at extremely, and therefore of less force; but built Venice, and still he looked down to the ground; upon no very sound foundations, and therefore and being asked the reason, said, "he was look- they have the less strength by any assured and ing to see whether the treasure had any root, so confident confederacy. With France they are in that, if that were spent, it would grow again; as competition for Navarre, Milan, Naples, and the his master's had." But, howsoever it be of their Franche County of Burgundy; with the see of treasure, certainly their forces have scarcely any | Rome, for Naples also; for Portugal, with the root, or at least such a root as putteth forth very poorly and slowly; whereas, there is not in the world again such a spring and seminary of military people as is England, Scotland, and Ireland; nor of seamen as is this island and the Low Countries so as if the wars should mow them down, yet they suddenly may be supplied and come up again.

A second reason is, and it is the principal, that if we truly consider the greatness of Spain, it consisteth chiefly in their treasure, and their treasure in their Indies, and their Indies, both of them, is but an accession to such as are masters by sea; so as this axle-tree, whereupon their greatness turns, is soon cut a-two by any that shall be stronger than they at sea. So then you report yourself to their opinions, and the opinions of all men, enemies or whosoever; whether that the maritime forces of Britain and the Low Countries are not able to beat them at sea. For if that be, you see the chain is broken from shipping to Indies, from Indies to treasure, and from treasure to greatness.

right heirs of that line; for that they have in their Low Countries, with the United Provinces; for Ormus, now, with Persia; for Valencia, with the Moors expulsed and their confederates; for the East and West Indies, with all the world. So that, if every bird had his feather, Spain would be left wonderful naked. But yet there is a greater confederation against them than by means of any of these quarrels or titles; and that is contracted by the fear that almost all nations have of their ambition, whereof men see no end. And thus much for balancing of their forces.

For the last point, which is the choice of the designs and enterprises, in which to conduct the war; you will not now speak, because you should be forced to descend to divers particulars, whereof some are of a more open, and some of a more secret nature. But that you would move the House to make a selected committee for that purpose; not to estrange the House in any sort, but to prepare things for them, giving them power and commission to call before them, and to confer with any martial men or others that are not of the House, that they The third reason, which hath some affinity shall think fit, for their advice and information: with this second, is a point comfortable to hear in and so to give an account of the business to a the state that we now are: wars are generally general committee of the whole House.

CONSIDERATIONS

TOUCHING A WAR WITH SPAIN.

INSCRIBED TO PRINCE CHARLES,

ANNO MDCXXIV.

YOUR highness hath an imperial name. It was a | if the king shall enter into it, is a mighty work: Charles that brought the empire first into France; it requireth strong materials, and active motions. a Charles that brought it first into Spain; why He that saith not so, is zealous, but not according should not Great Britain have its turn? But to lay to knowledge. But, nevertheless, Spain is no such aside all that may seem to have a show of fumes giant, and he that thinketh Spain to be some and fancies, and to speak solids: a war with Spain, great overmatch for this estate, assisted as it is VOL. II.-26.

and may be, is no good mintman; but takes | positively and resolutely; that it is impossible an greatness of kingdoms according to their bulk and elective monarchy should be so free and absolute currency, and not after their intrinsic value. Although, therefore, I had wholly sequestered my thoughts from civil affairs, yet, because it is a new case, and concerneth my country infinitely, I obtained of myself to set down, out of long continued experience in business of estate, and much conversation in books of policy and history, what I thought pertinent to this business; and in all humbleness present it to your highness: hoping that at least you will discern the strength of my affection through the weakness of my abilities: for the Spaniard hath a good proverb, "De suario si empre con la calentura;" there is no heat of affection, but is joined with some idleness of brain. To a war are required, a just quarrel; sufficient forces and provisions; and a prudent choice of the designs. So, then, I will first justify the quarrel; secondly, balance the forces; and lastly, propound variety of designs for choice, but not advise the choice; for that were not fit for a writing of this nature; neither is it a subject within the level of my judgment; I being, in effect, a stranger to the present occurrences.

