ordinary Rules and Methods of Confcience and Religion; it confults only legal Utility, and never matters it, provided the Publick may be the better for't, tho' the Inftruments and Managers go to the Devil. In fhort, it is moft certain that Reafon of State is a very devilish thing under a fpecious Name, and a Cover for all Wickednefs. What are Allian ces and Ruptures, but Temporary Expedients? And the ordinary Reafons of War and Peace, are very little better than Banter and Paradox.

Laws with Penalties are made for the Government of the Simple and the Weak, like Cobwebs to catch Flies, but Power is the Law of Laws, and there's no difputing with it, but upon the Swords Point.

'Tis matter of Prudence, to have a care not to out-do ones Mafter. All Superiority is odious, but in a Subject over his Prince, it is ever Foolish or Fatal: An accomplish'd Man conceals vulgar Advan tages, as a modeft Woman hides her Beauty under a negligent Drefs. There are many who will yield in good Fortune, or in good Humour; but no body will yield in good Wit, and leaft of all a Sovereign. Princes are willing to be affifted, but not furpaffed, thofe who advise them, ought to fpeak, as if they put them in mind of what they forgot, and not as teaching them what they knew not,

Religion is a kind of two Edged Sword in the Hands of a Man of Might, that cuts both ways alike, and it is either right or wrong, or wrong or right, as occalion ferves. Power, in fhort, is Beauty, Wit, Courage, and all good things together in one, where Slaves and Paralites are Judges.

We

We read in History, that most Princes, who have been in the apprehenfion of Confpiracies, have taken the courfe to meet and prevent them by Punishment and Revenge; but I find very few who have reaped any advantage by this proceed Xing, and whoever finds himself in this danger, ought not to expect much either from his Vigilancy or Power; For how hard a thing, is it for a Man to fecure himself from an Enemy, who lies conceal'd under the Countenance of the most officious Friend we have? and to difcover, and know the Wills, and inward thoughts of those who are continually doing us Service? And Moreover, this continual fufpition, that makes a Prince jealous of all the World, muft of neceffity be a strange Torment to him.

*There are few inftances found in Story, of a Prince that began and atchieved any great and Famous Enterprife after Fifty years of Age; whether the decline of Nature leaves not Vigor enough for fuch Designs or A&tions; or Fortune, like her Sex, have no kindness left for Old Men, how much foever he favour'd them when they were Young.

*The safety of a Prince, is never fo firm and well established upon any other bottom, as the general Safety, and thereby fatisfaction of the Common People, which make the bulk und ftrength of all great Kingdoms, whenever they confpire and unite in any common Pallion or Intereft: For the Nobles without them, are but like an Army of Officers without Soldiers, and make only a vain fhew or weak noife, unless raifed and encreafed by the Voice of the People; which for this Reafon, is in a common Latin Proverb, called the Voice of GOD.

* As

As Clemency is produced by Magnanimity, and Fearleffness of Dangers, fo is Cruelty by Cowardife and Fear; and argues not only a depravedness of Nature, but also a meannefs of Courage and imbecillity of Mind; for which reafon it is both hated by all that are within its reach and danger, and defpifed by all that are without.

*There is not any thing more dangerous for a Prince, than to confult only with Perfons that he thinks are of his own mind, or will be fo when they know it; nor more pernicious in a Councellor, than to give only fuch Advices as he thinks most agreeable to him that asks, or receives them.

We do fo willingly flip the Collar of Command upon any pretence whatever, and are fo ready to ufurp upon Dominion, and every one does fo naturally afpire to Liberty, and Power, that no Utility whatever, derived from the Wit or Valour of thofe he does imploy, ought to be fo dear to a fuperiour, as a downright and finćere Obedience. To obey more upon the Account of Understanding, than of Subjection, is to corrupt the Office, and fubvert the Power of Command.

* The Common Subjects of a Kingdom, are not fo apt to trouble theinfelves about the Rights and Poffeffion of a Crown, as about their own; and feldom engage in the quarrels of the firft, but upon fome general and ftrong apprehenfion that the laft are in danger.

Some make the quaintnefs of their Wit to confift in employing bad Inftruments." A dangerous Point of Honour, and worthy of an unhappy iffue. The Excellence of the Minifter has ne

ver leffened the Glory of the Master: on the contrary, all the Honour of the fuccefs, rebounds upon the Principal caufe, and in like manner, all the Blame; for Fame always founds the Praises of the firft Authors. Therefore a Prince muft endeavour to chufe his Minifters well, fince on them depends the immortality of his Reputation.

* Government can no more fubfift without Subjection, than the Multitude can agree without Government: And the duty of obliging, is no lefs of Divine Appointment, than the Authority of Commanding.

Princes may be faid in fome fence, to Command every thing that they do, and to forbid every thing that they do not; their Example has an attractive Power to draw others after them: Both their Virtue and their Vices spread themselves over all their Dominions, and are, in fome measure, eternized by imitation. The leaft Crime that they commit, renders them guilty of a Thousand others; and all the Virtues with which they are adorned, are inceffantly reproduc'd in the Hearts of an infinite Number of Perfons that are ambitions of refembling them.

They who give the firft Shock to a State, are voluntarily the firft over-whelm'd in its Ruin. The Fruits of Publick commotion are feldom enjoy'd by him who was the firft Master: He only troubles the Water for anothers Net う and beats the bush whilft another gets the Hare.

As the abfence of an ill Prince feldom fails of railing Difquiets and Commontions among the People in a Government which is obey'd only from fear, fo nothing contributes more to the Satisfaction and Obedience of Subjects, than the

prefence

prefence of a good King; and this is the reafo why all diftant Provinces, govern'd by Commi fions, or fubordinate Authorities, are fo fubjec to frequent Seditions and Revolts, how lawfull foever they are Inherited, or how well foeve they are Established, after any new Conqueft, on Acquifition; the Force and influence of Autho rity, growing ftill weaker by the change of Hands and distance of Place.

* To have been privy to the Secrets of Super riours, has been the undoing of many. Confi dence, is not the favour, but the impoft of a Prince many break their Looking-Glafs, becaufe it fhows them their Uglinefs. A Prince cannot abide to see the Man, who may have feen him; and the witness of an ill art, is always ill look'd upon. He that has entrusted his Secret to another has made himfelf his Slave: And in Sovereigns, it is a violence that cannot laft long; for they are impatient to redeem their loft Liber ty. In a word, the beft Maxim for Secrets, is, neither to hear them, nor tell them.

"Princes are generally kept fo much in the "Dark, as to Things, and have fo feldom a. true "Character given them of Perfons, that 'tis a won"der they commit no greater Errors, either in "the management of Affairs, or in the choice of "their Ministers.

A Prince fhould conftantly reflect that he Governs Men, and that he himself is but a Man.

*Reafons of State are fo very intricate, that a Good Minifter can hardly be a good Man.

The Affability of fome Great Men, is to make us believe their Goodness greater than their For

tune.

*Courage