Here the words of the last line "die durch ihr Eingeweide sich wanden" parallel Whiston's phrase above "contained in the bowels of it."

In one feature, however, Bodmer departs from Whiston. According to the New Theory, page 257: "The constitution of the antediluvian air was thin, pure, subtile, and homogeneous, without such... heterogeneous mixtures as occasion thunder (and lightning)... in our present air"; moreover, this homogeneity and tranquillity of the air, Whiston declares,14 probably continued "for the first five entire months of the Deluge." Not so in the Noah. Even at the beginning of the Flood Bodmer prefers to imagine the following elemental disturbances to have been present:

Öfters erhellte die tötlichen Schatten ein schlängelndes Blitzen,

Breit wie ein Strom and kreuzend vom Aufgang zum Untergang, Donner Brüllten mit schmetternder Stimm. (Noah, p. 231.)

As I have stated elsewhere, Klopstock represents another one of Bodmer's sources; 15 in this particular deviation from Whiston's conception of diluvial conditions I would see the influence of Klopstock, who in the Messias likewise represents the Deluge as accompanied by storm and thunder.16

For his treatment of the comet as the physical cause of the Flood Bodmer, as already remarked, seems to have drawn for certain suggestions also upon some of the writings of Newton. With this chapter of his literary indebtedness I hope to deal on another occasion.

University of Iowa.

14 Cf. ibid., p. 260.

15 Cf. my article Bodmer and Milton in the Journal of English and Germanic Philology (1918), pp. 589-601.

10 Cf. the Messias, II, 28. I intend elsewhere to point out some of Bodmer's more important borrowings from Klopstock's epic.

UNPUBLISHED FRAGMENTS ON AESTHETICS BY

S. T. COLERIDGE

EDITED BY THOMAS M. RAYSOR

1

These fragmentary essays on aesthetics are gleaned from a volume of Coleridge manuscripts which the British Museum acquired from Ernest Hartley Coleridge in 1895. Nearly all of the material in the manuscripts was published by H. N. Coleridge in Literary Remains, but something which will be of interest to students still remains. Those shorter fragments which deal with literary criticism rather than aesthetics I hope to publish in the near future.

[I. The Nature of Beauty 2]

Definition. The universal Condition of Beauty in the beautiful or beauty-exciting Object is, that the Form of this Object shall appear to be a product of an intelligent Will, not wholly or principally as intelligence, but as Living Will causative of reality: in other words, of Will in its own form as Will. Corollary. The Will is the proper productivity or productive Power. Therefore the above Condition is implied in the Position-Every Form of Beauty outward and objective must be contemplated as a PRODUCT.

2. But Will may exist in a form in which the Intelligence is not only subordinate but latent-i. e. implied and to be inferred, but not evident. In this sense it is, that Life is a Will, a form of Will-and Spontaneity a function of living Will.-Corollary. The first is seen or felt with greatest facility or rather it is only seen with pleasurable facility when it exists in connection and combination with the second. Therefore every beautiful Object must have an association with Life-it must have Life in it or attributed to it-Life or Spontaneity, as an action of Vital Power.

3. The Beautiful, which demands the Spontaneous, forbids the arbitrary and as partaking of the arbitrary, the accidental. For the Arbitrary is an exclusion of Intelligence.-But the Will can not appear in its own form without Intelligence, contained tho' subordinated. Hence Life and Spontaneity will not of themselves but only as Secondaries, constitute the Beautiful.

1

1 Egerton 2800.

2

Egerton 2800, pages 67, 68, 70.

4. Hence, fourthly, the Beautiful excludes the distinct consciousness (which, n. b. is what we mean by the conscious Presence of the forms of the Understanding-for these are determined by a logical necessity-and likewise because in the process of the Understanding not an ultimate end, i. e. an end in which the mind is to rest-but means are considered-of course, therefore, not the Unity resulting but the mode of the conspiration of the manifold to the One. But the direct Contrary is the character of the Beautiful. The Manifold must be melted into the One and in all but the lowest or simplest Products must be felt in the result rather than noticed a beautiful Piece of Reasoning-not beautiful because it is understood as true; but because it is felt, as a truth of Reason, i. e. immediate, with the facility analogous to Life. In these instances, the Will is translucent thro' the Reason-There is a duplicity of Form which can only be rendered intelligible by the transparency of a ground color thro' another superficial coat. Elucidate by the sudden Light which the apprehension of a master thought will shoot thro' on a long Link of Reasoning-Ay, now— I see it, all at once. This is quite beautiful!-The same applies, when we speak of a beautiful piece of machinery-this we never do, till the whole process of the Understanding of it is completed, and the mind rests from its labor in the fruition of all. N. B.— Thus with the spirit as with the Body-Effort, Fatigue, are the accompaniments of one or more particular Faculties being exerted.

