5000 Europeans. The governor having deserted the place on the approach of the English, the garrison surrendered as soon as the English squadron opened its fire. (British India, Harper's edition, vol. ii., pages 16 and 21.)

Paragraph 5th states that "all the West India Islands" had repeatedly fallen before the broadsides of fleets. This is a sweeping assertion, but totally devoid of foundation. When Mr. Powell particularizes, it will probably be easy to show that his instances are as incorrect as those of the list under consideration.

The next instance brought forward is the attack on the batteries of Guadaloupe by the English in 1759. Mr. Powell states, from a French account, that the batteries were nearly silenced after a cannonade of nine hours, and the garrison, to avoid being made prisoners, fled to the mountains. An English account states that the batteries mounted eighty-one guns, and the ships which attacked them 558. That the shot from the ships neither injured nor dismounted the cannon of Fort Royal, which mounted forty-seven out of the eighty-one guns. (Beatson, vol. ii., page 236.) Do not these accounts prove that the fault was in the garrison. not in the battery? Instances of cowardice and unaccountable panics may be found in the history of all wars by sea or by land.

The next instance given is perhaps the most remarkable of all. It is thus stated: "Quebec was taken from the French in 1759 by Admiral Saunders." To be sure he adds afterwards: "His fleet conveyed the gallant Wolfe and ten thousand troops to the walls of the city, which capitulated in less than three months" How absurd then to place this as an instance in an enumeration of works alleged to have fallen before the broadsides of fleets!

The next instance is that of Havana. taken (according to Mr. Powell, in 1763) by Admiral Pocock. This capture, which was in 1762, embraces the memorable attack on the Moro Castle. The circumstances were these. The army under the command of Lord Albemarle was landed on the 7th of June, on the coast about six miles to the eastward of the entrance to the harbor The siege of the castle was then commenced, and on the 30th of July, a breach having been made by a mine, it

was taken by assault. The attack on the city was then commenced by the army, and on the 14th of August, it surrendered. (Campbell, vol. v., p. 54.) The fleet and its admiral, it thus pears, had nothing to do with the capture either of the city or the castle.

ap

Paragraph 9th enumerates, among the places which have fallen before the broadsides of fleets, "Sumatra, Java and the rich city of Manilla-the latter by Admiral Cornish." The facts are these. Manilla was captured in 1762 by an army of three thousand men un-der the command of General Draper, who first proposed the expedition. The troops were landed on the 24th of September, and on the 6th of October, a breach having been made by the land batteries, the place was assaulted and taken. (Campbell, vol. v., p. 65.)

Java was taken in 1811 by an army under the command of Sir Samuel Auchmuty. Two actions were fought with the Dutch army under General Jansens before the island was surrendered. (Campbell, vol. viii., p. 262.)

As to Sumatra, nothing is recorded respecting it, having anything to do with the subject under consideration.

In paragraph 27th, Mr. Powell states that "during the attack on Long Island, in our revolutionary war, the frigate Roebuck silenced the efficient batteries at Red Hook." Ramsay says not a word about this affair; Marshall and Botta merely mention a cannonade; and Beatson, the English Naval Historian, says: "The Roebuck only, which was the leading ship, exchanged a few random shots with their battery on Red Hook." (Vol. iv., p. 161.)

Next in order comes the remark about Charleston: "Charleston was taken notwithstanding the attack on Fort Moultrie failed." Yes; four years after the memorable attack on Fort Moultrie, Charleston was taken; but what has that to do with contests between the broadsides of ships and fortifications? There was no action between the fleet on entering the harbor and the forts on shore, and Marshall states that, at the time, Fort Moultrie, on one side of the entrance, was entirely out of repair, and Fort Johnson, on the other side, in ruins.

The 24th paragraph of the enumeration states, that "most of the West India Islands were re-captured by D'Estaing's fleet." This is incorrect.

Two or three islands only were re-captured, and by troops landed for the purpose. (Campbell, vol. v., p. 452.) Paragraph 22 is entirely incorrect. "The circumstances were these. In 1794, during the attack on Fort Royal, Martinique, Captain Faulkner, of the Zebra, ran his ship close to the fort, landed his men and, in conjunction with the men landed from the rest of the squadron, escaladed and took the fort. (Campbell, vol. vi., p. 417, and James's Naval History, vol. i., p. 218.) This was a very brave and gallant action, certainly, but has nothing whatever to do with the question of the superiority of the broadsides of ships of war over 'land batteries.