Wars, I speak not of ambitious predatory wars, are suits of appeal to the tribunal of God's justice, where there are no superiors on earth to determine the cause: and they are, as civil pleas are, plaints, or defences. There are therefore three just grounds of war with Spain: one plaint, two upon defence. Solomon saith, "A cord of three is not easily broken:" but especially when every of the lines would hold single by itself. They are these: the recovery of the Palatinate; a just fear of the subversion of our civil estate; a just fear of the subversion of our church and religion. For, in the handling of the two last grounds of war, I shall make it plain, that wars preventive upon just fears are true defensives, as well as upon actual invasions: and again, that wars defensive for religion, I speak not of rebellion, are most just though offensive wars for religion are seldom to be approved, or never, unless they have some mixture of civil titles. But all that I shall say in this whole argument, will be but like bottoms of thread close wound up, which, with a good needle, perhaps, may be flourished into large works.

For the asserting of the justice of the quarrel, for the recovery of the Palatinate, I shall not go so high as to discuss the right of the war of Bohemia; which if it be freed from doubt on our part, then there is no colour nor shadow why the Palatinate should be retained; the ravishing whereof was a mere excursion of the first wrong, and a super injustice. But I do not take myself to be so perfect in the customs, transactions, and privileges of that kingdom of Bohemia, as to be fit to handle that part: and I will not offer at that I cannot master. Yet this I will say, in passage,

as an hereditary; no more than it is possible for a father to have so full power and interest in an adoptive son as in a natural; "quia naturalis obligatio fortior civili." And again, that received maxim is almost unshaken and infallible; "Nil magis naturæ consentaneum est, quam ut iisdem modis res dissolvantur, quibus constituuntur." So that if the part of the people or estate be somewhat in the election, you cannot make them nulls or ciphers in the privation or translation. And if it be said, that this is a dangerous opinion for the pope, emperor, and elective kings; it is true, it is a dangerous opinion, and ought to be a dangerous opinion, to such personal popes, emperors, or elective kings, as shall transcend their limits, and become tyrannical. But it is a safe and sound opinion for their sees, empires, and kingdoms; and for themselves also, if they be wise; "plenitudo potestatis est plenitudo tempestatis." But the chief cause why I do not search into this point is, because I need it not. And in handling the right of a war, I am not willing to intermix matter doubtful with that which is out of doubt. For as in capital causes, wherein but one man's life is in question, "in favorem vita" the evidence ought to be clear; so much more in a judgment upon a war, which is capital to thousands. I suppose therefore the worst, that the offensive war upon Bohemia had been unjust; and then make the case, which is no sooner made than resolved; if it be made not enwrapped, but plainly and perspicuously. It is this" in thesi." An offensive war is made, which is unjust in the aggressor; the prosecution and race of the war carrieth the defendant to assail and invade the ancient and indubitate patrimony of the first aggressor, who is now turned defendant; shall he sit down and not put himself in defence? Or if he be dispossessed, shall he not make a war for the recovery? No man is so poor of judgment as will affirm it. The castle of Cadmus was taken, and the city of Thebes itself invested by Phoebidas the Lacedæmonian, insidiously, and in violation of league : the process of this action drew on a re-surprise of the castle by the Thebans, a recovery of the town, and a current of the war even unto the walls of Sparta. I demand, was the defence of the city of Sparta, and the expulsion of the Thebans out of the Laconian territories, unjust? The sharing of that part of the duchy of Milan, which lieth upon the river of Adda, by the Venetians, upon contract with the French, was an ambitious and unjust purchase. This wheel set on going, did pour a war upon the Venetians with such a tempest, as Padua and Trevigi were taken from them, and all their dominions upon the continent of Italy abandoned, and they confined within the salt waters. Will any man say, that the memorable recovery and defence of Padua, when the gentle

Clinias the Candian, in Plato, speaks desperately and wildly, as if there were no such thing as peace between nations; but that every nation expects but his advantage to war upon another. But yet in that excess of speech there is thus much that may have a civil construction; namely, that every state ought to stand upon its guard, and rather prevent than be prevented. His words are, "Quam rem fere vocant pacem, nudum et inane nomen est; revera autem omnibus, adversus omnes civitates, bellum sempiternum perdurat." "That which men for the most part call peace, is but a naked and empty name; but the truth is, that there is ever between all estates a secret war." I know well this speech is the objection and not the decision, and that it is after refuted; but yet, as I said before, it bears thus much of truth, that if that general malignity, and predisposition to war, which he untruly figureth to be in all nations, be produced and extended to a just fear of being oppressed, then it is no more a true peace, but a name of a peace.

