a beautiful figure in itself; it becomes sublime, when I contemplate eternity under that figure-The Beautiful is the perfection, the Sublime the suspension, of the comparing Power. Nothing not shapely (formosus: nam etiam musicé suam habet formam) can be called beautiful: nothing that has a shape can be sublime except by metaphor ab occasione ad rem. So true it is, that those objects whose shape most recedes from Shapeliness are commonly the exciting occasions.-Beauty itself is perhaps a compound-or rather an Indifferential or Equatorial Point or Permanence and Progress, Identity and Alterity considered wholly in respect of der Erscheinung. Solgar has, I think, injudiciously begun with the highest, perhaps the non-existent. Had he begun with the lowest (for the argument is wholly analytical) he might perhaps have traced an ascent that would have presented the Beautiful as a varying harmony or union of the shapely and the Vital. Even Shapeliness in lifeless things,-as in crystals, metals, etc., approximates to the lively: and hence we call it beautiful, as in gems. In the living, where we expect Life, the more shapely (i. e. regular figures) would offend us-they would be not indeed deformed but yet enormous. Further, Deformity in the sense of Disformity is contrary to the Shapely: the Ugly to the Lovely. But Beauty has and can have no opposite. For it is the mid-point, and not a Pole.

Pp. 28 and 29, with all the doctrine of resistance to Fate & Nature, and the rest of the hyper-tragic histrionic Stoicism borrowed from late Theories of the Greek Drama, appear to me-Stuff Stuffless! The Fearful or Frightful by itself is destructive of the Sublime, as I felt in the high mouldering steep earthy cliffes at Muddiford. P. 31. Solgar confounds an accompaniment of the Sublime with the Sublime itself. I know the feeling, he speaks of, right well; and it requires and deserves an investigation into its nature. The vividness of sense such as that sense is passing into sensation, when sense and sensorial activity has been suppressed and so accumulated-aided by the indefinite of the Sublime but not a component part.-In the following paragraphs I suspect it is a different feeling, arising out of the Interesting (in the Liebliche)-est inter me et rem aliquid.

Generally indeed I complain of the German philosophers (as we are most apt to complain of our dearest Friends)-of the Post

Kantians at least-for the precipitance with which they pass to their own determinations of what the thing is, without having first enquired what the word means when it is used appropriately. Whenever I can convince a man that another term would express his meaning far more unexceptionally, the term used was not appropriate. But the rule is that the same word should not have heterogeneous or even disparate senses. Thus instead of asking, Was Schönheit sey? I would enquire what Schön properly meant-i. e. what men mean when they use the word schön in preference to any other epithet. A rose is a pleasing sight: and so to a hungry man is a Hogspudding. But a rose is beautiful,— ergo, beautiful means something else or something more than pleasing. The difference is not in the degree-for add to a keen appetite a long involuntary abstinence from animal food, and as particular predilection, the Hogspudding will become tenfold more pleasing without advancing a single step towards Beauty. In this way I would proceed with all the other phrases that are confounded with beautiful, because perhaps they join in some common effect or because they are often in juxtaposition, etc. till I had exhausted the meanings of these words, and of course, discovered that one meaning which the word, beautiful, and that word alone, peculiarized and expressed. And this, if I mistake not, is the true Socratic method: assuredly that which best suits the Dialogue form, which only the analytic suits at any time, but this species of analysis, i. e. desynonymizative, best of all-it so naturally arises out of conversation. The synthetic, on the contrary demands the paideutic continuous form. We want a classification of words sadly-into the universals as applying to all the acts of the human Being-2. the generals, subdivided into the sensuous, intellectual, moral, 3. the words appropriate to each particular sense, at least, to the imperfect, Taste, Smell, and the organized Touch, Sight, Hearing, etc., etc. Thus pleasure, dový, voluptas, could wiselier be appropriated to the senses, Joy, evppoovn, laetitia, to the Intellect. Bliss, Beatitudo, μakapιorns, to the Moral Being-True it is & not to be forgotten, that in reality there exists no such divisions— even in the sense of smell, and among Epicures of Taste, there may be found analogies of the higher senses. The smell of the sweet Briar has a fineness, one would almost call elegant, the Rose a beautiful odor-but then in so doing you have organized the sense

itself Whereas the smell of the myrtle is a voluptuous smell, properly. Sir H. Davy has by long practice so organized the sense of smelling as completely to unsensualize it.-P. 38 Sölgar first leads Erwin into false positions, in explanation of a true position, and then deduces consequences from the former for the purpose of confuting the latter. Ex. gr.-Die Siele used as Ich: whereas the arguments required no mention of Soul, but if of any, it must be the Soul of Nature. Besides, it is a sophism to unbeautify Beauty, because the sense Beauty unsustained a tergo as it were, by something nobler could not long sustain itself as the sense of Beauty-And yet, there are exceptions to this as too frequently in the instance of eminent Musicians, whose Moral Being is injured by the exclusive attention to Beauty without destruction or apparent decrease of the sense of the Beautiful.