5. The case of the machine induces and requires another contradistinction of the Objective Beautiful. There must be a fitness, indeed, for to be unfit is to contradict Intelligence or Reason, which are to be implied not opposed-The trunk hides but does not contravene the Root-There must be a Fitness, but not a fitness to another Object; but a fitness to the Subject, i. e. the mind-and again not to the Subject in relation to this or that Constituent Power but to the total Subject, as shown in the first Lecture. Consequently, Fitness of means to other means or medial ends acts here negatively; it dare not be so absent as to be noticed as absent. Thus the absence producing a mental presentness.-illustrated by Cato's Omitted Image in the triumphal Procession.

6. But the fitness to the total Subject must not appear as the product of Design-and for this there are three Grounds. First, the Product would then be contemplated as a machine or tool

second, because the Will would not appear in its own form, but in the form of the Understanding-and third and lastly, because (as will be more fully explained hereafter) there must be a double correspondency of the object, to the Subject producing as well as to the Subject in which the Idea is to be re-produced. Therefore, what is equal to A in the latter must be likewise equal to A in the former. The conclusion is that Design must exist in the equivalence of the result, Virtual Design without the sense of Design. And this the Artist expresses by the term, Felicity, and the power of felicitous production generally is Artistic Genius. G- [indecipherable] is a very clever sort of Artist-of that sort, namely, which is half-brother to the Artisan.

7. But there is yet another reason & this, the most important of all, it being indeed the Evolute [?] of all the preceding Conditions The Fitness must not be a conspiration of component but of constituent Parts, not of parts put to each other, but of distinct but indivisible parts growing out of a common Antecedent Unity, or productive Life & Will. It must be an organic not a mechanic fitness-Whatever is necessary for a clear & distinct Insight into the difference of an Organ from a machine, of a living muscle from a Rope, or of a Heart from a fencing Punch [?] is no less requisite to a full comprehension of the conditions of the Beautiful. And hence it is that the Automaton in his demonstration of the Human Frame has at once before him Instances and Illustrations of Artistic Beauty. Nothing can show more plainly the truth of No. I and II, namely the presence of Will as Will, of Life and Spontaneity in the beautiful, than this Fact. Nothing could tend more to confirm a former position-that every work of Fine Art is a Language, the essence of which is that it cannot be divided from the meaning (the Mind) it transfers, without ipso facto ceasing to be a Language-So here the Product is inseparable from the Productivity-for Life is so definable-and Beauty and Life then [?]

The product, I say, indivisible from the Productivity, the Parts from each other and from the Antecedent productive Unity-As the whole is thus [?] alone the Counterfact of the One, the Whole must be everywhere present.

Love-We shall master the Idea of Love, when having assumed

that Love Beauty + Interest, we find the solution of the following Problem.

First, Immediateness being an essential and indispensable character of Beauty, and Immediateness and Esse inter being not opposites but contraries, how can they be united otherwise than by the destruction or suspension of the one or the other?

We must therefore discover, a Beauty that is not incompatible with an Interest. And at the same time an Interest not incompatible with Beauty.

Now these would be comprized in the problem generalized.

To find an Interest, i. e. a medium that is nevertheless immediate

This [?] must be therefore-1. Whil[e] not partial, an interest of the whole Being [?]. 2. As such it must involve the potential as well as the actual. 3. The potential must even predominate (For so only can the Will appear as in its own form.-etc., etc., etc. But the result will be to reveal the close analogy of Love and Beauty, and thus at once to present the likeness and the distinction of the Lovely and the Beautiful.

In short, in whatever direction we look, as long as we place ourselves within the sphere of the Good, we discern nothing but balances with Life & living Balances.

[II. Solgar's "Erwin"3]

P. 27 [?] This strikes me like making difficulties for difficulty's sake. First, I do not admit the Annäherungstrieb to be an essential of Beauty; but on the contrary the equilibrium or suspension both of the Annäherung and the fliehende. There where the appearance is perfect, we stop: neither is Desire, no, nor even Love, the correspondent of Beauty per se, but Complacency. Secondly, the difference of the Sublime and Beautiful is a diversity. They are not opposites, like Sweet and Sour, admitting of all proportions of intermediates, but contraries, like sweet and bitter. In neither can I discover any use of Trieb or Impulse or Tendency. I meet, I find the Beautiful-but I give, contribute, or rather attribute the Sublime. No object of Sense is sublime in itself; but only as far as I make it a symbol of some Idea. The circle is

* Egerton 2800, pages 71-72.