being grown great, to the terror of the Lacedæ- | fencing-school, that never ward till the blow be monians, did impose upon them a necessity of a past: "Ut barbari pugiles dimicare solent, ita vos war: but the causes that went abroad in speech bellum geritis cum Philippo: ex his enim is, qui were these, &c." Sulpitius Galba, consul, when ictus est, ictui semper inhæret; quod si eum alibi he persuaded the Romans to a preventive war, verberes, illo manus transfert; ictum autem dewith the later Philip, King of Macedon, in regard pellere, aut prospicere, neque scit neque vult.” of the great preparations which Philip had then "As country fellows use to do when they play at on foot, and his designs to ruin some of the wasters, such a kind of war do you, Athenians, confederates of the Romans, confidently saith, make with Philip; for with them he that gets a that they who took that for an offensive war, un-blow straight falleth to ward, when the blow is derstood not the state of the question. "Ignorare passed; and if you strike him in another place, videmini mihi, Quirites, non, utrum bellum an thither goes his hand likewise: but to put by, or pacem habeatis, vos consuli, neque enim liberum foresee a blow, they neither have the skill, nor the id vobis permittet Philippus, qui terra marique will." ingens bellum molitur, sed utrum in Macedoniam legiones transportetis, an hostem in Italiam recipiatis." "Ye seem to me, ye Romans, not to understand, that the consultation before you is not, whether you shall have war or peace, for Philip will take order you shall be no choosers, who prepareth a mighty war both by land and sea, but whether you shall transport the war into Macedon, or receive it into Italy." Antiochus, when he incited Prusias, King of Bithynia, at that time in league with the Romans, to join with him in war against them, setteth before him a just fear of the overspreading greatness of the Romans comparing it to a fire that continually took, and spread from kingdom to kingdom: "Venire Romanos ad omnia regna tollenda, ut nullum usquam orbis terrarum nisi Romanum imperium esset; Philippum et Nabin expugnatos, se tertium peti; ut quisque proximus ab oppresso sit, per omnes velut continens incendium pervasurum:" "That the Romans came to pull down all kingdoms, and to make the state of Rome a universal monarchy; that Philip and Nabis were already ruinated, and now was his turn to be assailed; so that, as every state lay next to the other that was oppressed, so the fire perpetually grazed." Wherein it is well to be noted, that towards ambitious states, which are noted to aspire to great monarchies, and to seek upon all occasions to enlarge their dominions, "crescunt argumenta justi metus ;" all particular fears do grow and multiply out of the contemplation of the general courses and practice of such states. Therefore, in deliberations of war against the Turk, it hath been often, with great judgment, maintained, that Christian princes and states have always a sufficient ground of invasive war against the enemy; not for cause of religion, but upon a just fear; forasmuch as it is a fundamental law in the Turkish empire, that they may, without any other provocation, make war upon Christendom for the propagation of their law; so that there lieth upon the Christians a perpetual fear of a war, hanging over their heads, from them; and therefore they may at all times, as they think good, be upon the prevention. Demosthenes exposeth to scorn wars which are not preventive, comparing those that make them to country fellows in a

As for the opinion of Iphicrates the Athenian, it demands not so much towards a war as a just fear, but rather cometh near the opinion of Clinias; as if there were ever amongst nations a brooding of a war, and that there is no sure league but impuissance to do hurt. For he, in the treaty of peace with the Lacedæmonians, speaketh plain language; telling them, there could be no true and secure peace, except the Lacedæmonians yielded to those things, which being granted, it would be no longer in their power to hurt the Athenians, though they would: and to say truth, if one mark it well, this was in all memory the main piece of wisdom, in strong and prudent counsels, to be in perpetual watch, that the states about them should neither by approach, nor by increase of dominion, nor by ruining confederates, nor by blocking of trade, nor by any the like means, have it in their power to hurt or annoy the states they serve; and whensoever any such cause did but appear, straightways to buy it out with a war, and never take up peace at credit and upon interest. It is so memorable, as it is yet as fresh as if it were done yesterday, how that triumvirate of kings, Henry the Eighth of England, Francis