[III. Taste *]

The same arguments that decide the question whether Taste have any fixed Principles may probably lead to the determination what those Principles are: First then, what is Taste, in its metaphorical sense? Or what will be the easiest mode of arriving at the same solution, what is there in the primary sense of the word, which may give to its metaphorical meaning an import different from that of Sight or Hearing, on the one hand, and of Touch or Feeling, on the other?-And this question seems the more natural because in correct Language we confine Beauty, which is the main object of Taste, to objects of Sight and combinations of Sounds and never except sportively or by abuse of words say a beautiful flavor, or beautiful Scent. Now the analysis of our senses in the commonest books of anthropology have drawn our attention to the distinction between the perfectly organic, and the mixt sensesthe first presenting objects to us, as distinct from the perception, the latter as blending the perception with the sense of the object. Our Eyes and Ears-we are not now considering what is or is not the case really, but only what we are regularly conscious of, as appearances our eyes most often appear to us perfect organs of the sentient principle, and wholly in action-and our Hearing is so much more so than the three other senses, and in all the ordi

Egerton 2800, pages 76-77.

nary exertions of that sense perhaps equally so with the sight, that all languages place them in one class, and express their different modifications by nearly the same metaphors-the three remaining senses appear in part passive, and combine with the perception of the outward object a distinct sense of our own Life. Taste therefcre as opposed to Vision and Sound will teach us to expect in its metaphorical use a certain reference of any given object to our own Being, and not merely a distinct notion of the Object as in itself, or of its independent properties-(From the sense of Touch, on the other hand, it is distinguishable by adding to this reference to our vital Being some degree of Enjoyment or the contrary, some distinguishable Impulse from Pleasure or Pain to complacency or dislike while Feeling as opposed to Touch is too wholly passive, not sufficiently organic, not distinctly or necessarily referring to an Object without us-The sense of Smell indeed might perhaps have furnished a metaphor of the same import with that of Taste; tho' the latter was naturally chosen by the majority of civilized nations on account of the greater frequency, importance, and dignity of its employment or exertion in human nature. By Taste therefore, as applied to the fine arts, we must be supposed to mean an intellectual perception of any object blended with a distinct reference to our own sensibility of pain or pleasure, or vice versa a sense of enjoyment or dislike co-instantaneously combined with an appearing to proceed from, some intellectual perception of the object. Intellectual-for otherwise it would be a definition of Taste in its primary rather than its metaphorical sense-Briefly, Taste is a metaphor taken from one of our mixed senses, and applied to objects of the more purely organic senses, and of our moral sense, when we would imply the co-existence of immediate and personal Dislike or Complacency-In this definition of Taste therefore is involved the definition of [the] fine arts as being such whose chief and discriminative Purpose it is to gratify the Taste that is not merely to connect but to combine and unite a sense of immediate pleasure in ourselves with the perception of external arrangement.

The great question, therefore, whether Taste, in any one of the fine arts, have any fixed Principle or Ideal will find its solution in the ascertainment of two facts-whether in every determination of the Taste concerning any work of the fine arts the Individual

does not, with or even against the approbation of his general Judgment, involuntarily claim that all other minds ought to think and feel the same-whether or no the common expressions, "I dare say, I may be wrong but this is my particular Taste" are uttered as an offspring of courtesy, as a sacrifice to the admitted fact of our individual Fallibility or whether they are spoken with an entire sincerity, not only of the reason but of the whole Feeling; with the same entireness of mind and heart with which we concede a right to every individual to differ from another in his preference of bodily Tastes and Flavors. If we should find ourselves compelled to deny this, and to admit that notwithstanding the consciousness of our liability to error and in spite [of] all these many individual experiences which may have strengthened this consciousness, each mind does not at the moment [?] so [?] far [?] legislate for all minds as to believe of necessity, that he is either right or wrong-and that if it be right for him, it is universally right, we must then proceed to ascertain whether the source of these phenomena is at all to be found in those parts of our nature, in which each intellect is representative of all and whether wholly, or partially. No person of Common reflection demands even in feeling, that what tastes pleasant to him ought to produce the same effect on all living Beings; but every man does and must expect and demand the universal acquiescence of all intelligent Beings in every conviction of his understanding from simple ... State College of Washington.