The action of the Winchester, mentioned in paragraph 23d, is thus mentioned by James, in his very detailed work written for the purpose of glorifying the English Navy:-"In 1794, Lord Garlies laid the Winchelsea frigate within half musket-shot of the enemy's batteries, and soon silenced the guns." (Vol. i., p. 221.) No particulars as regards the number of guns, the batteries mounted, their construction, &c., are given, and that the affair was very unimportant we may conclude from the manner in which James mentions it. Brenton, also an English Naval Historian, and better authority than James, calls the "batteries " a battery. In all probability a little fieldwork, thrown up in haste and imperfectly constructed.

The next instance in point of time is, "The Cape of Good Hope by the British fleet. The Cape has been twice taken by the English, but on both occasions by armies landed for the purpose; first, in 1795, by troops commanded by Generals Clarke and Craig; and the second time, in 1805, by an army under Sir David Baird. On "both occasions battles were fought with the Dutch before the colony surrendered. (Campbell, vol. vi., p. 446, and vol. viii., p. 74.)

As to Malta, mentioned in paragraph 11th, it was surrendered to the French in 1798 without opposition, and in consequence of French influence with the Knights. (Scott's Napoleon, vol. iv., p. 61.)

Paragraph 19th refers to the passage of the Dardanelles in 1807 by Admiral Duckworth. This was not a contest between ships and forts, but, like the

entrance into the harbor of Rio Janeiro, already mentioned, an attempt to pass through a strait defended by fortifications. The remarks which were made in that case will apply to this. The expedition, however, was a failure, as the object (which was the destruction of the Turkish fleet) the admiral did not dare attempt. In his official despatch, the admiral states that, had the Turks been allowed another week to complete their fortifications on the Dardanelles, it would have been very doubtful whether the return passage could have been effected at all. (See Sir John Duckworth's official letter, and Campbell, vol. viii., p. 97.)

According to Mr. Powell's own statement, the capture of Curaçoa, in 1807, by Sir Charles Brisbane, has nothing to do with the question as to the relative strength of forts and the broadsides of ships; but it will not be useless to say a word or two as to this capture. The fort was surprised and taken by escalade during the absence of the commanding officer and a large portion of the garrison. To show what chance of success there would have been in a contest with the forts, we will merely insert a paragraph from an account of the capture by Captain Brenton, of the English Navy. He says: "Ahead of our ships stood Fort République, which might have sunk every ship in half an hour." (See Brenton, vol. ii., p. 204, and a letter from Sir Charles Brisbane himself, in the United Service Journal, 1829, p. 676.)

Paragraph 15 states: The British fleet forced the passage by Flushing and took the city, in 1809." The fleet did run past the city towards the close of the siege, and, considering that the river there is two miles wide, this is not at all surprising. The place was regularly besieged and taken by an army of 17,000 men. A detailed account of the siege may be found in the notes to Jones's Journals of Sieges in Spain.

Paragraph 28 states, of the attack on Fort Washington, on the Potomac, during the last war: "But the fortress on the Potomac, which had more than 'two guns behind a parapet,' and was well placed, like the case cited by the reporter at Cape Licosa, had a good garrison, nay, when all the requisite

conditions were fulfilled,' was evacuated by the fire of two hostile frigates."

Mr. Powell, in this passage, quotes from the report of the Military Board, and evidently chuckles at the home thrust he gives its reporter. James, the English naval historian, thus relates the circumstances of the case :"On the 27th, the squadron arrived abreast of Fort Washington. The bomb-ships immediately began throwing their shells into the fort preparatory to an attack the next morning by the two frigates. On the bursting of the first shell the garrison was observed to retreat." (Vol. vi., p. 312.) The officer commanding the fort was afterwards tried and cashiered for cowardice.

We are then told that "the Mobile fort surrendered to a force landed from ships." Why this circumstance should have found a place in Mr. Powell's enumeration we cannot imagine. That forts have been, times without number, taken by forces on land, is well known, and why the important fact that the forces had been previously landed from ships should make a difference, is what we are at a loss to conceive.

The next instance brought forward is Algiers, which it is said, “has been five times bombarded into submission by ships of war." To bombard a town situated, like Algiers, directly on the sea shore, is a very different thing from a contest with the guns of fortifications. When a town is so placed, a single ship may take up a position at a distance of three miles from it and every bomb thrown from her will fall in the town, which may be thus set on fire and burnt; and, at such a distance, the ship would run but little risk from shells thrown at her, especially by such unskilful artillerists as the Algerines. We suppose the attack in 1816, by Lord Exmouth, is included in the five bombardments. This, however, was an affair very different from a bombardment, and we reserve it as well as the attack on St. Jean d'Acre, also cited by Mr. Powell, for subsequent examination.