the First of France, and Charles the Fifth, emperor | landi, libido dominandi, et si quæ sunt similia, and King of Spain, were in their times so provi- hæc sunt quæ in bellis jure culpantur." And the dent, as scarce a palm of ground could be gotten same St. Thomas in his own text, defining of the by either of the three, but that the other two just causes of a war, doth leave it upon very would be sure to do their best, to set the balance general terms: "Requiritur ad bellum causa justa, of Europe upright again. And the like diligence ut scilicet illi, qui impugnantur, propter aliquam was used in the age before by that league, where- culpam impugnationem mereanter:" for " impugwith Guicciardine beginneth his story, and maketh natio culpæ" is a far more general word than "ultio it, as it were, the calendar of the good days of injuriæ." And thus much for the first proposition, Italy, which was contracted between Ferdinando, of the second ground of a war with Spain: namely, King of Naples, Lorenzo of Medici, Potentate of that a just fear is a just cause of a war; and that Florence, and Lodovico Sforza, Duke of Milan, a preventive war is a true defensive. designed chiefly against the growing power of the Venetians; but yet so, as the confederates had a perpetual eye one upon another, that none of them should overtop. To conclude, therefore; howsoever some schoolmen, otherwise reverend men, yet fitter to guide penknives than swords, seem precisely to stand upon it, that every offensive war must be "ultio," a revenge, that presupposeth a precedent assault or injury; yet neither do they descend to this point, which we now handle, of a just fear; neither are they of authority to judge this question against all the precedents of time. For, certainly, as long as men are men, the sons, as the poets allude, of Prometheus, and not of Epimetheus, and as long as reason is reason, a just fear will be a just cause of a preventive war; but especially if it be part of the case, that there be a nation that is manifestly detected to aspire to monarchy and new acquest; then other states, assuredly, cannot be justly accused for not staying for the first blow; or for not accepting Polyphemus's courtesy, to be the last that shall be

eaten up.

Nay, I observe farther, that in that passage of Plato which I cited before, and even in the tenet of that person that beareth the resolving part, and not the objecting part, a just fear is justified for a cause of an invasive war, though the same fear proceed not from the fault of the foreign state to be assailed for it is there insinuated, that if a state, out of the distemper of their own body, do fear sedition and intestine troubles to break out amongst themselves, they may discharge their own ill humours upon a foreign war for a cure. And this kind of cure was tendered by Jasper Coligni, Admiral of France, to Charles the Ninth, the French king, when by a vive and forcible persuasion he moved him to a war upon Flanders, for the better extinguishment of the civil wars of France; but neither was that counsel prosperous; neither will I maintain that position: for I will never set politics against ethics; especially for that true ethics are but as a handmaid to divinity and religion. Surely St. Thomas, who had the largest heart of the school divines, bendeth chiefly his style against the depraved passions which reign in making wars, speaking out of St. Augustine: "Nocendi cupiditas, ulciscendi crudelitas, implacatus et implacabilis animus, feritas rebel

The second or minor proposition was this; that this kingdom hath cause of just fear of overthrow from Spain. Wherein it is true, that fears are ever seen in dimmer lights than facts. And, on the other side, fears use, many times, to be represented in such an imaginary fashion, as they rather dazzle men's eyes than open them: and therefore I will speak in that manner which the subject requires; that is, probably, and moderately, and briefly. Neither will I deduce these fears to present occurrences; but point only at general grounds, leaving the rest to more secret counsels.

Is it nothing, that the crown of Spain hath enlarged the bounds thereof within this last sixscore years, much more than the Ottoman's? I speak not of matches or unions, but of arms, occupations, invasions. Granada, Naples, Milan, Portugal, the East and West Indies; all these are actual additions to that crown. They had a mind to French Britain, the lower part of Picardy, and Piedmont; but they have let fall their bit. They have, to this day, such a hovering possession of the Valtoline, as a hobby hath over a lark: and the Palatinate is in their talons: so that nothing is more manifest, than that this nation of Spain runs a race still of empire, when all other states of Christendom stand in effect at a stay. Look then a little farther into the titles whereby they have acquired, and do now hold these new por tions of their crown; and you will find them of so many varieties, and such natures, to speak with due respect, as may appear to be easily minted, and such as can hardly at any time be wanting. And, therefore, so many new conquests and purchases, so many strokes of the alarm bell of fear and awaking to other nations; and the facility of the titles, which hand-over-head have served their turn, doth ring the peal so much the sharper and louder.

Shall we descend from their general disposition to enlarge their dominions, to their particular disposition and eye of appetite which they have had towards us: they have now twice sought to impatronize themselves of this kingdom of England; once by marriage with Queen Mary; and the second time by conquest in 88, when their forces by sea and land were not inferior to those they have now. And at that time in 88, the counse

S