for religion. In short, you may find all access to any species of philosophy, however pure, intercepted by the ignorance of divines. But any one who properly considers the subject will find natural philosophy to be, after the word of God, the surest remedy against superstition, and the most approved support of faith.

90. Again, in the habits and regulations of schools, universities, and the like assemblies, destined for the abode of learned men and the improvement of learning, everything is found to be opposed to the progress of the sciences.

91. The advancement of science is the work of a powerful genius; the prize and reward belong to the vulgar, or to princes, who, with a few exceptions, are scarcely moderately well informed. It is not wonderful, therefore, that little success has attended that which has been little honoured.

92. But by far the greatest obstacle to the advancement of the sciences, and the undertaking of any new attempt or department, is to be found in men's despair and the idea of impossibility.

95. The bee extracts matter from the flowers of the garden and the field, but works and fashions it by its own efforts. The true labour of philosophy resembles hers, for it neither relies entirely or principally on the powers of the mind, nor yet lays up in the memory the matter afforded by the experiments of natural history or mechanics in its raw state, but changes and works it in the understanding.

96. Natural philosophy is not yet to be found unadulterated, but is impure and corrupted; by logic in the school of Aristotle, by natural theology in that of Plato, by mathematics in the second school of Plato, that of Proclus and others, which ought rather to terminate natural philosophy than to generate or create it.

98. Learned, but idle and indolent men, have received some mere reports of experience, traditions, as it were, of dreams, as establishing or confirming their philosophy, and have not

hesitated to allow them the weight of legitimate evidence. Nothing is rightly inquired into, or verified, noted, weighed, or measured in natural history. Indefinite and vague observation produces fallacious and uncertain information.

100. We must not only search for and procure a greater number of experiments, but must also introduce a completely different method, order, and progress of continuing and promoting experience.

105. The induction which proceeds by simple enumeration is puerile, leads to uncertain conclusions, and is exposed to obvious danger from one contradictory instance, deciding generally from too small a number of facts, and those only the most obvious.

But a really useful induction for the discovery and demonstration of the arts and sciences should separate nature by proper rejections and exclusions, and then conclude for the affirmative after collecting a sufficient number of negatives. Now this has not been done, or even attempted, except, perhaps, by Plato, who certainly uses this form of induction in some measure, to sift definitions and ideas. The assistance of induction is to serve us, not only in the discovery of axioms, but also in defining our notions.

109. Referring to the discovery of gunpowder, silk, and the compass, he says: "That no previous knowledge could have led to either discovery, and affirms that neither discovery was the result of philosophy or reasoning, but of chance and opportunity." He ventures to think that many excellent and useful matters yet treasured up in the bosom of nature will be brought to light for the benefit of man.

110. He emphasises the enormous importance of the discovery of printing, and says: "It appears at first incredible that any such discovery should be made, and when it has been made it appears incredible that it should so long have escaped men's research."

112. Men have hitherto dwelt but little, or rather only

slightly touched upon experience, whilst they have wasted much time on theories and the fictions of the imagination.

113. He bids others to take courage from his own example, who, being much engaged in public business and not very strong in health, yet found time to work out and expound his new system of scientific investigation.

115. "Here, too," he says, "we should close the demolishing branch of our instauration, which is comprised in three confutations (1) The confutation of natural human reason left to itself, (2) the confutation of demonstration, (3) the confutation of theories or received systems of philosophy and doctrines."

129. The empire of man over things is founded on the arts and sciences alone, for nature is only to be commanded by obeying her. Only let mankind regain their rights over nature, assigned to them by the gift of God, and obtain that power whose exercise will be governed by right, reason, and true religion, and all will be well.

130. We are of opinion that if men had at their command a proper history of nature and experience, and would apply themselves steadily to it, and could bind themselves to two things, viz.-(1) To lay aside received opinions and notions; (2) to restrain themselves, till the proper season for generalization, they might, by the proper and genuine exertion of their minds, fall into our way of interpretation without the aid of any art.

BOOK II.
APHORISMS.

On the interpretation of nature, or the reign of man.

I. The aim and labour of human power is to generate a new nature or natures upon a given body; that of human knowledge is to discover the form or true difference of a given nature, or the nature to which such nature is owing, or the source from which it emanates.

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II. True knowledge is that which is deduced from causes. The division of causes into four (by Aristotle) is not amissmatter, form, the efficient, and end or final cause.

Although nothing exists in nature except individual bodies, exhibiting clear individual effects according to particular laws, yet in each branch of learning, that very law, its investigation, discovery, and development, are the foundation both of theory and practice. This law is what we understand by the term "Form."

III. He who is acquainted with "Forms" comprehends the unity of nature in substances apparently most distinct from each other. From the discovery of "Forms," therefore, results genuine theory and free practice.

IV. There is a most intimate connexion and almost an identity between the ways of human power and human knowledge. In order to generate and superinduce any nature upon a given body, e.g., the yellow colour of gold upon silver, or tenacity in glass, we will lay this down as the genuine and perfect rule of practice that it should be certain, free, and preparatory, or having relation to practice.

And this is the same thing as the discovery of a true "Form." For the "form" of any nature is such, that when it is assigned the particular nature infallibly follows.

Such then is our determination and rule with regard to a genuine and perfect theoretical axiom, that a nature be found convertible with a given nature, and yet such as to limit the more known nature, in the manner of a real genus. But these two rules, the practical and theoretical, are in fact the same.

VI. In all generations and transformations of bodies we must inquire what is in the act of being lost and escaping, what remains, what is being added, what is being diluted, what is being contracted, what is being united, what is being separated, what is continuous, what is broken off, what is urging forward, what impedes, what predominates, what is subservient, and many other circumstances.

Nor are these enquiries again to be made in the mere generation and transformation of bodies only, but in all other alterations and fluctuations we must in like manner enquire—what precedes, what succeeds, what is quick, what is slow, what produces, and what governs motion, and the like.

VII. Labour is well and usefully bestowed upon the anatomy of organised bodies, such as those of men and animals, which appears to be a subtile matter, and a useful examination of nature. It is obvious, and of ready access, when compared with the real anatomy of latent conformation in bodies which are considered similar, particularly in specific objects and their parts, as those of iron, stone, and the similar parts of plants and animals, as the root, the leaf, the flower, the flesh, the blood and bones, &c.

We must examine what spirit is in every body, what tangible essence; whether the spirit is copious and exuberant, or meagre and scarce, fine or coarse, &c., &c.

VIII. This method will not bring us to atoms-the theory of the Epicureans and others—which takes for granted the vacuum and the immutability of matter, neither of which hypotheses is correct, but to the real particles such as we discover them to be.

Let none be alarmed at vast numbers and fractions; for, in calculation, it is as easy to set down or to reflect upon a thousand as an unit, or the thousandth part of an integer as an integer itself.

IX. From the two kinds of axioms above specified arise the two divisions of philosophy and the sciences:-Physics and metaphysics.

Parallel to these, let there be two practical divisions; to physics that of mechanics, and to metaphysics that of magic in the purest sense of the term.

X. The object of our philosophy being thus laid down, we proceed to precepts.

The signs for the interpretation of nature comprehend two