To swell the long lists of the triumphs of fleets over fortifications, the recent victories of the English over the Chinese are enumerated!-the poor Chinese, almost entirely ignorant of everything relating to artillery and gunnery, and who fancied that by clashing their swords together, so great a noise would

be made, that the English would be frightened and run away.

We have now, we believe, examined every instance adduced by Mr. Powell except two, Nos. 14 and 16 of this ennumeration"-the first, the capture of Senegal by the French, and the second, the capture of Mocha, by one English frigate. We find this capture of Senegal scarcely noticed by the authorities we have consulted, and, therefore, conclude that the affair was unimportant; and as regards the capture of Mocha by the English, with one frigate, it deserves a place by the side of their Chinese victories.

There is still one instance which has been omitted, that of Constantinople, which, it is stated, was once taken by the Venetian fleet. We have looked over the history of Venice for mention of this exploit, and the only account we can find having a bearing that way, is, that the Crusaders, with important aid from the Venetian fleet, took Constantinople in 1204, before the invention of gunpowder-a case, it must be confessed, remarkably in point.

In this long catalogue of nearly fifty instances, it has been shown that there are but five which deserve mention at all. Of these five we reserve two, St. Jean d'Acre and Algiers, for further remark; and of the remaining three, it is clearly shown that the results of two, viz., the capture of Porto Bello in 1739, and of Guadaloupe in 1759, were owing to cowardice on the part of the defenders. As to the remaining instance, that of Chagres in 1740, we refer to the remarks already made in relation to it. We might here, so far as Mr. Powell's document is concerned, close these remarks, but as, in other quarters, ideas have been advanced indicating doubts as to the relative strength of fortifications and ships of war, we will say a few words on the subject.

In the Report of the Military Board, from pages 16 to 28, accurate accounts of many actions between ships of war and land batteries are given, all proving the very great superiority of the latter. We will enlarge a little upon what has been said in that Report with respect to two memorable instances. The first and most important is the great attack on the water batteries of Gibraltar in 1782. Never was an ex

periment on a grand scale more complete, and never was a result more clear and decisive. The combined energies of France and Spain were put forth to wrest this fortress from England. Forty thousand land troops, commanded by a most distinguished general, and forty-seven sail of the line, besides frigates and smaller vessels, constituted the force of the besiegers. For nearly three years every effort had been vain, and the last and greatest was to be the attack with floating batteries. Mr. Powell chooses to undervalue these floating batteries by calling them "hulks." They were all that the skill and ingenuity and treasure of France and Spain could make them. Willingly would the allies have sacrificed twenty of their best ships of the line to have effected the reduction of the fortress. In fact, Campbell tells us that one of the plans for reducing it was, that the whole fleet should attack the place by water at the same time with a land attack by the army, and it was hoped that, by this plan, the fortress might be captured, with the loss perhaps of ten or twenty ships of the line and a proportional number of troops. This plan was abandoned as impracticable, and that of an attack by floating batteries substituted. These batteries were made bomb-proof by means of sloping roofs of timber, their sides were made so thick as to be shotproof, and, by filling in the sides with wet sand and cork, thoroughly soaked, and by a system of pipes circulating through the sides, which pipes were, by pumps, kept constantly full of water, it was supposed that they had been made proof against red hot shot. About ten in the morning of the 13th September, the ten ships sailed over and took up their positions at distances varying from 500 to 1200 yards from the batteries of the fortress. They carried, on the broadside opposed to the batteries, 142 heavy guns, and the whole number firing on the fortress, including the land batteries of the besiegers, was upwards of 300. To these were opposed, on the part of the besieged, 80 cannon, 7 mortars, and 7 howitzers, the fire being principally directed against the battering ships. The cannonade commenced at about ten, and on the part of the ships was powerful and well sustained. The garrison commenced using red hot shot at twelve, but their

use was not general until between one and two. Some of the ships were soon discovered to be on fire and the greatest exertions were made by their crews to extinguish the flames. At 7 or 8 in the evening, the fire had increased so much on board the ships that their cannon ceased firing, and during the night and the next morning, six of them blew up and the remaining four, their magazines having been drowned, were burnt to the water's edge. The injury done to the fortifications during the engagement was trifling, and, out of a garrison of 7500 men, there were but 15 killed, and 68 wounded. Was ever the result of any action more conclusive? To one not blinded by prejudice it proves, beyond a doubt, supposing the relative state of land and naval artillery to be as in 1782, that, at similar distances, a contest between land batteries and ships will always result in the destruction of the latter. For the facts stated we refer to Drinkwater's detailed account of the siege, and Campbell's Naval History.

The second of the instances referred to above, is the attack on Fort Moultrie in 1776, by the British squadron, under Sir Peter Parker. Fortunately for the cause we are supporting, this memorable instance occurred in our own country. The attending circumstances are familiar to all of us; we all can appreciate the difficulties under which the little garrison labored, and no American will doubt that, what they so nobly did on that occasion, our countrymen, under more favorable circumstances, can do again. To render the account of this action more striking, we will give it in the words of an English Naval Historian, Campbell. In volume 5th, page 376, he says: "Everything being settled between the commanders, by sea and by land, the Thunder bombship took her station, covered by an armed ship, and began the attack by throwing shells at the fort. The Bristol, Solebay, Experiment, and Actæon, soon after brought up and began a most furious and incessant cannonade. The Sphynx, Syren, and Actæon, were ordered to the westward between the end of the island and Charleston, partly with a view to enfilade the works of the fort and, if possible, to cut off all communication between the island and the continent, and partly to interrupt all attempts, by means of fire-ships or other-

wise, to prevent the grand attack. But this design was rendered unsuccessful by the strange unskilfulness of the pilot, who entangled the frigates in the shoals called the Middle Grounds, where they all stuck fast, and, though two of them were speedily disengaged, it was then too late to execute the intended service. The Acteon could not be got off, and was burnt by the officers and crew to prevent her stores and materials from falling into the hands of the enemy. Amidst the dreadful roar of artillery and continued thunder from the ships, the garrison of the fort stuck with the greatest firmness and constancy to their guns, fired deliberately and slowly, and took an effective aim. The ships suffered accordingly, and never did our marine, in an engagement of the same nature with any foreign enemy, experience so rude an encounter. The springs of the Bristol's cable being cut by the shot, she lay for some time so much exposed to the enemy's fire that she was most dreadfully raked. It is said that the quarter deck of the Bristol was at one time cleared of every person but the commander, who stood alone, a spectacle of daring firmness which has never been exceeded, seldom equalled. The fortifications being exceedingly strong, and their lowness preserving them from the weight of our shot, the fire from the ships produced not all the effect which was hoped or expected. The fort, indeed, seemed, for a short time, to be silenced, but this proceeded only from a want of powder which was soon supplied from the continent. The night, at length, put an end to the attack of the fleet. Sir Peter Parker finding all hope of success at an end, and the tide of ebb nearly spent, called off his shattered vessels after an engagement of ten hours." The force of the British fleet in the action thus described by one of their own writers, was two 50 gunships, four frigates of 28 guns each, and several smaller vessels; in all, 276 guns. To these were opposed, on the part of the Americans, 26 guns, many of which were of small calibre. The loss in the two 50 gun ships alone, was 190 killed and wounded, whereas in the fort there were but 32 killed and wounded. The distance at which the action was fought was within the point blank range of heavy guns, consequently less than 700 yards. Our

authorities for these facts are Ramsay (American) and Beatson (English). In his Naval History of the United States, vol. 1st, page 133, Cooper, whom no one would accuse of a bias against the Navy, says of this action: "It goes fully to prove the important military position, that ships cannot withstand forts, when the latter are properly armed, constructed, and garrisoned General Moultrie says, that only thirty rounds from the battery were fired, and was of opinion, that the want of powder alone prevented the Americans from destroying the men of war."

At the risk of being too prolix, we cannot refrain from mentioning three other instances of conflicts between shipping and forts, two of which have not been referred to in the Report of the Military Board.

James (vol. 2d, page 116) states, that, in 1798, May 7th, a French squadron consisting of 52 gun-brigs and flat bottomed boats, attacked a redoubt in the island of St. Marcouf, on the coast of France. The enemy had eighty bow guns, of which many were long 36's, and none, it is believed, below long 18's; while the guns on land, which could be brought to bear against them, were in number nineteen, consisting of four 4 pounders, two 6 pounders, nine 24 pounders, two 32 pounders, and two 68 pounders carronades. The gun-boats took up their stations at between 300 and 400 yards from the redoubt. The attack was repulsed, with a considerable loss to the assailants, while the loss in the redoubt was but five killed and wounded.

In 1814, as stated by the United Service Journal for 1833, a French 80 gun ship attempted to silence a small battery of one 18 pounder and one 5 inch howitzer near Antwerp. The ship took her position at 600 yards from the battery and commenced firing, and although, from the direction of the embrasures, the howitzer only could be brought to bear upon the ship, after a cannonade of five hours, she was obliged to haul off, with a loss of fortyone killed and wounded, besides having sustained serious injury in her hull and rigging.

The last instance we will mention is the attack on Fort Bowyer, near Mobile, in September, 1814. This was a small, temporary work, mounting only twenty guns, of which the greater part